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ABSTRACT
The United States pharmaceutical industry is a dynamic organizational system
populated by organizations pursuing different strategies to reach different goals. The aim
of this dissertation is to examine the organizational field of the pharmaceutical industry to
determine if categories of pharmaceutical organizations exist based on organizational
strategy. This project applies the theoretical constructs of organizational fields and
institutional logics developed by institutional theorists to examine the institutional effects
on organizational strategies. This is a mixed methods project using historical analysis,
latent class analysis, and case studies to evaluate the drug development process. The
findings of this study show field level institutions do affect organizational strategy and
contribute to organizational diversity within a field. However, the findings suggest the
influence of institutional logics is neither straightforward nor without organizational
costs. The general findings of my research show organizations benefit when their
dominant logic aligns with the dominant logic of the field; while, misaligned logics
require organizations to pursue alternative tactics to legitimize their strategies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Several highly publicized events have raised public concern over organizational
practices within the United States pharmaceutical industry during the past few years. One
of the most recent incidents was the accusation of price gouging by executives at Turning
Pharmaceuticals last fall (Ramsey 2015); however, the practice of acquiring the patent
rights on a drug and then raising the drug’s price to generate profits is not uncommon. In
2011, Gilead spent $11 billion to acquire Pharmasset Inc., a small biotech company
started by researchers at Emory, for the intellectual property rights to the hepatitis C drug
it was currently testing (Tirrell 2011). Gilead currently prices Sovaldi, the brand name of
the approved hepatitis C drug, at approximately $84,000 for a 12-week treatment course
(Express Scripts 2015). Gilead publically argued the high cost of the drug was due to the
high cost of research and development; however, the available information on Pharmasset
Inc. indicates the research cost for developing Sovaldi up to phase II clinical trials was
only between $300 and $500 million (Sachs 2015).
The Sovaldi case reveals two reasons behind the high cost for prescription drugs
in the United States (1) market factors of speculation and (2) pharmaceutical corporations
acting strategically in pursuing organizational goals. As a small research company,
Pharmasset Inc. lacked the organizational capacities of a large multinational corporation,
such as Gilead, to manufacture and mass market a product. Pharmasset approached
Gilead in 2004 with a buyout offer after the compound for Sovaldi had been developed

1

but prior to the completion of clinical testing. However, rather than make an offer
significantly lower than the eventual purchase price, Pharmasset’s founder and largest
stock holder quoted $400 million as an acceptable offer at the time, Gilead waited until
clinical trial data showed Sovaldi was a marketable product before making the acquisition
bid (Berkort 2011).
This example indicates the United States pharmaceutical industry is a dynamic
organizational system populated by organizations pursuing different strategies to reach
different goals. The aim of this dissertation is to examine the organizational field of the
pharmaceutical industry to determine if categories of pharmaceutical organizations exist
based on institutionalized organizational strategy. This project applies theoretical
constructs developed by institutional theorists to examine how expectations from
different stakeholders create organizational fields of institutional pluralism legitimating
multiple organizational strategies.
Institutional theory research in organizational studies seeks to understand
organizational behaviors within the broader cultural context of a society. Key areas of
work within the theory are the institutional logics perspective and organizational fields.
The institutional logics perspective argues organizations align with societal logic orders,
whereby it is possible to identify which logic order dominates an organization’s strategy.
The organizational field is an analytical tool for evaluating how actors outside an
organization influence organizational behavior. Organizational field researchers examine
power relations to identify key stakeholders and the methods employed externally that
influence organizational strategy.
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Drawing from an historical analysis and prior organizational research, I argue that
the organizational field of the pharmaceutical industry in the United States is composed
of several key stakeholders: pharmaceutical corporations, the federal government, third
party payers, professional medicine, and patients. These stakeholders coexist in an
interdependent system with varying levels of power that allow certain stakeholders
influence over other stakeholders and the ability to shape field structure. Drawing from
the institutional logics perspective, I propose that these stakeholders adhere to different
logic orders, which results in an organizational field of institutional pluralism that
legitimates multiple organizational strategies.
I use a mixed methods approach to evaluate my propositions by conducting three
distinct research projects. First, following the recent work of Neil Fligstein and Doug
McAdam (2012) that sought to develop a cohesive field theory approach for institutional
analysis, I conduct a historical analysis of the United States pharmaceutical industry. The
purpose of the historical analysis is to show that the pharmaceutical industry is a distinct
organizational field and to examine the changing field dynamics to identify the logic
orders and key stakeholders in the current field. The second project is a quantitative
analysis using a dataset of information on approved new drug applications by the Food
and Drug Administration and annual corporate financial data from a sample of
pharmaceutical corporations between 1997 and 2014. The purpose of the quantitative
analysis is to examine the sample of pharmaceutical corporations for latent classes and
determine if the identified factors of organizational strategy act as mechanisms creating
organizational heterogeneity within the field. The final research project is four case
studies drawn from the classes identified through the latent class analysis. The main
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purpose of the case studies is to evaluate if differences in organizational strategy can
explain class separation. The second purpose of the case studies is to compare the
identified organizational strategies with the framework of institutional logics to evaluate
if logic orders differ between classes.
This dissertation is organized around these three research projects. Chapter 2
presents an overview of institutional theory in organizational studies. I review the
literature on the specific components of the theory that are relevant to my work and list
the guiding questions of the project as well as the more detailed theoretical propositions
that I evaluated. Chapter 3 examines the major contemporary stakeholder relationships in
the pharmaceutical industry. Since this project was focused on pharmaceutical
organizations, I restricted my analysis to the direct relationships between pharmaceutical
organizations and the other main stakeholders in the field: the Food and Drug
Administration, professional medicine, patients, and the pharmaceutical supply chain.
Chapter 4 is the historical analysis. In this chapter, I present evidence showing the
pharmaceutical field developed as the result of distinct historical events and collective
action by the key stakeholders mentioned above. The changing field dynamics over the
past century indicate the field structure was continually reshaped by external factors and
altering power relationships in way that allowed multiple organizational strategies to
emerge.
Chapter 5 is the quantitative analysis of the drug submission and corporate
financial data. I use factor analysis to evaluate the data for latent constructs that can be
identified as organizational strategies. I use the identified strategies to build a structural
equation model that represents a coherent latent strategic framework within the field. The
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final model provides the variables used to conduct a latent class analysis that reveals two
organizational categories.
Chapter 6 is four cases studies, two from each latent class. Analysis of the case
studies provides contextual data on the specific organizational strategies of organizations
in each class. The qualitative data indicates the dominant institutional order of
organizations differs between classes, but that this difference is not the sole factor driving
class separation. The final chapter is a comprehensive evaluation of the historical,
quantitative, and qualitative data. My central conclusion is that institutional effects do
result in divisions within the field based on latent organizational strategy; however, it is
the processes of legitimation, rather than logic orders, which drive organizational
subgrouping in the field.
This project provides several contributions to the organizational studies literature.
One contribution is a novel approach to mixed-methods analysis that addresses the
challenge institutional theorists face in measuring institutional effects (Greenwood et
al.2014, Schneiberg and Clemens 2006, Scott 2014, Thornton et al. 2012). Bazeley’s
(2015) review of mixed methods research published in the top organization and
management journals revealed that most previous work utilizes a priori qualitative
analyses to inform the direction of quantitative research. This introduces the potential of
selection bias if the observed differences are not causal to the category separation. For
this project, I sought to reverse the common practice by using a quantitative analysis to
direct the qualitative analysis. Rather than relying on a priori indicators of institutional
orders, I sought to evaluate if a latent class analysis would indicate existing subgroups
within the field using common organizational practices as indicators. This methodology
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aligns with the conceptual approaches proposed by researchers in the strategy-as-practice
literature (Vaara and Whittington 2012).
Another contribution to the literature is that this study addresses the issue recently
raised by Greenwood et al. (2014) that current organizational research focuses primarily
on the construction and maintenance of institutions rather than how institutions actually
effect organizations. Recent scholarship in the field of family business has illustrated how
the intersection of family and market institutions directly effects organizational strategy
in family firms, creating strategies that differ from publically traded companies (Cannella
et al. 2015, Gomez-Mejia et al 2011). While these studies in family business cut across
industry categories, my project adds to the literature by exploring the effects of
institutional pluralism on organizations within the same industry.
The findings of this study show institutions do affect organizational strategy and
contribute to organizational diversity within a field. The data indicate common
organizational practices do form coherent and divergent organizational strategies within a
field. However, the findings also suggest the influence of institutional logics is neither
straightforward nor without organizational costs. The general findings of my research
show organizations benefit when their dominant logic aligns with the dominant logic of
the field; while, misaligned logics require organizations to pursue alternative tactics to
legitimize their strategies.
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CHAPTER 2
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL STUDIES
2.1 Introduction
Sociologists argue that institutions are pivotal social phenomena that have
multidimensional effects on society; but institutions are latent constructs, which
complicates research seeking to understand their affects (Berger and Luckmann 1967,
Parsons 1980, Scott 2014, Weber 1978). Institutional theory is a branch of organizational
studies that focuses on analyzing institutional effects on organizations. The broad goal of
institutional theory is to understand how institutional effects produce similarities or
facilitate differences between organizations in the same environment. Through the
application of institutional theory as a framework for analysis, previous researchers have
gained valuable insights on organizational processes and structures (DiMaggio 1991, Rao
et al. 2003, Scott et al 2000). Moreover, recent developments and studies using
institutional theory indicate the theory continues to hold value for future work
(Greenwood et al. 2014, Powell and Sandholtz 2012, Quirke 2013).
The goal of this project is to explore if institutions influence the strategy of
pharmaceutical corporations. Institutional frameworks become incorporated into
organizational fields through stakeholder evaluations and expectations, and differences in
stakeholder power can lead to contradictions within a field as organization’s struggle to
develop a consistent strategy to meet competing demands (DiMaggio 1991, Scott et al
2000). The pharmaceutical industry in the United States is an organizational field with
7

competing institutional frameworks where multiple stakeholders hold different interests
in the outcomes of pharmaceutical research and on the behaviors of pharmaceutical
corporations.
Organizational strategy is one element of organizational behavior theoretically
subject to institutional effects. I choose to focus on organizational strategy because unlike
other aspects of organizational behavior, such as informal organizational culture, strategy
is constrained by the basic functions of an organization. The basic practice of a research
based pharmaceutical corporation is to develop marketable drugs that are advancements
over current treatments to improve patient lives. Since research based pharmaceutical
organizations operating in a capitalist market need to meet this expectation for survival,
identifying strategies used to achieve this goal provides a good source of material for
examining institutional effects. My central question is that if different institutional logics
exist within the organizational field and provide legitimacy to a range of strategies, then
will pharmaceutical corporations adopt different strategies of drug development or is
there a dominate institutional framework creating isomorphic pressure to adopt strategy.
As an exploratory project, I constructed two guiding questions drawn from the literature
to serve as the general frameworks of the analysis.
Question 1: Do multiple institutional logics exists in the pharmaceutical
organizational field and serve as potential sources of legitimacy for different
organizational strategies?
Question 2: Is pharmaceutical development an interorganizational1 negotiation
between field stakeholders whereby strategic action by pharmaceutical

1

The term interorganizational denotes organizational processes that require organizations to cooperate,
collaborate, or interact directly to achieve a desired outcome at either the firm or organizational field level.
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corporations is necessary to address the claims of the other stakeholders in the
field: regulators, physicians, patients, and investors in order for a new product to
be successfully legitimized and adopted?
These questions frame my central arguments as an institutional analysis project and
position pharmaceutical corporations as the site of evaluation within the organizational
field. From these general questions, I develop two sets of specific theoretical
propositions, presented later in the chapter, to evaluate the quantitative and qualitative
data collected.
The counter argument to institutional theory is that organizational strategy results
from the aggregate of individual choices; therefore, similarities between organizations are
the result of market constraints or opportunities specific to industry and organizational
types but not attributable to latent conceptual frameworks. The organizational
environment affects strategy through options for action presented to managers following
rational decision-making processes not influenced by ideological trends or culture (March
1988). Organizational success or failure, then, depends on the ability and skills of
organization members over normative evaluations by outside stakeholders. This
framework for organizational studies treats organizational strategy as calculated and
impersonal but this stance is problematic because organizations are composed of
individuals who bring differing perceptions and connections with the social world into
the organization (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Selznick 1949). Even within the same

For example, the interaction between the FDA and a pharmaceutical corporation seeking approval for a
new drug is an interorganizational situation.
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company, the rational decision of one manager might not be viewed as rational by
another manager.
The embeddedness of individuals within culture implies that broader social
ideologies become incorporated into organizations; therefore, the perspective of
organizational strategy as constructed by aggregating individual choices is rather sterile.
Institutional theory offers a framework for explaining organizational strategy that
recognizes the complexity of interactions between individuals, organizations, and society
and provides the tools for analyzing how similarities between organizational strategies
can result from societal level forces outside of the individual’s direct perception. This
chapter provides a brief history on institutional analysis in organizational studies and
discusses the contemporary theoretical concepts from institutional theory applied to
explore organizational strategy in the U.S. pharmaceutical field.
2.2 Early Perspectives in Institutional Analysis and Organizational Studies
Institutional analysis is fundamental to the discipline of sociology and a topic
discussed by many classical theorists. Emile Durkheim reified institutions as social facts
reflecting collective understanding and affecting individual behavior. In the preface to the
second edition of The Rules of Sociological Method, he advocated institutional analysis
as central within the discipline writing, “sociology can then be defined as the science of
institutions, their genesis and their functioning” (1981: 45). Max Weber contributed the
process of rationalization and ideal types to institutional analysis while additionally
recognizing the interdependent quality of their relationship with society (1978). Weber’s
detailed analysis of bureaucratic structure and authority systems was foundational to
multiple branches of organizational studies (Perrow 1986). The work of Karl Marx
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demonstrated a multilevel institutional analysis between capitalist economies,
organizations, and workers (Adler 2009). Finally, Scott (2014) noted Herbert Spencer’s
application of an organic framework to social systems, highlighting the concept of
interdependence between systems components, as seminal to understanding modern
sociological work on institutions.
Later scholars in the 20th century appropriated these classical insights on
institutions within their research agendas and began focusing on the institutional analysis
of organizational behavior. Talcott Parsons (1980) integrated the concepts of Weber and
Durkheim to develop his functional perspective that highlighted institutionalization as a
key force creating and maintaining social order and solidarity. His AGIL model, based on
functionality within a system, proposes organizational behavior develops from a link
between functional requirements and structural arrangements. Berger and Luckmann
(1967) incorporated institutionalization into their broad perspective on the social
construction of reality, arguing that institutions act as elements of social control by
shaping individual perception and knowledge through channeling conduct in
predetermined directions. Organizational strategy then is viewed a product of pre-existing
cultural expectations. Parsons’ and Berger and Luckmann’s conceptualizations on
institutionalization framed institutions as macro-level elements for analyzing the
construction of social structure and how organizations are integrated into societies.
Other modern theorists incorporated the institutional perspectives of classical
scholars into their frameworks for understanding organizations as units of analysis. Philip
Selznick was one of the most important figures in the early school of institutional
analysis (Scott 2014). Selznick’s (1949) classic study on the Tennessee Valley Authority
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proposes organizations can become institutionalized through a “process of organic
growth, wherein the organization adapts to the strivings of internal groups and the values
of the external society” (Perrow 1986: 167). Selznick’s work, and that of his students,
demonstrated that while organizations hold formal and official goals, interactions with
interests internal and external to the organization result in organizations being guided by
objectives other than those officially promoted (Scott 2014). Organizational strategy then,
instead of being merely a means to an end can become the end in itself when
organizational behavior becomes oriented to self-sustainment.
The work of James March and Herbert Simon (1958) represents another important
branch of organizational studies. March and Simon focused on the decision-making
process within organizations and, following Weberian thought, attempted to incorporate
rationalization into their explanations of organizational strategy (Perrow 1986). Their
work focused on how organizational structure simplified decision-making for individuals
by restricting the number of appropriate choices. The “garbage can” model is their wellknown concept of organizational strategy and argues solutions are generated every day
and stockpiled, thrown in the garbage can. When managers encounter problems, rather
than delegating employees to find a solution, they pull a pre-existing solution out from
the garbage can. The “garbage can” model represents the most significant contribution of
March and Simon’s work, the application of bounded rationality to organizational
strategy, that lead to richer analytical techniques for empirically analyzing the allocation
of attention in organizations (March 1988, Scott 2014).
Another pivotal contribution of Selznick, March and Simon, and their
contemporaries was expanding the field of organizational research by reframing
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organizations as open systems as opposed to previous scholars who analyzed
organizations as closed entities. This development allowed researchers to incorporate
non-organizational factors from the external social environment into explanations of
organizational behavior. An example of later work drawing on these developments is
Paul Hirsh’s (1975) comparative study between the phonograph record industry and
pharmaceutical manufacturing, which demonstrated the ability of organizations to control
aspects of their external environments that affect profitability. Importantly, Hirsh (1975)
showed how these external factors could be products of social construction, such as the
social prestige of the industry, in addition to technical or material factors. His findings
indicated organizations within each industry developed similar strategies while the
strategies were different between industries.
Some critics of these early open system researchers, however, pointed out their
work was still focused on explaining organizational strategy from the point of individual
organizations instead of considering organizational strategy as a product of collective
behavior. For example, Selznick’s research on the TVA was viewed as typical of the
exposé style research conducted by early institutionalists (Scott & Davis 2016). Perrow
(1986), for instance, criticized the early institutional school for this, stating the “school’s
view of organizations and society fails to connect the two” (173). This line of criticism
paved the way for the development of three notable theoretical frameworks in the 1970s:
resource dependency, population ecology, and institutional theory, which sought to
address the complex interdependent relationship between organizations and their
environments by analyzing multiple organizations to find patterns of behavior.
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2.3 Neoinstitutional and Institutional Theory in Sociology
Contemporary institutional theory is a field of organizational studies that frames
organizations as open systems embedded within the larger social structure of a society.
The value institutional theory adds to organizational studies is the understanding that
cultural factors, such as differences in power relations between stakeholders, impact
organizational strategy on multiple levels by affecting individual perceptions of
legitimate organizational activities and goals, the role of organizations within society, and
the social structure supporting or constraining organizations (DiMaggio 1991, Fligstein
1991). Institutional theorists seek to understand how institutions and institutional
processes in the organizational environment collectively affect organizations instead of
focusing on explaining behaviors as firm specific behaviors (Scott 2014).
2.3.1 Early Works and Theoretical Cohesion
The origins of contemporary institutional theory lie in four studies conducted
during the late 1970s and early 1980s. While these four articles overlap conceptually,
they were not written intentionally as a cohesive collection for an emerging theoretical
paradigm. They are now considered the foundational works of the “new institutionalism
in organizational analysis” not only because of their direct influence on subsequent work
but because DiMaggio and Powell (1991) grouped them together as the first section of
their edited volume intended to delineate neoinstitutionalism as a distinct research
paradigm. As DiMaggio and Powell pointed out in the introduction to their anthology,
one of the needs for the book was to distinguish and consolidate sociological
institutionalism from the institutional work of scholars in other disciplines. To facilitate
this goal, they categorized work beginning with Meyer and Rowan’s 1977 article
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“Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony” as new
institutionalism, or neoinstitutionalism, while older work was labeled old institutionalism.
However not every scholar accepts that there is a theoretical distinction between
old and new institutionalism. Philip Selznick (1996), who DiMaggio and Powell labeled
as a prominent old institutionalist, notably objected to this categorization scheme and
instead argued the work of current institutionalists represented the expansion and
development of sociological institutionalism in general not the emergence of a distinct
research paradigm. While there continues to be scholarly debate between the demarcation
of the terms new institutionalism and neoinstitutionalism, the work of sociologists in
institutional theory since these early papers has become theoretically cohesive and
recognizable as a distinct research field within organizational studies in general
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991, Hall and Taylor 1996, Tolbert and Zucker 1996, Scott
2014). I agree with Selznick’s point that the term neoinstitutionalism is a semantic
distinction rather than the demarcation of a novel theoretical field, so I use the general
term institutional theory throughout this project to represent the collective work within
this branch of organizational sociology.
The first pivotal article of institutional theory is the classic paper by John Meyer
and Brian Rowan (1977) who departed from existing organizational research paradigms
by emphasizing how organizations were guided by both informal (symbolic) and formal
(rational) properties. Meyer and Rowan’s research revealed that the importance
organizations place on symbolic value could extend to an organization adopting an
institutionalized practice even if it decreased operational efficiency. At the same time,
organizations can engage in the processes of decoupling, which is the public adoption of
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a practice without implementing it. Decoupling provides organizations with a crucial
advantage because it “enables organizations to maintain standardized, legitimating,
formal structures while their activities vary in response to practical considerations”
Meyer and Rowan (1977: 357). Meyer and Rowan framed institutionalism as a social
mechanism external to the organization and functioning as a rational myth that generated
isomorphism, organizational uniformity, within the organizational environment.
“Institutionalization involves the processes by which social processes, obligations, or
actualities come to take on rulelike statues in social thought and action” (Meyer and
Rowan 1977: 341). In other words, organizations will adopt practices because of
normative pressures to avoid the social label of a deviant or non-adopter.
Tolbert and Zucker (1996: 178) derived three major effects Meyer and Rowan’s
article had on research at the time connecting organizational behavior to institutions:
organizations are driven to adopt formal structures regardless of their efficacy to increase
legitimacy and survival, the social evaluation of an organization is partially an evaluation
on the appropriateness of the organizations formal structure, and the relationships
between daily activities and formal structure may be negligible or “loosely coupled.”
Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) work represented a key departure from other organizational
studies by focusing on the impact of symbolic structures in organizational behavior and
moving organizational studies beyond analyzing organizations individually to analyzing
organizations as embedded in relational networks.
The second important article on institutionalization is by Lynne Zucker (1977),
who was a student of Meyer’s (Scott 2014). Zucker (1977) drew on the then recent
developments in ethnomethodology to develop a micro-level understanding of
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institutionalization as a process that she tested in a laboratory experiment. Zucker (1977)
argued institutionalization was a process of objectification involving three aspects of
cultural persistence: transmission, maintenance, and resistance to change. The importance
of Zucker’s (1997) work was in operationalizing institutionalization as a measurable
property and reframing institutions as a variable of degrees, rather than a binary event.
Assessing institutional effects through a continuum allows researchers to study how
institutions produce differences between organizational strategy rather than treating
institutional effects as uniformly homogenizing. In her later work, Zucker developed an
expanded model of the institutionalization process that included innovation,
habitualization, and sedimentation as additional components to objectification (Tolbert
and Zucker 1996).
One of the most well cited and influential articles of institutional theory (and the
only work of institutional theory I’ve seen covered in an introductory sociology textbook)
is Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell’s (1983) article on institutional isomorphism.
DiMaggio and Powell elaborated on the macro level nature of institutional effects on
organizational strategy by arguing institutions act as isomorphic factors on firms. They
defined three mechanism of institutional isomorphism: coercive, mimic, and normative.
Coercive isomorphism occurs through external acts of regulation. Mimic isomorphism is
the result of uncertainty resulting in organizations adopting the practices of successful
organizations to deal with ambiguity. Finally, normative isomorphism is the result of
cultural affects, primarily stemming from professionalization. Together these pressures
operate to create organizational homogeneity.
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In their seminal work on institutional isomorphism, DiMaggio and Powell also
proposed the concept of organizational fields as a framework for the institutional analysis
of organizations. Organizational fields are defined as “those organizations that, in
aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and
product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar
services or products” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983:148). The utility of the organizational
field framework for organizational studies is that framing organizational analysis around
an issue or process, as opposed to organizational types, reveals a wider range of
environmental factors and actors affecting organizational decisions; furthermore, the
organizational field framework underscores the need to consider historical context when
evaluating organizational behavior. As Scott (2014: 51) nicely summarized,
“Organizational fields help to bound the environments within which institutional
processes operate.”
The fourth foundational article is Richard Scott and John Meyer’s (1983) work
“The Organization of Societal Sectors.” In this article, Scott and Meyer proposed a
framework for the institutional analysis of organizations that was similar to DiMaggio
and Powell’s (1983) organizational field. Scott and Meyer created a typology perspective
arguing both technical and institutional forces shaped organizations and then proposed
the concept of societal sectors to understand this dynamic system. Societal sectors were
“defined to include all organizations within a society supplying a given type of product or
service together with their associate organizational sets: suppliers, financiers, regulators,
and so forth” (Scott and Meyer 1983: 129). Like the organizational field framework, the
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boundaries of societal sectors were functional, signifying that organizations operated in
interdependent systems not limited by geographic proximity (Scott and Meyer 1983).
2.3.2 Further Cohesion and Contemporary Directions
Several scholars since Powell and DiMaggio’s (1991) first attempt at
consolidation have developed other metatheoretical frameworks for institutional theory.
Richard Scott’s three pillars is one well-known model utilized by researchers to study
institutional effects on organizational strategy. Scott (1995, 2001, 2014) originally
proposed the three pillars almost 20 years ago as a method to integrate the major concepts
in institutional theory and since then has adapted and modified the framework to
incorporate developing research and criticisms. The basic argument of Scott’s framework
is that all institutions use the same set of processes to construct social structure and three
pillars categorize these processes: regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive. These
pillars are similar to the three isomorphic mechanisms identified by DiMaggio and
Powell (1983) but the pillars framework defines each pillar through multiple dimensions
as an analytical approach for evaluating the distinct processes that lead to the
construction of organizational strategy and the effects of institutional intersections on
organizations.
The regulatory pillar gives prominence to the explicit regulatory processes of an
institution (Scott 2014). Organizational research applying the regulatory pillar focuses on
the rules, laws, and sanctions institutions impose and frames the logic of such institutions
as instrumental, or technical. Differences in power are important factors to measure
because coercion is the dominant mechanism of regulatory institutions. The normative
pillar focuses on how institutions construct rules and procedures as a relationship to
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social obligations (Scott 2014). The normative framework evaluates organizational
strategy as the result of appropriateness and organizational legitimacy is tied to moral
assessments made by actors within the institutional system. The cultural-cognitive pillar
stresses how institutions create meanings through shared conceptions of social reality
(Scott 2014). Orthodoxy is the cultural-cognitive mechanisms used to generate
compliance suggesting organizational strategy is the result of normative pressures
because deviant actions are simply inconceivable by decision-making actors within
organizations.
While distinctive features define the three pillars, Scott argued that “in most
empirically observed institutional forms, we observe not one, single element at work but
varying combinations of elements” (2014: 70). The three pillars framework views
specific institutions as composed of elements from all the pillars but Scott pointed out
current institutional analysis research tends to focus on explaining institutions through
only one pillar, which one varies by discipline and researcher interest. This is a
significant component of the framework because the misalignment of these pillars within
an organizational field can generate contradictions and conflicts leading to institutional
change (Scott 2014). The three pillars framework is a valuable analytical tool for
institutional analysis and studying institutional effects on organizations but it is not as
efficient for studying organizations subject to competing institutional claims, referred to
as situations of institutional pluralism. The institutional logics perspective is a
metatheoretical framework that better addresses the development of organizational
strategy under institutional pluralism.
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The origin of the institutional logics perspective is the article written by Roger
Friedland and Robert Alford (1991) for Powell and DiMaggio’s (1991) anthology
(Thornton et al. 2012). The article was a theoretical departure from the other works in the
book and proposed a logic of institutions framework that, while not immediately taken up
by other scholars, has become an important and distinct perspective within institutional
theory over the past decade (Thornton et al. 2012). Friedland and Alford (1991:248)
defined an institutional logic as “a set of material practices and symbolic constructions
which constitutes its organizing principles and which is available to organizations and
individuals to elaborate.” This conceptualization of institutions departed from the
contemporary perspectives by arguing that institutions were limited to a core societal
level set and that institutions encompassed material practices as well as symbolic
systems.
The most important aspect of the institutional logic perspective is the
conceptualization of society as an interinstitutional system, meaning that the institutions
within any given society are interdependent with one another and change subject to
historically contingent affects (Thornton and Ocasio 2008, Thornton et al. 2012).
Conceptualizing society as an interinstitutional system shifts the focus of analysis from
institutions as having homogenous effects on organizational strategy to analyzing
differences in organizational strategy as emerging from contradictions between
institutional orders (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). Instead of being subject to the effects of
a singular institutional order, organizations are reframed as affected by multiple
institutional orders, placing them in positions of institutional pluralism; however,
organizations are argued to align more strongly with one logic order over the others,
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resulting in the ability to categorize individual organizations by a dominant logic.
Differences between institutional orders result in conflicts at the organizational level and
produce heterogeneity within an organizational field because the salience of each logic
order varies between organizations and because organizations possess partial autonomy
that allows for organization in the same field to pursue dominant organizational strategies
aligned to different logics.
The concept of partial autonomy addresses how organizations negotiate
institutional contradictions. As Thornton et al. (2012) stated individuals and organizations
assume multiple roles and identities in society that can lead to contradictions between
identity and behavior. The concept of partial autonomy originates in the earlier work of
Meyer and Rowan (1977) on decoupling and proposes that while institutions constrain
actors, this constraint operates as a mechanism of degree providing actors with the ability
to loosely couple, or decouple, their identity from their behavior to negotiate
contradictions. Congruently partial autonomy also allows for organizational
heterogeneity because actors subject to the same competing institutional pressures have
the ability to respond differently. The institutional logics perspective is a valuable
expansion of institutional theory for conducting an organizational analysis in a complex
system because it departs from the earlier emphasis on the uniform effects of institutions
while still incorporating the significance of culture in affecting organizational strategy.
In summary, institutional theory has become a dominant paradigm in
organizational sociology (Scott 2014, Scott and Davis 2016, Thornton et al. 2012). Core
components include the recognition that symbolic and cultural mechanisms impact
organizations in multiple ways, that organizations are not isolated entities but embedded
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in complex interdependent systems, and that the effects of institutions operate on multiple
social levels with differing strengths between organizations in the same environment. The
remainder of this chapter focuses on the following four concepts within institutional
theory: institutions and institutionalization as a dynamic social process, organizational
fields as a level of analysis, legitimacy as a symbolic mechanism guiding organizational
behavior, and organizational decisions as strategic actions shaped by the cognitive
framework of institutional orders.
2.4 Institutions and Institutionalization
This project is an institutional analysis, which requires me to identify measurable
factors of institutional effects. It is difficult to measure institutions primarily because they
are latent social constructions. The difficulty of the task is compounded by the fact that
while institutions are a basic concept in sociology, researchers do not use a uniform
definition for the term nor is the scholarly usage of the concept consistent (Abrutyn 2014,
Clemens and Cook 1999, Hall and Taylor 1996, Jepperson 1991, Scott 2014, Thornton et
al. 2012). Therefore, it is necessary to review the various definitions of institutions and
institutionalization used in previous organizational studies and develop a definition of
institutions for this study that allows me to address the issues set forth in the guiding
questions.
2.4.1 Conceptualization of institutions in Early Institutional Theory
In general institutional theory in organizational studies adheres to a
constructionist frame of institutions as macro level social forces external to the
organization that affect organizational behavior through cognitive-cultural mechanisms
which both constrain and construct perceptions of normative processes and structures of
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action. The constructionist perspective of institutions in institutional theory originates
from the work of Berger and Luckmann (1967). They stated institutions were the result of
habitualized actions that become typified through reciprocation in social interaction; this
conceptualization frames institutions as predetermined patterns of behavior that are
historically contingent and mechanisms of social control (Berger and Luckmann 1967).
Institutionalization is a process of social interaction because many habits develop
in society but not all habits become institutions; institutionalization occurs only when a
habit becomes objectified (Berger and Luckmann 1967). Objectification is a state where
participants conceive of the action reflexively and when society members who are not
participants in the interaction recognize the habit (behavior) as distinct from the
individuals engaging in the activity. An institution then is a social mechanism external to
and coercive of the individual through normative processes (1967:58). The example
Berger and Luckmann (1967: 58) use to explain their concept is paternity. Paternity is
institutionalized because when a man states he is the father of a child, members within
the society who are strangers understand the meaning and associated role of that claim.
Ronald Jepperson’s (1991) article in Powell and DiMaggio’s anthology takes
Berger and Luckmann’s concept as a starting point for consolidating the various
definitions of institutions used in the institutional theory literature up to that point.
Jepperson’s article is now widely cited in the field as providing the definitive
conceptualization of an institution. According to Jepperson (1991), the core definition of
an institution is “an organized, established, procedure” (143) where “routine reproductive
procedures support and sustain the pattern” (145). Jepperson provides a list of common
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institutions in society ranging from social abstractions, for example marriage, to specific
behaviors, for example a handshake.
There are several key conceptual ideas behind Jepperson’s varied list about how
institutions should be defined and measured by researchers. First is “whether we consider
an object an institution depends upon what we are considering to be our analytical
problem” (Jepperson 1991: 146). Operationalizing institutions around the research
question frames them as relative constructs existing within a specific context; therefore,
an institution can be more than a binary state, an institution can be dimensional relative to
the framework of analysis, as Zucker (1977, 1991) argued. Another key point is that
because institutions are macro level structures they “are not reproduced by ‘action,’ in
this strict sense of collective intervention in a social convention” (145), rather Jepperson
argued that taking action is a departure from institutionalized behavior. As normative
constructs within social structure, institutional reproduction occurs through conformity
that makes action a deviation from expectations.
Jepperson (1991) viewed theoretical conceptions of institutions that defined
institutions primarily as taken-for-granted structures as problematic because the concept
taken-for-granted was ambiguous and framed institutions as background elements rather
than dynamic phenomena. Institutions do not just constrain actors; they also empower
actors creating a constraint/freedom duality. Jepperson stated institutions possess a takenfor-grantedness that is distinct from comprehension, conscious awareness, and
evaluation: “Institutions are taken for granted, then, in the sense that they are both
relative fixtures in a social environment and explicated (accounted for) as functional
elements of that environment” (1991:147). Institutions are taken-for-granted macro-level
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structures, but this is not their defining property; institutions create opportunities for
actions by providing alternative paths. These alternative paths are actions that have not
been institutionalized. Within organizational studies Jepperson noted rules and cognitive
frameworks are considered the basic elements of institutional effects but cautioned on
measuring institutions as property variables for legitimacy, formal organization, and
context since determining causality is problematic because institutions do not operate
solely as top-down mechanisms. This last viewpoint reflects the process of
institutionalization discussed by Berger and Luckmann (1967) that individual habits can
diffuse through society from bottom-up processes to become institutions.
Zucker (1977) pointed out a key factor of institutions in organizational studies is
how institutions persist even if they are suboptimal. Like Jepperson (1991), she viewed
institutionalization as a matter of degree, specifically between three processes: cultural
persistence, maintenance of culture, and resistance to change. Moreover, in agreement
with Berger and Luckmann (1967) she argued that institutions must be perceived as
exterior and objective to the individual. Zucker’s (1977) classic article focused on the
micro foundations of institutions and in the reprint for Powell and DiMaggio’s (1991)
anthology, she added postscripts that address some conceptual issues with definitions for
institutions in institutional theory since the publication of the original paper.
The importance of Zucker’s (1991) postscripts is two specific problems in how
the organizational literature treats macro level institutionalization. First, the existence of
institutionalization as a social factor is simply taken-for-granted; by this, she argued not
enough research focused on the organizational level to unpack the process of
institutionalization. Second, institutionalization was confounded with resource
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dependency perspectives; by this Zucker pointed out that the diffusion of technical
processes between organizations is not necessarily a result of institutional influence but
may represent the rational adoption of a technical advancement or innovation. In other
words, if a practice spreads through an organizational field, institutionalization should not
be the default explanation; the new practice could be a real improvement in
organizational practices that places non-adopters at a competitive disadvantage. Zucker’s
central point with these two critiques is organizational researchers need to pay attention
to the micro foundations of institutions to avoid treating institutions as black boxes at the
organizational level. Zucker took up her own critique a few years later by proposing a
component process of institutionalization that framed institutionalization as a stage
process, allowing for analysis of institutions at various points in their development
(Tolbert and Zucker 1996).
2.4.2 Conceptualization of Institutions from Outside Institutional Theory
Applying a clear definition of institutions is important for sociological analysis
because institutions link micro level processes of individual cognition with the macro
level processes of social structure. Mary Douglas (1986: 46) asserted, “minimally an
institution is a convention” which provides the cognitive structure to legitimize a social
grouping. Douglas’ (1986) perspective reflects the general framing of the concept in
institutional theory by arguing institutions are not just practical social arrangements,
which she contrast to an economic view, institutions have cultural meanings.
Institutions become embedded in society not as passive elements but as systems
that structure social life beyond daily routines (Douglas 1986). Douglas’ comparison of
wine classification between the Bordeaux region of France and Napa Valley vineyards
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illustrated how institutional systems defy rationalization because neither classification
system is logically superior and both created distinct cognitive schemas and industry
practices (1986: 105-108). What was important to the vintners in Douglas’ study was
how the institutional framework provided the means to construct categories of wine
within their region by structuring the knowledge of differences between wines. The
systems of wine classification also shaped the organizational identity of the vintners:
French wineries were defined by wine type while California wineries were categorized by
operational scale and scope. The fact these two categorization systems were not
compatible illustrates Douglas’ central point that institutionalization is not a process of
universal logics or economic rationalization but a culturally specific phenomena. The
effect of institutions to create and shape actors identities is a pivotal concept other
researchers have also found occurring in diverse settings including French cuisine (Rao et
al. 2003) environmental forestry organizations (Bartley 2007) and accounting firms
(Greenwood et al. 2002).
Douglas North (1990) applied the concept of institutions to organizational
strategy from an economic perspective. In North’s (1990) view institutions exist prior to
organizations as frameworks in which organizations develop and the relationship between
institutions and organizations is one of interdependence. “Both what organizations come
into existence and how they evolve are fundamentally influenced by the institutional
framework. In turn they influence how the institutional framework evolves” (North 1990:
5). A key aspect of North’s (1990) framework is how institutions function as constraints
and determine the opportunities in a society while leading to the creation of organizations
that take advantage of those opportunities. “The major role of institutions in society is to
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reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to
human interaction” (North 1990:6). North’s concept of institutions is more formal than
the other perspectives presented; however, this more structured relationship between
institutions and organizations is important to consider when conducting a quantitative
analysis of institutional effects on organizational strategy.
2.4.3 An Alternative Conceptualization of Institutions
Before condensing these perspectives on institutions and institutionalization into
the framework for this project, I think it is valuable to mention some dissenting
viewpoints on institutions. Seth Abrutyn’s (2014) recent work provides a concise
summary of the criticisms against the concept of institutions applied within much of
institutional theory and organizational studies. Abrutyn (2014) pointed out the concept of
institutions is not theoretically problematic for most sociologists but when confronted by
Jepperson’s (1991) list of institutions the question arises “Are institutions so broadly
defined that the differences between collectives, patterned action, role positions and
ideologies are less important that their similarities?” (6).
Abrutyn’s aim was not to dismiss the work of institutional theorists but to argue
these scholars overemphasize the cultural aspect of institutions by broadening the concept
of institutions to frame them as dynamic mechanisms around singular phenomena.
Abrutyn (2014) argued that there are a finite number of institutions and institutions are
distinct societal level phenomena that affect both structural and cultural elements. To
clarify Abrutyn’s position, a kinship system is an institution but marriage is not an
institution; marriage is only a component within a society’s kinship institution. Applying
Abrutyn’s definition to Douglas’ winemaker example results in neither winemaking
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tradition being an institution; instead, French winemaking becomes a component within
the French market institution and California winemaking becomes a component within
the American market institution. Hence, Abrutyn’s concept of institutions aligns with the
perspective of historical institutionalists who view institutions as broad and stable
societal level structures that are not reducible to smaller parts.
2.4.4 Conceptualizing Institutions for this Project
This project adheres to the dominant conceptualizations of institutions found in
the institutional theory literature. I conceptualize institutions as macro level phenomena
exerting influence on multiple social levels: individual, organizational, field, and societal,
and not limited to a small set of societal institutions. Institutions shape cognition through
both material and symbolic mechanisms. Institutions shape material aspects through
practices and cultural structures, and symbolically institutions provide meaning systems
for interpretation and understanding (Thornton et al 2012). Institutions create social
stability by laying out “the rules of the game” (North 1990), providing structure in daily
life that goes beyond simple routine. Institutions are more than social conventions; they
provide meaning and structure to social interactions beyond single events.
Institutions constrain perception and action but also support and empower actors
(Scott 2014) by providing mechanisms for agency. Institutions legitimize social
structures and behaviors but constrain actors by limiting choices to a range of legitimate
options. This form of social control is neutral but can create negative or positive
outcomes depending on social context. Institutions can provide paths for innovation when
actors find a more beneficial or rational process than the current one and require
conscious action to deviate from the taken-for-grated route. Institutions help reduce
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uncertainty and risk by providing templates for decision-making through the construction
of normative expectations. Institutions can also empower individual actors by providing
them with the context and tools to initiate change.
Institutionalization is a social process that, once achieved, embeds the institution
in society in a taken-for-granted manner; however, embeddedness does not guarantee the
institution will continue to exist. Deinstitutionalization can, and has, occurred (Dacin and
Dacin 2008, Davis et al 1994). Institutions change due to both endogenous and
exogenous factors; therefore an institutional analysis should frame the institution under
study as historically contingent (Thornton et al. 2012). Institutions are also subject to
change through collective behavior. These mechanisms indicate that while institutions
provide stability for society they not are stable phenomena themselves. Rather
institutional maintenance, or reproduction, is an active and interdependent process.
The institutions within a society are interdependent. Change in one institution can
diffuse into other institutions. This interdependence between institutions also means
actors can find themselves in positions where competing institutional demands create
contradictions for action. These situations can illuminate the salience of a specific
institution for making decisions as well as expose the complexity of the underlying
institutional structure.
I apply my conceptualization of institutions on two levels. First, I propose the use
of pharmaceuticals is institutionalized in U.S. society through the acceptance of what
some scholars refer to as pharmaceutical regimes (Busfield 2010, Conrad and Lieter
2008, Williams et al. 2011). The pharmaceutical regime is an institutional regime
whereby individuals accept pharmaceuticals as a legitimate treatment method for
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conditions of illness and disease or expect pharmaceutical usage to improve their general
quality of life. Institutional regimes occur around social phenomena when the
institutional rules and sanctions for inclusion exist outside of any specific organization
and monitoring occurs through collective action within a strategic action field (Jepperson
1991).
The purpose of utilizing the concept of pharmaceutical regimes is to construct the
boundaries of pharmaceutical development outside of pharmaceutical organizations. The
pharmaceutical regime exists at the societal level; therefore, the drug development
strategies of pharmaceutical corporations include the social negotiation for the inclusion
of a specific product into the regime, in addition to pharmacological development. The
acceptance of any one pharmaceutical product is not taken-for-granted but subject to
challenges requiring strategic action at the organizational level to convince other
stakeholders within the organizational field. This indicates that the structure of the
organizational field is dynamic with differing levels of influence between stakeholders
based on power and claims of authority. Therefore, for the inclusion of a new product
within the pharmaceutical regime it is necessary to legitimize a product to all of the
stakeholders.
The second conceptualization of institutions I propose comes from the
institutional logics perspective, which I discuss in detail later in the chapter. Here
institutions are conceptualized as combinations of social phenomena connected within a
dominant meaning system referred to as a logic order. Relevant to this project, these logic
orders serve to legitimize specific organizational structures and practices within society. I
assert the competing institutional logics within the organizational field result in
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pharmaceutical corporations adhering to a finite number of organizational strategies that
align with specific logic orders in order to gain legitimacy with the other stakeholders:
the Food and Drug Administration, medical professionals, patients, corporate owners, and
third party payers.
Logic orders serve as a normative force within an organization by creating the
templates for appropriate decision-making. Therefore, I propose that analyzing the
research and development decisions of a pharmaceutical corporation should reveal what
logic order dominates that organization’s strategy. My reasoning is institutionalization
results in organizational practices becoming routine, therefore, when analyzed over time
patterns of different practices should emerge within and between organizations.
2.5 Organizational Fields and Institutional Pluralism
The purpose for applying the organizational field framework in this project is to
frame pharmaceutical development as a collective process. Pharmaceutical development
in this respect does not refer to pharmacological discovery but the interorganizational
process necessary to bring a new drug into the pharmaceutical regime. The organizational
field framework allows me to incorporate non-pharmaceutical organizations in the
process of drug development because these organizations are stakeholders in the
pharmaceutical regime. These stakeholders also bring different logic orders into the
pharmaceutical field through their membership in other fields. This makes the
pharmaceutical field a site of institutional pluralism. I propose it is because of
institutional pluralism that pharmaceutical corporations have the opportunity to adopt an
organizational strategy from a set of legitimate models.
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2.5.1 The Development of Organizational Fields
A strength of institutional theory compared to other organizational theories is the
awareness that organizational decisions are subjectively influenced by divergent internal
interest, differences in power relations, and historical contingencies. The realization that a
diverse range of external forces affects organizational strategy led institutional theorists
to develop complex frameworks for understanding how organizations function as
embedded entities. In their seminal work on institutional isomorphism, Powell and
DiMaggio (1983: 148) proposed the concept of organizational fields to link the impact of
institutions to organizational behaviors. The utility of the organizational field framework
for organizational analysis is that positioning organizations within a relational network,
as opposed to focusing on the operations of a single organization, reveals a wider range
of environmental factors affecting organizational strategy. The organizational field
framework provides researchers with a better understanding on why organizations with
dissimilar goals would collaborate to accomplish a given task and expands the level of
analysis beyond direct connections to larger fields of influence.
Institutions are the structures that guide behavior within an organizational field.
Early research on organizational fields highlighted how cultural-cognitive, regulative,
and normative structures provided collective meaning and stability within the field
(Wooten and Hoffman 2008). The decision to adopt a specific practice was framed as an
isomorphic process where the effect of the organizational field was to confer external
legitimacy on the organization. While decision-making occurred within the organization,
early theorists argued strategy was guided by the institutional framework of structured
decision-making not by objective assessments of efficiency. DiMaggio’s (1991) article
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on the emergence of public art museums in the United States exemplifies this early
approach in reach applying organizational fields as the level of analysis.
DiMaggio (1991) noted that two competing ideologies about the purpose of
public art museums existed during the early 20th century period when these organizations
were being founded: museums as educational centers displaying replicas of famous
works versus museums as centers of connoisseurship containing only original pieces. The
convergence of museums around the curator model (connoisseurship ideology) occurred
in conjunction with the rise of professional museum curators and the influence of external
funding organizations controlled by wealthy donors. DiMaggio proposed that because the
conflict between ideologies did not occur within individual museums, different
stakeholders in the field were able to work collectively to construct the organizational
environment at the field level.
Isomorphic pressure defined organizational strategy based on the connoisseurship
ideology as the only legitimate model for public art museums. Museums following the
education ideology faced a crisis of legitimacy that effectively cut them off them from
necessary revenue streams. This example also illustrates another important aspect of the
organizational field framework, the need to consider historical context when evaluating
organizational behavior because the widespread rise in art museums was partially due to
gilded age tycoons seeking ways to create public legacies. Scott el al. (2000)
demonstrated in detail the value of historical context for analyzing organizational strategy
in their detailed examination of hospital changes in the San Francisco Bay Area during
the last half of the 20th century.
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Scott et al. (2000) studied institutional change by analyzing health care
organizations in the San Francisco Bay Area between the mid-1940s and mid-1990s. One
portion of their analysis focused on the organizational field and the effects field level
changes had on individual hospitals. The data revealed a field of three competing logic
orders: professional dominance, federal responsibility, and managerial-market orientation
(Scott et al. 2000: 316). Within the period of the study, each of these institutional orders
experienced a time where it was the dominant logic of the field; however, all three logic
orders were always present to some degree in the field. Scott et al (2000) categorized this
field level phenomenon as institutional fragmentation: a measure of degree to which field
participants confront a coherent institutional environment. They drew several conclusions
from these findings. Related to institutional theory the data indicated the factors leading
to the decline in one logic order were not necessarily the factors leading to the subsequent
rise of the new dominant logic order. Specifically they point out the decline of the
professional dominance logic was followed by the rise of the federal responsibility logic,
but the federal responsibility logic was intentionally constructed to maintain professional
dominance. The incongruence in institutional change also demonstrated how exogenous
factors affect field structure as illustrated by the shift from federal responsibility to
managerial control, which originated with economists questioning the efficiency of
public health and regulatory structures.
DiMaggio’s (1991) study of public art museums and Scott et al.’s (2000) study of
hospitals in the San Francisco Bay Area illustrate another key component of
organizational fields: the process of field demarcation is flexible. Powell and DiMaggio’s
(1983) original definition constructed organizational fields as relational networks, which
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makes the boundaries not only porous but also definable around empirical conditions
determined by the researcher’s analytical focus (Scott 2014). This allows the demarcation
of organizational fields around a broader range of potential measures than the marketexchange relationship definition of industry sectors.
2.5.2 Demarcating Organizational Fields
Charlene Zietsma and Thomas Lawrence (2010) stated field boundaries and
practices are interdependent. “Thus we adopt an understanding of fields as coevolutionary systems in which boundaries and practices exist in a recursive relationship
significantly affected by the heterogeneous boundary work and practice work of
interested actors” (Zietsma and Lawrence 2010:191). Demarcating the boundaries of an
organizational field through practice underscores the importance of embedded and
collective action for analyzing organizational strategy. Organizations face behavioral
constraints as embedded actors by the institutionalized structure of legitimate practices
while at the same time, the structure only gains institutionalized legitimacy through
collective recognition. Zietsma and Lawrence (2010) expanded DiMaggio and Powell’s
(1983) conception of the organizational field by adding this recursive element to the
framework which explains how the boundaries of organizational fields are beyond
market-exchange connections and can encompass activities tangentially connected to the
production of a commoditized good or service.
Current research utilizing organizational fields has also shifted from the
isomorphic perspective of early studies towards a view of fields as contested arenas.
Reframing the relationship between institutions and organizations as both dynamic
bottom-up and top-down processes was pivotal to this expansion of the organizational
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field framework (Scott 2014). One of the ways researchers have demonstrated fields are
dynamic structures has been through the analysis of the conflicts and change that
accompany a shift in the dominant institutional order within an organizational field. Roy
Suddaby and Royston Greenwood’s (2005) study of organizational change within
Canadian accounting firms is a clear illustration of the contested process of institutional
change within an organizational field.
The institutional change observed by Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) was the
expansion of accounting firms from provided financial services to offering legal
advisement on financial and tax matters. Within the organizational field of financial
service firms, accounting firms and law firms were two stakeholders originally offering
different services and adhering to different logic orders. The acquisition of a legal firm by
a major accounting firm represented a violation of the jurisdictional borders between
accounting and legal firms (Abbott 1988). Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) revealed
stakeholders within the field contested this acquisition because it violated the accepted
institutional logics governing accounting firms. Accounting organizations re-established
field stability by employing rhetorical strategies that redefined the institutional logics of
accounting firms to incorporate the role of legal advisement on financial matters. This
example illustrates another question raised by contemporary research on organizational
fields: if organizational fields are sites of conflict and negotiation, is field stability better
framed as a temporary truce, or settlement, between stakeholders (Reay and Hinings
2005, Wooten and Hoffman 2008).
As Trish Reay and Bob Hinings (2005: 354) stated “Actors within a field
recognize the dominance of one institutional logic during times that we can characterize
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as relative stability, even though all actors may not agree with that dominant logic.” The
lack of agreement required by actors to achieve field stability poses another direction for
organizational field research to move away from organizational isomorphism towards
explaining organizational heterogeneity. The concept of institutional pluralism provides
the conceptual framework to expand the organizational field concept as contested arenas
where stability is only temporary outcome of settlement negotiations. The institutional
logics perspective argues that in situations of institutional pluralism an organization will
use practices aligned to different institutional orders but adopts one logic order as the
dominant order for overall organizational strategy (Thornton el al. 2012). Expanded to
the organizational field level this would explain heterogeneity between organizations of
the same type because in a field where multiple logics exist organizations could adopt
differing dominant logics and still maintain legitimacy.
2.5.3 Institutional Pluralism within Organizational Fields
Michael Lounsbury and Ellen Crumley’s (2007) research on the mutual fund
industry demonstrates how heterogeneous organizational fields emerge and continue to
exists in a state of institutional pluralism. Mutual funds originated in Boston in 1924 and
operated under a strategy of conservative trusteeship (Lounsbury and Crumley 2007).
Around the middle of the century, developments in statistical techniques and economic
theory operated as exogenous factors generating new practice strategies for mutual fund
management. These new practice strategies were contradictory to the Boston model of
passive investing; however, unlike nouvelle cuisine (Rao et al. 2003) or offering legal
advice (Suddaby and Greenwood 2005), the new active money management model did
not replace the old model but was incorporated into the mutual fund field as valid
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alternative for mutual fund management (Lounsbury and Crumley 2007). The current
mutual fund market is an organizational field where several institutionalized strategies for
mutual fund management coexists. The “Process Model of New Practice Creation”
Lounsbury and Crumley (2007) proposed as an explanation for the rise of actively
managed mutual funds also reinforces the broader claim that organizational fields are
dynamic structures that engender conflict and where stability occurs through a negotiated
settlement between stakeholders.
Another recent article by Mary Dunn and Candace Jones (2010) examined
institutional pluralism within formal medical education in the United States. Dunn and
Jones found that the strategies of medical education programs in the U.S. were contested
between institutional logic orders of science and care. Understanding how these
competing logics coexisted required analyzing the historical context of the formal
institution of medicine in the United States. Dunn and Jones (2010) stated the logic of
science originated during the 19th century professional project developing formal
medicine while the logic of care was incorporated into formal medicine through the rise
of public health as a discipline in the 20th century. Their analysis on the frequency of
these logic orders in medical journals indicated that while the logics were dominant at
different points in time both were continually present with vocal advocates continually
seeking to promote whichever position was not currently in favor.
At the organizational level, recent work by Walter Powell and Kurt Sandholtz
(2012) on the emergence of the biotechnology sector in the United States revealed
institutional pluralism at the field level allowed the development of two distinct
organizational strategies. Powell and Sandholtz (2012) analyzed the organizational
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practices of 11 prominent early biotechnology firms with founding dates between 1968
and 1981. Because biotechnology was an entirely new field, these early firms lacked an
institutionalized template of legitimatized organizational strategy; furthermore, as a
developing field the contested dynamics between stakeholders had not reached a period
of settlement. Based on the data, Powell and Sandholtz (2012) concluded these
organizations adhered to two distinct and legitimate organizational strategies drawn from
models legitimated outside of the field: organizational strategy based on a logic of
science and organizational strategy based on a logic of commerce. Furthermore, Powell
and Sandholtz demonstrated that the background of the firm founders’ heavily influenced
the organization strategy adopted by a specific firm. Firms founded by academic
researchers were more likely to adhere to an organizational strategy that aligned with the
logic of science. While firms founded by venture capitalist or pharmaceutical executives
were more likely to an organizational strategy that aligned with the logic of commerce.
In summation, organizational fields are a well researched and valuable component
of institutional theory. The concept allows organizational researchers to recognize the
importance of organizational embeddedness and reinforces the conceptualization of
institutions as dynamic phenomena. Additionally, the incorporation of institutional logics
and institutional pluralism within the organizational field framework provides an avenue
for institutional theorists to address strategic agency at the organizational level.
2.6 Organizational Agency and Strategic Action
In order to interpret organizational categories as influenced by institutional
effects, the organizations studied have to possess some flexibility in adopting
organizational strategies. A key component of this project is the proposition that
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pharmaceutical corporations, or the actors within them, possess decision-making agency
in regards to the overall strategy of an organization. There are multiple factors
researchers have used to indicate organizational agency. I chose to collect corporate
financial data and information on the drugs approval by the Food and Drug
Administration as measure of organizational decisions that could reveal variations in
strategies between pharmaceutical corporations.
Using FDA approval information as data on organizational strategy aligns with
the strategy-as-practice approach developed within the strategic management literature
(Vaara and Whittington 2012). The strategy-as-practice perspective argues that strategy
can be invisible because it has become institutionalized; therefore, analyzing common
practices at the organizational field level can reveal distinct strategies if groupings of
practices emerge across organizational boundaries. Since regulatory approval is a
constraint placed on all pharmaceutical companies, how organizations manage the FDA
submission process is an ideal common practice to analyze for latent strategies at the field
level.
Furthermore, the FDA approval process is a dynamic interaction between an
organization and the FDA that requires strategic action on the part of both organizations
(Babiarz and Pisano 2014, Monahan and Babiarz 2014). Companies do not haphazardly
submit drugs for approval but engage with regulators through a multi-year process that
starts with the submission of an investigational new drug application to begin clinical
trials with the end goal as approval of a new drug application (NDA). In addition to being
a lengthy and uncertain process, drug approval is also expensive making it unlikely a
company would not manage the process internally or attempt to monitor best practices
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within the field (Babiarz and Pisano 2014); therefore, it is logical to expect organizational
strategies are exists within this practice.
2.6.1 Bringing Agency into Institutional Theory
The main strength of institutional theory, the recognition that culture shapes
organizational behavior, poses a problem for organizational analysis because it risks
framing organizations as over socialized. “In other words, the theoretical
accomplishments of institutional theory are limited in scope to the diffusion and
reproduction of successfully institutionalized organizational forms and practices”
(DiMaggio 1988: 12). This problem originated when early institutional theorists tackled
the structure agency debate by claiming that structure trumps agency because institutional
effects were isomorphic forces on organizations. However, as researchers expanded
beyond studies of isomorphism to explore institutional change, creation, and destruction,
the need for incorporating agency into the theory became apparent (DiMaggio 1988,
Lawrence, Suddaby, and Roy 2009, Oliver 1999, Scott 2014).
To address this deficiency, DiMaggio (1988) proposed the concept of the
institutional entrepreneur: organizational actors “who have an interest in particular
institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to
transform existing ones” (Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence 2004: 657). The concept has led
to a distinct subfield of literature analyzing the actions of specific agents towards
changing institutional structures (Hardy and Maguire 2008) but is criticized for framing
institutional entrepreneurs as heroic actors and ignoring their embedded institutionalized
context (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2009). Another early approach for incorporating
agency into institutional theory stems from the work of Christine Oliver.
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Oliver (1991) stated institutional theory had not fully addressed agency or interest
driven action by organizations but the theory was compatible with these concepts.
Applying concepts from resource-dependency theory, she constructed a typology of five
strategic responses organizations could have to institutional processes: acquiesce,
compromise, avoid, defy, and manipulate. Oliver (1991) defined in detail the tactics and
strategies for these five responses as well as the differences in institutional structures that
are more likely to engender specific responses. In his review of Oliver’s work, Scott
(2014) provided examples of research applying each strategic response and supporting
the overall validity of concept. In general, Oliver’s (1991) framework for strategic action
indicates that the more complex an organizational field is, the more ability, and
likelihood, individual organizations will engage in acts of non-conformity; i.e. engage in
strategies of compromise, avoidance, defiance, or manipulation.
Jens Beckert (1999) presented a dissenting viewpoint from DiMaggio (1988) and
Oliver’s (1991) approaches and argued instead that “under market conditions,
institutional rules and strategic agency can be conceptualized as two coordination
mechanisms that destabilize each other, but, nevertheless, remain interdependent” (779).
According to Beckert (1999), the attempts to introduce agency through periods of
institutional conflict were inadequate because they did not explain how actors decided on
strategy, and while conceptualizations of the institutional entrepreneur were more
successful, they altered the fundamental argument of institutions as taken-for-granted.
Beckert (1999) argued strategic agency was the purposeful attempt to reach a goal
but the means to achieve that goal could only be chosen rationally if the actor had a
reasonable expectation of the other actors’ behavior. Institutions provide structure for
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interorganizational relations, which reduce uncertainty and make organizational action
more likely. Beckert’s argument challenged the view that periods of contestation in
organizational fields are the source of strategic action by instead proposing that periods
of institutional stability lead to strategic action because they are times when organizations
are better able to predict the outcomes of their decisions and therefore risk taking actions
that depart from institutional expectations.
The work of DiMaggio (1988), Oliver (1991), and Beckert (1999) facilitated the
ability of institutional theorists to analyze agency within institutional structures but still
met with criticism for treating agency as a product of institutional structures rather than
individual actors. The concept of institutional work was proposed to link the previous
ideas of agency and shift the focus of analysis to understating how actions affect
institutions (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2009). Institutional work does not discount
the previous ideas of agency but expands the analysis of agency in institutional theory by
arguing agency and institutions have a recursive relationship: institutions structure action
but at the same time actions create, maintain, and disrupt institutions (Lawrence,
Suddaby, and Leca 2009).
Institutional work focuses on activity rather than accomplishment, which allows
for the analysis of the intentions behind actions as opposed to focusing on the outcomes
of the actions. Institutional work proposes agency does not occur because a vacuum of
isomorphic pressures drives decision-making but because actors derive distinctive
intentions from the institutional structure. Agency, however, is still embedded within an
institutional framework because it is the institutional structure that provides the enabling
conditions for action (Battilana and D’Aunno 2009). Evaluating agency then requires a
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multidimensional viewpoint since changes in the institutional and organizational
environments will result in changes to the purpose and intention of an action. Battilana
and D’Aunno (2009) developed a typology for evaluating the intersections of the three
main forms of institutional work: creating, maintaining, and disrupting, with three
dimensions of agency: iterative, practical-evaluative, and projective. Institutional work is
an important construct within institutional theory because it reiterates the core argument
that institutions are products of collective action and at the same time indicates
institutions are neither totalitarian nor permanent. Institutional work explains why
institutional pluralism occurs within a field because organizations structure their
interactions through the dominant logic order of their primary field and thereby
incorporate components of those logics into the shared field. In the pharmaceutical
industry, professional medical organizations, third party payers, and financial investors
engage in institutional work by brining different institutional logics into the field for
evaluating pharmaceutical development strategies.
2.6.2 Strategic Action Fields
Neil Fligstein and David McAdam (2012) recently proposed a comprehensive
theory of fields that builds on the previous work of institutional theorists by incorporating
agency in organizational analysis through the framework of strategic action fields. The
strategic action field concept proposes the act of reproducing an existing social institution
is a function of constant negotiation between actors. A strength of this framework is that
while collective action underpins the interdependence of field members, the interests and
advantages of individual actors are incorporated. Strategic action fields are socially
constructed arenas dependent on the definition of the situation and issues at stake

46

(Fligstein and McAdam 2012); therefore, they retain the flexible demarcation of the
organizational field framework. This project applies Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012)
field theory to argue the pharmaceutical industry in the United States is a distinct
strategic action field within the health care system comprised of six main stakeholders:
pharmaceutical corporations, medical professionals, patients, the Food and Drug
Administration, third party payers, and financial investors.
The framework of strategic action fields is appropriate for my research because all of
the stakeholders within the pharmaceutical field do not automatically accept newly
developed pharmaceutical products. Pharmaceutical corporations actively manage
knowledge of new drugs utilizing a variety of different organizational strategies designed
to address the specific interest of each stakeholder. With investors and other financially
motivated stakeholders, pharmaceutical corporations discuss drug innovation and disease
prevalence rates to support claims a new product has market potential. Pharmaceutical
corporations strategically use the concept of science and empirical validity to frame the
presentation of clinical data to government regulators and medical professionals as a
method of gaining product legitimacy (Abraham 1995, Applbaum 2009, 2010, Matheson
2008). With potential patients, pharmaceutical corporations focus on developing a
perception of need for treatment around a disease or condition while framing
pharmaceutical use as the solution and pathway toward an improved quality of life (Fox
and Ward 2009, Williams et al. 2009).
Strategic action fields can also explain why pharmaceutical corporations within the
same organizational field would display a heterogeneous mix of organizational strategies.
Each organization possesses the ability to adopt a preferred organizational strategy but
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external stakeholders could also influence these preferences. For example, a small startup
firm might desire to be research oriented but the need to secure funding from private
sources could act as a countervailing force resulting in the organization adopting a
market-based strategy. The research of Powell and Sandholtz (2012) showed that these
two organizational strategies existed in early biotechnology firms, and while their
analysis indicated these differences were associated with an organizations founding, the
concept can be applied to analyze established organizations.
2.7 Institutions and Organizational Legitimacy
From its conception, institutional theory has recognized the importance of
legitimacy in organizational studies and incorporated the concept into multiple research
frameworks (Deephouse and Suchman 2008, DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Meyer and
Rowan 1977, Scott 2014). Developing a framework for legitimacy is important for this
project because legitimacy underlies the institutional process of pharmaceutical regimes
and the organizational actions taken by stakeholders within the pharmaceutical field.
Pharmaceutical corporations are unlikely to adopt drug development strategies if other
stakeholders perceive them to be illegitimate means. However, if corporations adopt
strategies not institutionally legitimized, they may attempt to justify those strategies to a
stakeholder as legitimate using an alternate logic order.
Legitimacy research has resulted in a variety of definitions for legitimacy, but the
idea that legitimacy is a collective process requiring social consensus is found in a
majority of definitions (Deephouse and Suchman 2008, Ridgeway and Berger 1986,
Zelditch 2001). To analyze how legitimacy works in relation to the development of new
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pharmaceutical products, a distinct process of legitimacy should be adopted which
addresses legitimacy issues that may arise in an institutionally plural organizational field.
2.7.1 Organizational Legitimacy and Logic Orders
Organizational legitimacy occurs when there is congruence between the social
values and norms of a society and the organizational behavior or activities of a specific
organization (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Dowling and Pfeffer 1975, Scott 2014).
Applying this concept of legitimacy to the pharmaceutical industry allows for the
evaluation of specific organizational strategies as legitimate on a variety of dimensions:
“For instance, regulatory approval of a new pharmaceutical not only confers
regulatory legitimacy but also (a) enhances the ‘cognitive’ comprehensibility
and taken-for-grantedness of the new compound, (b) indicates the that entity is
consistent with the ‘moral’ value of good health, and (c) confirms the entity’s
demonstrable ‘pragmatic’ benefits.” (Deephouse and Suchman 2008: 68)
At the organizational level, this framework of legitimacy is useful to analyze
specific organizations within a field by evaluating the differences between organizational
strategy and societal expectations. However, focusing on organizational legitimacy is
problematic for analyzing organizational interactions within a complex field because
organizations can be embedded in multiple fields each with distinct institutional logics so
an interaction between organizations necessitates acknowledging multiple, and
sometimes contradictory, institutional expectations. As Deephouse and Suchman
(2008:68) argued, “researchers might do well to attend more closely to the workings of
various sources of legitimacy.”
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The concept of institutional pluralism is necessary to analyze legitimacy in a
complex organizational field because stakeholders evaluate an organization’s actions as
legitimate through the institutional order most in line with that stakeholder’s relationship
to the organization (Jarzabkoski, Matthiesen, and Van de Len 2009). I argue three logic
orders are salient to pharmaceutical corporations: commerce, science, and care. Table 2.1
list the components of these logic orders adapted from the Table 3.1 found in Thornton et
al. (2012: 56) and the work of Dunn and Jones (2010) and Powell and Sandholtz (2012).
Table 2.1 Institutional Logic Ideal Types
Institutional
Component

Logic Order
Commerce

Science

Care

Basis of norms

Self-interest

Objective analysis

Patient interest

Source of legitimacy

Market position
of firm

Verifiable results

Patient outcomes

Formal mechanisms of
Regulations
control

Research practices

Professional
certification

Informal mechanism of
control

Industry analyst

Peer review

Professional
reputation

Basis of attention

Profit

Scientific
unknowns

Patient health

Basis of strategy

Increase profit

Experimentation

Conventional
medical treatment
routines

Sources of authority

Market share

Scholarly
publications

Professional
associations

Cultural-cognitive
frame

Free market
capitalism

Theoretical
paradigms

Professional
expertise

Viewing the pharmaceutical industry as a multi-institutional strategic action field
requires more than analyzing organizational legitimacy since stakeholders within the field
evaluate their interactions with pharmaceutical corporations using different logic orders
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but the actions of all field members still adhere to an institutional level of legitimacy
supporting pharmaceutical regimes. Understanding organizational strategy in a field of
institutional pluralism requires utilizing a concept of institutional legitimacy. Institutional
legitimacy “emphasizes the ways in which sector-wide structural dynamics generate
cultural pressures that transcend any single organization’s purposive control” (Suchman
(1995: 572).
2.7.2 Institutional Legitimacy and Stakeholder Expectations
Suchman (1995) stratifies legitimacy into three broad categories, pragmatic,
moral and cognitive, all of which are applicable to analyze of the pharmaceutical field as
a strategic action field. Pragmatic legitimacy is tied to self-interest, and characterized an
exchange-based legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy is evaluated through the outcome value
of the product an organization receives through interaction. Moral legitimacy is a
normative evaluation on organizational behaviors as a reflection of their promotion of
social welfare. In moral legitimacy, legitimacy occurs through the judgment of
organizational accomplishments, the assessment of organizational operations as using
socially accepted techniques and procedures, and the perception of worthiness of the
social institution. The third process of legitimacy is cognitive legitimacy which is
legitimacy based on the comprehensibility of organizational action and a social structure
that makes alternative actions unthinkable. Cognitive legitimacy focuses on the culturally
constructed nature of legitimacy as a process of collective action.
My argument is that through the development of a new product within the
organizational field pharmaceutical organizations strategically engage other field
stakeholders using mechanisms designed to address pragmatic, moral, and cognitive
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legitimacy concerns at the institutional level by using different logic orders. My research
explores the following theoretical propositions related to the organizational pursuit of
legitimacy in a situation of institutional pluralism:
P1a: When interacting with investors, trade industry groups, or third party
payers, pharmaceutical corporations will strategically frame a new product
through measures of potential profitability as a method to secure pragmatic
legitimacy in line with the logic order of commerce.
P1b: When interacting with regulative stakeholders, pharmaceutical
corporations will strategically frame data on new product efficacy through
measures of empirical and scientific validity as a method to secure moral
legitimacy in line with the logic order of science.
P1c: When interacting with potential patients and physicians, pharmaceutical
corporations will strategically employ narratives to frame the perception of need
for a new pharmaceutical product as a method to secure cognitive legitimacy in
line with the logic order of care.
These theoretical propositions suggest the actions of pharmaceutical corporations in
developing new pharmaceutical products is a strategic interorganizational processes
designed to meet the specific institutional expectations of outside stakeholders. Figure 2.1
displays the general model of these propositions. The arrows between stakeholders are
double-sided to indicate the interactive structure of a strategic action field. Only
relationships between pharmaceutical corporations and other field stakeholder are
represented because these relations are the focus of this project.
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Investors, industry trade groups, and insurance companies interact with
pharmaceutical corporations through the logic order of commerce where the value of a
new pharmaceutical product is based on market exchange principles; therefore, the
legitimation of a new product by these stakeholders requires the demonstration of
profitability, as either an investment or increased cost-effectiveness in a payment

Figure 2.1 Theoretical Model of Pharmaceutical Corporations’
Relations to Other Field Stakeholders by Logic Order
scheme. The Food and Drug Administration acts as the regulator and gatekeeper within
the pharmaceutical field leading to the evaluation of pharmaceutical products through a
framework of scientific validity based on the experimental methodology of clinical trials.
To gain legitimacy from the FDA pharmaceutical corporations should adopt concepts of
institutionalized science to demonstrate objectively and empirically that a new product
demonstrates efficacy and safety. Finally, pharmaceutical corporations need to address
the legitimacy of consumers and physicians who evaluate pharmaceutical products
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through a framework of how they can improve individual health. To legitimate a new
product to potential consumers and physicians pharmaceutical corporations need to
operate within the logic order of care, where institutionalized medicine positions the
value of a treatment in its ability to address a pathological problem or improve quality of
life.
In conclusion, the process of market development places pharmaceutical
corporations in a position of institutional pluralism by the requirement that new products
meet the interest of each stakeholder for successful institutionalization within the
pharmaceutical regime. Navigating these institutional expectations requires that
organizations act strategically by applying different mechanism to meet the institutional
expectations of legitimacy held by each stakeholder. Drawing from institutional theory,
the expectation is these institutional effects will create a field of heterogeneous
organizations because pharmaceutical corporations will align their dominant
organizational strategy to different logic orders.
2.8 Institutionalization, Medicalization, and Pharmaceutical Regimes
Contemporary drug development proceeds on the logic that consumers have
unmet needs that the company can determine and market to (Applbaum 2009, Civan and
Maloney 2006, Fisher et al. 2015). Critics contend research programs at large
pharmaceutical companies focus not on improving health but on increasing profit.
“Pharmaceutical companies continuously emphasize how deeply society depends on their
development of innovative products to improve health. But in fact, these companies are
mostly developing drugs that are mostly little better than existing products but have the
potential to cause widespread adverse reactions even when appropriately prescribed”
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(Light et al. 2013: 591). While this critique of industry interest is valid, it obscures the
dynamics of the field because it fails to distinguish that the interest of public health and
consumer markets derive from different institutional frameworks making commercial
interest valid too. A more useful analysis reframes the issue of pharmaceuticals usage as
an institutionalized process, which is why I adopt the concept of the pharmaceutical
regime. The fact pharmaceutical use is institutionalized in society is not debated even by
the most vocal critics of the industry. Neither Marcia Angell (2005), Peter Conrad (2007),
Ben Goldacre (2012) or, Ray Moynihan and Alan Cassels (2005) suggest pharmaceutical
products cannot actually treat disease or improve patients’ lives, rather the idea a
chemical compound can be consumed and lead to a cure or improvement in health is a
taken-for-granted concept.
Analyzing pharmaceutical development as an institutionalized interorganizational
process allows for better understanding on how different perceptions of pharmaceutical
use develop. More explicitly, stakeholder perceptions on the purpose of pharmaceutical
usage can incorporate aspects of both public health and market economics because if
these logic orders coexist in the organizational field. In the United States, pharmaceutical
usage can be an aspect of public health when the product is intended to benefit more than
the user; an example is vaccines. Likewise, pharmaceutical usage can be part of the
market economy when they are purchased in lieu of an alternative treatment option: for
example the consumption of antidepressants instead of behavioral therapy. Complications
arise at institutional intersections, most clearly demonstrated by the current debates over
the high cost of cancer treatments and price increases on patent expired medications with
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no generic competition. It is through these contested situations that understanding
pharmaceutical usage as an institutional process is most valuable.
By framing pharmaceutical development as institutionalized, this project is in a
unique position to engage critically with one of the significant areas of research in
medical sociology, the thesis of medicalization. Social scientists have studied
medicalization for the past forty years (Conrad 2007, Freidson 1970, Zola 1972).
Medicalization is a social process that researchers have broadly defined to allow for a
wide range of applications in empirical analysis. Conrad (2007:4) defined medicalization
as “a process by which nonmedical problems become defined and treated as medical
problems, usually in terms of illness and disorders.”
Recent researchers have proposed pharmaceuticalization as an elaboration on the
general medicalization thesis to address issues related specifically to the use of
pharmaceuticals in society and reflect the changes that have occurred in the past two
decades within society and the institution of formal medicine (Abraham 2010, Barker
2011, Bell and Figert 2012, Williams et al. 2011). One of the key aspects of the
pharmaceuticalization literature that diverges from the general claims of medicalization is
the concept pharmaceutical regimes can be developed for conditions not considered
pathological, meaning pharmaceuticals are developed and promoted as capable of general
lifestyle enhancements not just medical treatments (Bell and Figert 2012).
The majority of the existing sociological research on medicalization and
pharmaceuticalization is qualitative which presents the opportunity for new research to
add to the literature by analyzing medicalization using quantitative methods. A
quantitative analysis would address the criticism of medicalization that the thesis itself is
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too abstract; specifically that the existing research has not presented sufficient empirical
evidence for the claim of medicalization over an argument that pharmaceutical expansion
is actually the result of advancements in medical knowledge. For example, a significant
proportion of the medicalization literature focuses on medicalization through the
expansion of psychiatric conditions but current research on the drug pipeline shows
products targeting mental disorders only account for 4.12% of the drugs currently under
development (Fisher et al. 2015).
The medicalization thesis is important to address in this project because it implies
a distinct path of strategic action by a pharmaceutical corporation. A pharmaceutical
corporation engages in medicalization if it seeks to expand the definition of treatment on
specific conditions. The medicalization thesis is neutral in that the motivation for actively
seeking expansion can be categorized as components of all three logic orders: commerce,
science, and care. At the same time, medicalization could also be the consequence of
pharmaceutical research and not a defined organizational strategy. Analyzing
pharmaceutical development strategies for latent constructs could reveal if medicalization
is a distinct organizational strategy.
Regarding expectations of organizational strategy, industry critics argue
medicalization practices align primarily with the commerce logic and pragmatic
legitimacy. However, if pharmaceutical corporations operate from a position of
institutional pluralism, framing a new product as an advancement in medical knowledge
and addressing a health care need is necessary for market success. Product development
requires a pharmaceutical corporation to meet the interest of all the stakeholders,
obscuring the internal interest of the organization so expansionary practices could also
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result from the logics of science and care. I explore the concept of medicalization in the
case study analysis through the following theoretical propositions designed to evaluate
internal organizational interest within the strategy of expansion, if one is identified in the
quantitative analysis.
P2a: If a pharmaceutical corporation’s dominant logic aligns with the commerce
logic then the primary organizational reaction to a product-harm crisis will be to
mitigate internal financial loss.
P2b: If a pharmaceutical corporation’s dominant logic aligns with the logic of
science then the primary organizational reaction to a product-harm crisis will be
to validate the scientific accuracy of clinical trial data.
P2c: If a pharmaceutical corporation’s dominant logic aligns with the logic of
care then the primary organizational reaction to a product-harm crisis will be to
mitigate potential harm to patient health.
These propositions assess the medicalization thesis because if pharmaceutical
corporations are not primarily concerned about financial loss it undercuts the claim
market interest drive medical expansion. If pharmaceutical corporations are concerned
with ensuring the accuracy of clinical trial data then the argument medical expansion is
due to genuine scientific advancements cannot be dismissed. If pharmaceutical
corporations are primarily concerned with protecting patients from harm then medical
expansion is more likely driven by the logic of care.
2.9 Conclusion
Organizations are not isolated entities; they are dynamic phenomena shaped by
both external social factors and the interest of internal actors. Institutional theory

58

provides a conceptual framework for understanding and analyzing organizations in
society and is the theoretical foundation of this project. Researchers have demonstrated
that the connection between institutions and organizations is an interactive process, but
the focus of my analysis is on how institutions effect organizational strategy. Institutional
theory contains concepts that can thoroughly explain organizational level actions in a
complex system where organizations must meet the competing demands of multiple
stakeholders.
I apply the construct of organizational fields as the conduit that mediates strategic
choice between institutions and organizations. The field level provides context for
organizational behavior by framing strategy as an agentic process bound by the
expectations of other stakeholders. A pharmaceutical corporation is unlikely to pursue
strategies that are viewed externally as illegitimate even if they maximize the self-interest
of the company. Analysis at the field level also allows the indirect influence on
organizational behavior by other stakeholders to be observed through the processes of
collective negotiation and settlement over the dominant institution of the field.
Of central importance in this project is the concept of institutional logics and their
connection to organizational strategy. Institutional logics exist in the background of the
organizational environment, shaping both organizational practices and external
evaluations of organizational behavior. Drawing from the strategy-as-practice theory
literature, institutional logics are expected to influence the drug development process and
should be measurable in basic organizational decisions. Analyzing the characteristics of a
product submitted to the FDA for approval as representational of organizational decisions
that are effected by a logic order can reveal the institutional logics in the field.
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The pharmaceutical industry in the United States is complex with corporations
following different organizational structures and developing different products, but are
these differences the result of unique decisions at the organizational level or are external
factors creating commonalities in strategy between organizations? I argue that the
presence of multiple institutional logics within an organization field explains diversity in
organizational strategy. The impact of institutional pluralism at the field level results in
diversity because individual firms address the influence of competing logics by selecting
one logic order as the dominant framework for the organization. The caveat though is that
the field’s other stakeholders must perceive the each logic orders of as legitimate.
Using organizational fields as the site of analysis necessitates that the researcher
develop an awareness of the field dynamics. Power shifts between stakeholders and
technological advancements are to two mechanisms that result in changing logics so it is
important for a researcher to take historical context into account (Fligstein and McAdam
2012). These field level dynamics influence institutional logics by operating as
mechanisms of exposure to alternate logics and organizational forms as well as
structuring the field by providing paths or constraints on specific organizational
behaviors. The next chapter is an analysis of the current dynamics between
pharmaceutical corporations and the other stakeholders in the field to assess the general
structure of interactions between organizations.

60

CHAPTER 3
CURRENT STAKEHOLDER DYNAMICS WITHIN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL FIELD
3.1 Introduction
The goal of this study is to understand how multiple institutional frameworks
come to populate an organizational field and effect organizational strategy. Theoretically,
the structure of interorganizational relationships will affect strategy choice at the firm
level through mechanisms such as power differentials or resource dependencies but
studying strategy selection within the firm may not reveal institutional influences. In
order to reveal institutional level effects on pharmaceutical organizations, it is necessary
to evaluate the details of the interorganizational interactions within the field to determine
how institutional logics structure these relationships. The purpose of this chapter is to
provide empirical evidence to evaluate the proposed model of stakeholder relationships in
Figure 2.1, page 53, and demonstrate the complex interdependent structure of
pharmaceutical development is appropriate for an institutional theory analysis.
The benefit of analyzing pharmaceutical development through the organizational
field framework, instead of an industry perspective, is the field framework incorporates
stakeholder dynamics as interactive and reciprocal. This chapter covers the general
structure of the relationships between pharmaceutical corporations and the other main
stakeholders in the modern pharmaceutical field of the United States and defines them
within the frameworks of the three logic orders: commerce, science, and care. While each
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relationship is subject to a complex set of dynamics resulting in changes over the past
several decades worthy of detailed study, my discussion of these relationships only
highlights the major dynamics since an extensive analysis of each relationship is beyond
the scope of this project.
One of the most important relationships in the current field is between the FDA
and pharmaceutical corporations. The central element shaping the current dynamic was
the passage of the Prescription Drug Users Fee Act in 1992. This piece of legislation
changed the overall field dynamics by weakening the FDA’s position for the benefit of
pharmaceutical corporations and possibly at the expense of patients’ health. The direct
relationship between pharmaceutical corporations and patients is similarly complicated.
Pharmaceutical corporations engage patients as consumers in a market system through
direct to consumer advertisements and indirectly by providing financial support for
patient advocacy organizations. Pharmaceutical corporations present both strategies as
awareness campaigns rather than product marketing, obscuring financial motivations and
increasing the likelihood of patient buy-in.
Pharmaceutical corporations manage their direct relationship with physicians by
treating physicians as liaisons to the consumer. Pharmaceutical corporations use a variety
of subtle strategies to influence physician prescription habits, such as managing
continuing education programs and enlisting well-respected experts to serve as
ghostwriters on professional publications. Pharmaceutical corporations also employ
strategies of direct marketing towards physicians through advertisements in medical
journals and deploying drug representatives for office visits. The final stakeholder
dynamic I discuss is the structure of the retail pharmaceutical supply chain. Recent public
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debate has focused on the pricing of prescription pharmaceuticals, but concern over the
listed price of drugs obscures how the fragmented supply structure actually creates a
market of differential pricing. Figure 3.1, page 87, provides a concise overview of the
complex relationships in the pharmaceutical supply chain between health maintenance
organizations, pharmacy benefits managers, retail pharmacies, wholesale distributors, and
pharmaceutical corporations.
3.2 Pharmaceutical Corporations and the Food and Drug Administration
The regulatory strategy in the pharmaceutical field combines components from
the logic of care and science. Historical developments, discussed in chapter 4, resulted in
the Food and Drug Administration gaining enough stakeholder power in the late 1960s to
shape the pharmaceutical field and determine the processes of drug development from
clinical trials to market release. While these actions were beneficial to patients,
pharmaceutical corporations found these regulatory statues increasingly burdensome and
constraining on corporate goals.
By the late 1970s, the increased regulatory requirements of the FDA had become
a major point of contention between the agency and pharmaceutical manufacturers, and
companies were complaining loudly of a drug-lag in the United States (Schweitzer 1996),
and pharmaceutical corporations began to increasingly engage in strategic collective
actions designed to shift the regulatory process towards the logic of commerce. At the
same time, there was a shift in disease politics as the National Cancer Institute began
pressuring the FDA for quicker approvals on new treatments following recent
developments in chemotherapy (Carpenter 2010). The 1980s brought a general rise in the
power of corporate America as well as the anti-regulatory administrations of Regan and
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Bush, Sr. further setting the stage for major changes in the field dynamics between
pharmaceutical corporations and the FDA. Changes in drug regulation where additionally
spurred on as other stakeholders began calling for FDA reform; notably AIDs activist
organizations started pressuring the FDA in the late 1980s to relax regularly standards on
drug approvals to allow quicker and expanded access to experimental treatments.
3.2.1 The Prescription Drug User Fee Act and Drug Reviews
The external pressures mentioned above all contributed to the legislative events of
1992 that caused a significant shift in the field dynamics between pharmaceutical
corporations and government regulators. In 1992, Congress passed the Prescription Drug
User Fee Act (PDUFA) that altered the funding stream for drug reviewers at the FDA
from being solely dependent on the federal government to include funds from
pharmaceutical companies by authorizing the FDA to charge companies application fees
for each review submission. However, PDUFA was not a neutral piece of legislation; it
was a strategic settlement within the field intended to diminish the power of the FDA by
making it more dependent on private industry.
PDFUA was also a solution to the staffing needs within the FDA, which was the
result of the chronic underfunding from deregulation during the 1980s and had led to
increased drug approval times from an average of 6 months to 30 months (Carpenter
2010, Light et al. 2013). PDUFA provided the FDA with the additional income stream
the organization needed to increase drug review staff and reduce approval times.
Pharmaceutical corporations benefited directly from the passage of PDUFA by receiving
an explicit guarantee from the FDA that priority drug applications would be reviewed
within 6 months and regular applications within 12 months. The FDA, however, received

64

no guarantee from the industry regarding the quality of the data submitted for review and
the organizations reliance on industry money has led scholars to charge the Act resulted
in regulatory capture and institutional corruption (Light et al. 2013).
One direct outcome of PDUFA was that while drugs were being approved
quicker, the rates of adverse drug events (ADRs and commonly referred to as side
effects) also increased (Chen and Yang 2013, Light et al. 2013). “An in-depth analysis
found that each 10-month reduction in review time — which could take up to 30 months
— resulted in an 18.1-percent increase in serious adverse reactions, a 10.9-percent
increase in hospitalizations, and a 7.2-percent increase in deaths” (Light et al. 2013:595).
“From 2000 through 2010, serious ADRs reported through the FDA Adverse Event
Reporting System (AERS) increased 3.1-fold from 153,818 to 471,291 cases, and fatal
ADRs rose 4.3-fold from 19,445 to 82,724 reports” (Chen and Yang 2013). These trends
remain even after increases in prescription drug usage are controlled for indicating either
more drugs of lower quality are being developed or the new shortened regulatory
structure is inadequate for detecting and preventing many iatrogenic effects.
Part of the adverse drug event problem is the approval process is a delicate
balance of risk: the risk of releasing a drug too soon and causing patient harm through
adverse drug reactions versus the risk of keeping a drug under review to long and causing
patient harm by denying access to beneficial treatments (Daemmrich and Krücken 2000).
However, critics contend PDUFA skews this risk-risk calculation towards increasing the
risk of adverse drug events by restructuring the regulatory process around industry
interest rather than patient interest (Angell 2004, Chen and Yang 2013, Light et al. 2013).
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Increased adverse drug events do not align with the logic order of commerce, but do
indicate influence from the order of care has diminished in the regulatory process.
PDUFA altered the power dynamics between field stakeholders by weakening the
FDA and solidifying pharmaceutical corporations as the dominant field stakeholder;
physicians and the FDA are still gatekeepers, but their ability to fulfill this role has
shifted from a proactive regulation and assessment of new products to a reactive position
with the ability to apply constraints only after problems arise. The case of Zyprexa is a
well-known example that demonstrates how strategic actions on the part of
pharmaceutical corporations led to industry control over the process of drug regulation
and supports the argument of regulatory capture.
3.2.2 Zyprexa and the Corporate Management of Data
Scholars of the pharmaceutical industry and industry insiders make a distinction
between the market competitiveness and scientific aspects of a drug. A competitive
pharmaceutical product is a drug that can gain market share while scientific progress is a
product offering a therapeutic advancement over existing treatment options. The
strategies of market competition and scientific advancement are not mutually exclusive,
many drugs are developed intending to achieve both, but a drug can be competitive
without offering a therapeutic advantage. The current regulatory approval process
encourages the adoption of a strategy for market competition over scientific advancement
by only requiring that a new drug demonstrate efficacy in placebo control trials;
therefore, a successful marketing campaign can increase the competitiveness of a new
product with no novel scientific value.
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Kalman Applbaum (2009) stated the marketing of Zyprexa was typical for
contemporary pharmaceutical corporations. In 1998, Eli Lilly’s patent on Prozac was
close to expiration. Seeking to develop a replacement blockbuster, the company formed
the New Antidepressant Team, which was headed by a marketing strategy expert and a
psychiatrist (Applbaum 2009). It is important to note pharmaceutical companies now rely
primarily on blockbuster drugs to generate income (Lexchin 2006, Lybecker 2006, Vogel
2007). Internal company documents reveal the strategic focus for developing Zyprexa
was on uncovering patient needs, framed as expanding the market, and meeting them
through a competitive product rather than a scientific advancement. This strategy was
partially the result of the lesson learned from Prozac that a successful drug needed not
only to be effective but also required a campaign to raise public awareness on need.
Zyprexa was an antipsychotic medication approved in 1997 to treat schizophrenia.
At the start, the Eli Lilly development team determined “Zyprexa will be the world’s
number one neuroscience pharmaceutical in history” (Applbaum 2009: 198) and set out
to achieve this goal by expanding the approved therapeutic categories for Zyprexa usage.
The first success the company had was in getting Zyprexa approved to treat bipolar
disorder and Eli Lilly subsequently began marketing the drug to physicians as a new
treatment option for this condition. Released internal documents, however, show Lilly
sought to deceive physicians both about the adverse drug reactions of Zyprexa and
illegally promoted off-label usage for unapproved conditions (Applbaum 2010).
The adverse drug reactions did not go unnoticed outside of the company and
articles began appearing in journals linking Zyprexa to various negative side effects. For
years, Eli Lilly managed this increasing evidence by producing and sponsoring articles
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designed to counter any negative claims that surfaced in the medical literature (Applbaum
2010). Eventually Eli Lilly lost a series class action lawsuits over the company’s
intentional withholding of information on adverse drug reactions and received a criminal
misdemeanor charge for promoting off-label uses. The Zyprexa court case revealed Eli
Lilly managed the FDAs regulatory process by strategically providing information to the
agency that downplayed the risk of the drug while overstating its benefits (Applbaum
2009, 2010). Lacking the funds or authority to conduct internal clinical trials, the FDA
was limited in its ability to sanction the corporation because it was dependent on the data
provided by the company. John Abraham’s (1995) research indicated the corporate
control of scientific information is not unique to the Zyprexa case but is a common
industry strategy for managing the regulatory process in the submission company’s favor.
In conclusion, the relationship between the FDA and the pharmaceutical industry
has changed to one where industry now has countervailing power within the field. New
drugs are still subject to regulatory approval by the FDA but companies have been able to
gain control of this process by selectively submitting data that leads to their desired
outcome. Moreover, once the FDA has approved a drug, it is slow to issue a withdrawal.
These shifting dynamics are the result of both broader political and economic changes
exogenous to the organizational field, as well as, the rise of patients as a stakeholder
within the field who began to view the FDA as an obstacle to treatment and further
advocated for reducing the organizations regulatory power. Finally, while the current
regulatory process appears be increasingly aligned with the logic of commerce, the logics
of care and science are still evident in the FDAs standards of clinical trial testing and that
corporations need to address these concerns during the process of regulatory approval.
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3.3 Pharmaceutical Corporations and Patients, or the Potential Consumer
Researchers have argued one of the central changes in the field of health care
since the 1980s has been the rise of the patient as an independent health care consumer
(Applbaum 2006, Clarke and Adele 2009, Conrad 2007). Although other researchers state
this type of patient interaction with the health care system has its roots in an earlier era
(Tomes 2001). Regardless of the exact origin, pharmaceutical corporations have actively
facilitated this normative shift from passive patient to active consumer with increasing
emphasis during the previous three decades (Applbaum 2009). In the United States,
pharmaceutical companies engage with patients as consumers primarily through two
organizational strategies: direct interaction through marketing campaigns and indirect
interaction by supporting patient advocacy organizations. Both of these strategies utilize
components from the logic of care to engender the perception that pharmaceutical
products offer patients an avenue to wellbeing.
3.3.1 Direct to Consumer Advertisement of Pharmaceuticals
The direct advertisement of prescription drugs to consumers, while not legally
prohibited, did not occur much between 1906 and 1980 because of the gentleman’s
agreement between industry and the American Medical Association (Conrad and Leiter
2008). There was also confusion over the regulatory jurisdiction of pharmaceutical
advertisements between the FDA and Federal Trade Commission that was only resolved
after the 1962 Drug Amendments Act (Junod 2007). Direct to consumer marketing
strategies for prescription pharmaceutical products became a common industry practice
during the 1980s following the general deregulation of the Regan administration, the
declining power of professional medicine, and the rise of market style models for health
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care management. The early advertisements were tenuous as companies sought to
establish the boundaries rather than exceed them and risk negative publicity.
Conrad and Leiter (2008) noted that there was a general sense of
inappropriateness about direct to consumer marketing in the FDA, the medical
profession, and surprisingly the pharmaceutical industry in early years of the 1980s. The
primary concerns over direct to consumers advertising (DTCA) were the ability of
patients to understand the information, whether it would lead to self-diagnosis, and how
this could undermine the physician role in health care delivery. Because the consumption
of any prescription medication contains the risk of iatrogenic effects, proponents argued
that the advertisement of pharmaceutical products could not present only the benefits of
treatment but needed to include risk and side effect information. This argument aligns
with the logic of care as patient outcomes outweighed the immediate economic benefits
for the corporation. However, the increasing pressures of market competition that
accompanied the shift of investors focusing more on financial metrics as performance
indicators led corporations to begin testing DTCA.
The FDA reacted to the earliest attempts of DTCAs in 1981 by calling for a
moratorium on DTCA at the end of 1982 that was not retracted until 1985. For the rest of
the decade and into the 1990s, the FDA applied a policy of ‘fair balance” on
advertisements. This policy required ads to give equal space on potential benefits and
possible side effects. This requirement served as an unintentional restriction on DTCA to
print media and despite the initial hesitant responses within the industry, DTCA spending
quickly grew to $12 billion annually by 1989 (Conrad and Leiter 2008). In August of
1997, the FDA issued formal guidelines for broadcast advertisements that relaxed the
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pervious rules by allowing companies to list a source where consumers could find
additional information instead of requiring all the information be included in the
advertisement.
The most vocal industry opponents argue direct to consumer advertisements are
inherently negative because they present misleading information and are focused on
expanding market share rather than improving public health (Angell 2005, Moynihan and
Cassels 2005, Goldacre 2012). These critics point out the marketing cycle for products is
designed to stimulate demand for brand name prescription drugs only while they are still
under patent; after patent protection ends and generics become available companies tend
to cease marketing a drug. Some research has even indicated marketing can increase the
price of a drug over time as sales, and usage, increase, a contradiction to the expectations
of price sensitivity in basic economic theories on supply and demand (Faden et al. 2009).
Industry officials and representatives argue direct to consumer advertisements
serve a vital function by educating the public about both the treatment options available
as well as the conditions themselves. However, pharmaceutical companies use these
marketing tools strategically to expand the market share of specific products. Companies
are aware of the connection between direct to consumer marketing and product success.
A strong marketing campaign serves to build the brand of a specific drug and increases
the chance patients will ask their physician for that drug during an office visit (Applbaum
2009, Lexchin 2006).
Companies are also aware of the importance of marketing plans in the product life
cycle. The prescription drug market is a competitive market where consumers frequently
encounter several treatment options that may offer no perceivable differences in
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outcomes. The financial success of a new product depends on a rapid adoption rate, and
with the time of patent protection constantly decreasing, the window for a company to
make money on a product is small. Therefore, it is common for corporations to devote a
significant amount of marketing resources into advertising a product just prior to its
launch on the open market (Applbaum 2009, 2010). This strategy increases the chance
consumers will request the product sooner, which results in longer spans of treatment that
maximize profits. The other patient targeted marketing strategy pharmaceutical
corporations pursue is establishing relationships with patient advocacy organizations to
build awareness on both prescription drugs and health conditions.
3.3.2 Patient Advocacy Organizations and Pharmaceutical Corporations
Non-profit patient advocacy organizations (PAO) have been part of the health
care field for most of the 20th century. Some of these organizations have evolved into
large, well known organizations, for example the March of Dime and the American
Cancer Society (Rothman et al. 2011, Starr 1982). The early PAOs were funded by
private individuals and were able to become influential and trusted stakeholders within
the health care field (Rothman 2011 et al.). However, the structure of these organizations
began to change during the 1980s with the rise of HIV and AIDS activist groups. These
new groups represented a distinct change in organizational strategy because they focused
on making new pharmaceutical treatments, including drugs still in experimental trials,
readily available to patients (Rothman et al. 2011). At the same time, pharmaceutical
companies began to view these organizations as potential partners for expanding their
product markets and started increasing their financial donations to them (Moynihan and
Cassels 2005, Rothman et al. 2011).
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PAOs are perceived by outsiders to be primarily motivated by the desire to
improve health care options for individuals but research has indicated these organizations
now increasing favor new, expensive medical technologies and brand name drugs
(Conrad 2007, Rothman et al. 2011). However, evidence on the co-optation of patient
advocacy organizations by pharmaceutical corporations is difficult to find because an
asymmetry of information exist whereby pharmaceutical corporations are under certain
legal obligations to report money given to advocacy organizations but advocacy
organizations are not subject to the same disclosure requirements (Jones 2008, Rose
2013, Rothman et al. 2011).
Advocacy for the newest medical treatments does not necessarily indicate
industry co-optation of a PAO but several instances support the conclusion that the
relationship between the two stakeholders is not neutral. Marcia Angell (2005: 152)
discussed the case of hepatitis C coalitions that appeared to be grassroots organizations
but were revealed as initiated and sponsored by Schering-Plough, the manufacturer of
Rebetron, the primary treatment for hepatitis C at the time. Another well-cited example is
the case of the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI). While receiving millions
of dollars in funding from the pharmaceutical industry, NAMI used its political position
to oppose black-box warnings and down play emerging data that linked antidepressant
use to increased suicide rates in adolescents (Conrad 2007, Rose 2013). NAMI concealed
both the amount of funding it received from the pharmaceutical industry and that it
coordinated its lobbying efforts with drug makers; this information was uncovered and
disclosed only after a government investigation on conflicts of interest (Rose 2013).
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Patient advocacy organizations occupy an interesting stakeholder position within
the pharmaceutical field. These organizations have differing interests from
pharmaceutical corporations but their actions align with the commerce logic interest in
expanding access to prescription drugs. PAOs position as advocates for improving health
care provide the organizations with moral legitimacy that allows them to engage directly
with policy makers on legislation related to pharmaceutical regulation. Nevertheless,
many of these organizations also have direct financial ties with the pharmaceutical
industry creating potential conflicts of interest that could negate an organization’s moral
legitimacy if these relationships were made public. The exact extent of industry ties is
complicated by the information asymmetry mentioned earlier but researchers have
estimated between 30 and 70 percent of all PAOs receive varying levels of financial
support from the industry (Rose 2013). The acceptance of financial support does not
automatically mean a PAO advocates for industry interest but the examples above
indicate the potential for conflicts of interest and co-optations exist in these relationships.
Despite the potential risk of appearing to mislead the public, pharmaceutical
corporations have an interest in continuing to support PAOs because these organizations
also facilitate the marketing and branding of disease conditions (Moynihan and Cassels
2005). A good example of brand management utilizing PAOs is the expansion of
attention-deficit/ hyperactive disorder from being a childhood problem to a condition also
afflicting adults. Moynihan and Cassels (2005: 61-81) discussed in detail how events
hosted by the Children and Adults with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
(CHADD) were sponsored by pharmaceutical corporations with the intent of spreading
awareness on ADHD in adults while branding the solution with their product. The
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significance of these industry tactics for Moynihan and Cassels (2005) was how they
were hidden from public view. Company logos and product names appeared at the events
but the events themselves were publicized as CHADD events even though a
pharmaceutical corporation was covering all the expenses.
The research of Shelia Rothman and her colleagues (2011) provides detailed
information about one company’s relationships to PAOs. Rothman et al. (2011) analyzed
the grant activity of Eli Lilly, one of the first U. S. pharmaceutical corporations to make
its charitable donations available to the public. The most significant finding from their
study is how the company acted strategically by donating to PAOs that aligned with the
therapeutic areas of the company’s bestselling products: neuroscience, endocrinology,
and oncology. Because the company listed all the PAOs receiving donations, the
researchers were able crosscheck the information by looking at the websites and tax
filings for the 188 PAOs meeting the study criteria. Of these 188 PAOs, the researchers
found complete data on 161 (85.6%) organizations. Of these 161 organizations, only 40
(25%) publically acknowledged receiving financial support from Eli Lilly. Not listing a
corporate sponsor does not mean an organization is co-opted, but researchers argue that
this lack of transparency is the main problem in accurately understanding the dynamics of
the relationship between pharmaceutical companies and patient advocacy organizations
(Angell 2005, Jones 2008, Moynihan and Cassels 2005, Rose 2008, Rothman et al.
2011).
This lack of transparency is not limited to the United States. Kathryn Jones’
(2008) research addressed the issue of industry influence in patient advocacy groups in
the UK. Jones’ (2008) study used a similar method of crosschecking publically available
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information on corporate donations with publically available PAO disclosure
information. Her data also indicated companies made donations strategically by selecting
organizations advocating for causes represented by the therapeutic classes of their
products. Her general conclusion was that while the industry is not bankrolling or setting
the agenda for advocacy groups, the lack of transparency in reporting financial
connections constrains the identification of possible conflicts of interest.
In conclusion, pharmaceutical corporations structure their interactions with
patients as actions of public awareness on the management of pathological conditions by
framing patients as active health care consumers. Direct to customer advertisements rely
on disease narratives to engender the salience of a disease state to potential customers and
frame pharmaceutical products as a legitimate, if not the optimal, treatment option.
Pharmaceutical corporations support patient advocacy organizations because they can
generate public awareness on diseases and provide an additional legitimate platform for
product advertisement. Moreover, when pharmaceutical corporations donate to advocacy
groups, they tend to select charities advocating for diseases represented within their
product range, demonstrating this is a strategic activity aligned with the logic order of the
market as opposed to the logic order of care.
Within the pharmaceutical field, patients appear to be the stakeholders with the
least amount of power to influence field dynamics and shape interactions. I do not
propose that patients are passive actors, Patient Advocacy Organizations are initiated and
lead by patients, but the relationship between pharmaceutical corporations and patient is
dominated by the corporate agenda. Social media has provided some increased power to
patients as a platform for public complaints, but this power is limited. While
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pharmaceutical corporations may frame drug advertisements within narratives of care, the
likelihood patients as a stakeholder group could directly influence dominant
organizational strategy seems remote.
3.4 Pharmaceutical Corporations and Physicians
Physicians function as gatekeepers in the organizational field but their ability to
perform this function has changed over time due to the actions of pharmaceutical
corporations. During the 1980s, the structure of the relationship between pharmaceutical
corporations and physicians shifted away from being a partnership in health care
treatment towards a market based dynamic of unequal power where physicians are
consumers of pharmaceutical products (Angell 2005, Applbaum 2009, Goldacre 2012,
Jaakkola and Renko 2007, Jain 2007, Landa and Elliot 2013, Spurling 2010). Elina
Jaakkola and Mijia Renko’s (2007) study represents the structure of this new market
dynamic as they frame physicians as “surrogate adopters” who evaluate new drugs using
a different set of criteria than the end-user (patient). “As physicians evaluate the
product’s acceptability from their patients’ viewpoint as well as their own, marketers of
new products should communicate the key benefits of an innovation for both parties”
(Jaakkola and Renko 2007: 342). Pharmaceutical companies are advised to understand
the context in which physicians make decisions shapes physician perceptions about a
product so the presentation of information to physicians should be treated as a marketing
campaign to increase new product adoption (Cook 2006, Sismondo 2009). Applbaum
(2009) succinctly summarized the new dynamic between pharmaceutical companies and
physicians by stating, “The strategic goal becomes how to convert them from potential
obstacles to compliant facilitators” (187).
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3.4.1 Key Opinion Leaders, Ghostwriters, and Clinical Data
One of the main strategies pharmaceutical corporations employ to align physician
interest with their own is the utilization of key opinion leaders (KOL). Pharmaceutical
companies realized in the early 20th century that physicians were more responsive to
product claims when they occurred through a direct physician-to-physician interaction
(Fox 1961, Landa and Elliot 2013, Sismondo 2013). Pharmaceutical corporations now
utilize KOLs for authorship on journal articles and as speakers at conferences and
symposiums. The role of KOLs within the field is so important to the successful
management of pharmaceutical products that a separate industry of companies has
emerged focusing on locating, recruiting, and managing KOLs (Landa and Elliot 2013,
Sismondo 2009, 2013).
The strategic goal for pharmaceutical companies in employing KOLs is to
increase the adoption rate of products (Matheson 2008, Sismondo 2009). This is achieved
through the careful selection of KOLs on the criteria of professional reputation and
professional embeddedness. Another important selection criterion for KOLs is that their
research should align with the product, meaning KOLs are generally already working and
established in the therapeutic area of a pharmaceutical company’s product portfolio.
Nevertheless, key opinion leaders are not industry shills but are reflexive actors
within the field (Fox 1961, Goldacre 2012, Matheson 2008). KOLs are medical
professionals aware of their ethical obligations towards patients and publically resent
implications that they would advocate for inferior, or harmful, products because of their
industry relationships. As Sergio Sismondo (2009: 640) found in his research: “Dr. A, for
example, cheerfully comments: ‘My mother and father are on a lot of the drugs I speak

78

for. I think they’re terrific. So, I am not putting my parents on it because I am speaking
for the company — it’s the best drug.’” This statement indicates that while KOLs
advocate on behalf of pharmaceutical corporations for specific products, they publically
maintain a primary alignment with the logic order of care.
Becoming a KOL provides both professional and financial opportunities for a
physician. KOLs can receive compensation for travel expenses to conferences and
honorariums for giving conference talks. They can also receive honorariums for giving
talks to local physicians groups. However, the financial benefits scholars are most critical
towards are the available research grants from the companies of the products they
advocate. Critics argue the real dynamics of the KOL relationships are not neutral but
structured to align the larger presentation of medical knowledge to physicians with the
interest of the pharmaceutical industry (Goldacre 2012, Matheson 2008, Sismondo 2009).
Pharmaceutical companies also strategically control the knowledge available on
their products and seek to influence physicians by hiring ghostwriters on journal articles.
Ghostwriting is the practice whereby a pharmaceutical company, or a company hired by a
pharmaceutical company, writes an article on the results of a clinical trial and then
solicits a physician to sign on as the primary author. The ability of the physician to make
changes to the article varies, as well as, the access the physician is given to review the
data. This practice is one of the most contested strategies within the pharmaceutical field
because in addition to being seen by many as a subversive form of marketing (Goldacre
2012, Matheson 2008, Sismondo 2009, Spielmans and Parry 2010), it also raises
questions on the scientific legitimacy of professional medicine. The extent of
ghostwriting is hard to determine because it is an opaque practice but Marcia Angell

79

(2005), a former editor in chief at the New England Journal of Medicine, stated
ghostwriting articles for professional journals has become increasingly commonplace.
Ghostwriting occurs because it meets the interests of both individual physicians
and pharmaceutical corporations. The practice assists physicians in developing their
professional reputations by increasing their publication count. Physicians, especially
those with academic careers, are evaluated on their impact within the discipline and
publication counts are a prime measure of this (Sismondo 2009). Ghostwriting benefits
companies through practices that generate the highest impact and product exposure:
strategically targeting KOLs for authorship and submitting to the most prestigious
journals. Both of these tactics can improve the cultural capital of a product, regardless of
its scientific merit, by engendering the perception in other physicians that the drug
provides a greater advancement in treatment because a leading professional in a
prestigious journal endorsed it (Applbaum 2009, Sah and Fugh-Berman 2013).
Cognitively, this strategy is a way to get around the problem of a reflexive gatekeeper
because delivering a questionable message through a trusted source discourages the
receiver from questioning the validity of the message.
The medical profession has been reluctant to address the issue of ghostwriting.
Many physicians do not think it is a problem because the ghostwriter is able to review
and revise the work before the final submission (Goldacre 2012, Sismondo 2009).
Journals also benefit from ghostwriting because the requests for reprints of individual
articles by pharmaceutical companies, drug representatives use reprints of articles as
handouts during office visits, brings in a significant amount of revenue (Spielmans and
Parry 2010). Nevertheless, as an institutionalized practice, ghostwriting threatens the
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legitimacy of scientific authority within professional medicine because the extent and
impact of the practice is currently unmeasurable.
Related to the practice of ghostwriting, the ownership of clinical research data by
pharmaceutical corporations also threatens the scientific legitimacy of professional
medicine. Ben Goldacre (2012) and others (Abraham 1996, Angel 2005, Moynihan and
Cassels 2005, Spielmans and Parry 2010) argue one of the biggest problems in the
pharmaceutical field is the misleading use of evidence in professional journal articles.
The corporate ownership of data is viewed as problematic because scientific legitimacy
claims rest on the idea of objective analysis but when data are treated as proprietary
products, their validity cannot be assessed.
Brown (2013) argued that the incentive to manipulate results is tied to the
financial logic of the industry and made possible because the system of scientific review
at journals relies on routinized practices, like test for statistical significance, which can be
gamed, instead of engaging in difficult scientific judgement calls. Based on his extensive
fieldwork within the industry on publication management, Sismondo (2009) argued the
people and companies producing ghostwritten work understand the importance of
scientific standards and the quality of the articles produced is not inferior to non-industry
funded work. However, ghostwriting is a top-down managed process where the
companies providing the service are financially dependent on pharmaceutical
corporations. This interorganizational structure means that despite the importance of
maintaining scientific standards, publication management companies know their value in
the pharmaceutical field is determined primarily by producing material that successfully
markets products and not just good science (Sismondo 2009). The dynamics of KOLs and
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ghostwriting indicate the concern of pharmaceutical corporations over scientific validity
may only be significant within physician interactions and is not likely to represent the
dominant organizational strategy within the field.
3.4.2 Advertising to Physicians
Pharmaceutical corporations also engage in direct marketing to physicians
through advertisements in medical journals. Pharmaceutical companies argue that these
advertisements serve educational purposes and research has revealed physicians do use
advertisements in this way (Othman et al. 2009). This is a lucrative marketing strategy for
corporations with research indicating returns of $2.43 for each dollar spent during the
first four years of a products lifecycle and upwards of $4 after that (Othman et al. 2009).
The systematic review of studies on journal advertisements by Noordin Othman and
colleagues (2009) found that most advertisements used low quality references and studies
examining advertisements for misleading claims consistently find them. While
researchers point out these are problems with allowing direct to physician advertisements,
journals have been reluctant to address the issue because many rely on the revenue
advertising brings in (Goldacre 2012). Furthermore, the journals typically have internal
standards and review policies that they argue are sufficient to identify fraudulent claims
(Othman et al. 2009).
One of the most well researched areas in the relationship between pharmaceutical
corporations and physicians is the practice of using drug representatives to market
products through direct interactions with physicians. Research consistently indicates that
a cognitive dissonance occurs in the practice whereby physicians do not think accepting
small items or the occasional meal from drug representatives influences their prescribing
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habits but they think it does influence their peers (Chimonas 2007, Goldacre 2012, Sah
and Fugh-Berman 2013). However, the evidence is clear that physician’s prescribing
habits are influenced by gift practices and that companies, with their sophisticated
marketing analysis teams, are aware of this or else they would not be spending money on
the practice (Chimonas 2007, Goldacre 2012, Sah and Fugh-Berman 2013).
Research on the interactions between physicians and drug industry representatives
indicate that these are complex social situations. Physicians view interactions with drug
representatives reflexively and claim that they critically evaluate the material presented
rather than accept the message at face value (Chimonas 2007, Goldacre 2012, Jain 2007).
Physicians perceive the interactions as educational and informative, but at the same time
are aware drug reps are sales personnel trained to present information biased towards
their products. Yet the awareness of receiving a biased message does not prevent bias
from occurring since researchers consistently show that physician prescription rates
increase for specific medications and company products after a drug representative visit
(Goldacre 2012, Sah and Fugh-Berman 2013). Susan Chimonas (2007) and her
colleagues applied cognitive dissonance to explain how physicians negotiated this
contradiction and argued that creating voluntary guidelines to regulate these interactions
would not change physician behavior but the practice would have to completely stop in
order to address the issue.
The final way pharmaceutical companies manage the information physicians
receive is through continuing medical education. Continuing medical education
requirements in the United States have been in place since the 1970s and mean that
physicians must accumulate a certain amount of education hours annually to maintain
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their medical license. The Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education
(ACCME), formalized by the AMA in 1981, regulates and certifies continuing medical
education programs but a range of other organizations actually develop and run the
programs. Some of these organizations are almost completely supported by money from
pharmaceutical corporations while others, such as the Veterans Administration, are less
connected to industry (Brody 2009). The ACCME has strict guidelines on the content of
continuing education programs but industry members sit on the boards developing these
guidelines, which raises conflict of interest concerns. Pharmaceutical corporations also
hire KOLs as presenters and provide them with scripts and slideshows, insuring the
message physicians receive by maintaining control over program content (Brody 2009,
Sismondo 2013).
In conclusion, pharmaceutical corporations structure their interactions with
physicians in the field through practices designed to manage the availability and content
on knowledge about pharmaceutical products. The strategies used range from the subtle
control of information through key opinion leaders and ghostwriting to overt
advertisements for products in medical journals and designing continuing education
curriculum. I contend it is not that physicians do not adhere to the logic of care in the
interactions with pharmaceutical corporations; rather pharmaceutical corporations have
become more skillful in negotiating these interactions around their commercial interest. I
think Sergio Sismondo best captured the institutionalized structure behind these field
dynamics when he stated:
Pharmaceutical companies not only shape taken-for-granted medical
knowledge and opinions, but have also, in many situations, naturalized their
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presence and roles: most physicians see the companies as playing legitimate
roles when the companies promote products in clinics, when they create and
distribute medical research, and when they fund and provide continuing
medical education. (Sismondo 2013: 640)
3.5 Pharmaceutical Corporations and the Retail Pharmaceutical Supply Chain
Unlike in other commercial industries, pharmaceutical corporations cannot sell
their products directly to the consumer. Instead, products move through a series of
intermediary organizations until reaching the patient. Further complicating the supply
process is the fact that most consumers do not pay the complete cost of a prescription
drug at the time of purchase. Payments move through a different series of intermediary
organizations before reaching pharmaceutical corporations. This market structure is best
understood as a subfield within the larger pharmaceutical field. Pharmaceutical
corporations hold the dominant position in terms of drug pricing but the fragmented
market created by different intermediary paths for supply and payment have allowed
other stakeholders to gain a significant amount of negotiating power against the interests
of pharmaceutical corporations.
3.5.1 Prescription Drug Pricing
Few people in the United States currently pay for prescription drugs out-of-pocket
but this was not always the case. In 1970, 82.4% of retail expenditures on prescription
drugs were paid for out-of-pocket but by 2013, this figure had been reduced to 16.9% and
health insurance was covering 82.1% of expenditures (Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services 2015). Unlike other consumer goods, there is no single price for a
prescription drug in the United States; instead, drug pricing is a market of differential
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pricing, known as a Ramsey pricing scheme (Frank 2001, Lybecker 2006, Vogel 2007).
Patients’ who use cash to purchase prescription drugs pay the highest price while
individuals with drug benefits pay less, both in direct out-of-pocket cost and in the
amount their insurer reimburses the retailer.
The common criticism of drug prices in the United States follows narratives of
corporations engaged in profiteering and cost shifting (Spitz and Wickham 2012). The
methods pharmaceutical corporations use to determine drug prices are proprietary
knowledge but firms publicly state that price determinations reflect the need to remain
profitable and continue engaging in research and development (Freeman 2006). The
recent decision by Turing Pharmaceuticals to raise the price of Daraprim from $13.50 to
$750 a pill is unique only because of the sustained attention it has received which is most
likely due to the CEO’s brash manner and the presidential election cycle rather than the
actual price hike (Ramsey 2015).
Most other industrialized nations employ a national level system of price control
on prescription drugs, but in the United States, there is no regulation on drug pricing and
private corporations act as intermediaries altering the price between pharmaceutical
corporations and the consumer. Scholars argue that this structure of pharmaceutical
coverage creates price differentials because prices are determined through negotiations
between profit-maximizing firms and price-sensitive buyers (Frank 2001). Framing prices
as a process of structural factors counters the ideological argument that pharmaceutical
corporations are engaging in excessive rent seeking, or gouging the customer, by
charging high prices. Four types of organizations occupy the role of negotiators in the
pharmaceutical supply chain between manufacturers and consumers: health maintenance
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organizations (HMOs), pharmacy benefits managers (PBMs), wholesale distributors, and
retail pharmacies.

Figure 3.1 Stakeholder Connections in the United States Retail Pharmacy Supply Chain
3.5.2 Structure of the Pharmaceutical Supply Chain
Since the 1980s, HMOs, PBMs, wholesalers, and retail pharmacies have held
different levels of influence within the pharmaceutical supply chain, but organizations of
all four types continue to operate as negotiators within the pharmaceutical field. One of
the key strategies employed by HMOs and PBMs is the use of formularies to restrict
consumer drug choice and thereby lower the organizational cost of drug coverage. A drug
formulary is a list of drugs for routine use that have been approved for some level of cost
coverage (Neumann 2004). There are three categories of formulary lists based on the
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guideline’s incentive structure: open, preferred, or closed (Simonet 2007). Drug choice is
unrestricted in open plans, meaning that any drug that a physician prescribes for the
patient are covered. In preferred plans, some unlisted drugs are covered only if the patient
receives prior authorization. Finally, in closed plans, unlisted drugs are not covered in
any form, meaning that the patient has to pay the total cost out-of-pocket.
Cost-effective analysis is the basis of drug evaluations for formulary inclusion. To
avoid conflicts of interests independent pharmacy and therapeutics committees oversee
the drug selection process using information from a variety of sources that range from
anecdotal physician evidence to clinical trial data from pharmaceutical manufactures
(Neumann 2004). Large market PBMs are able to receive clinical data from
pharmaceutical corporations that is not publically available because the companies want
their products listed in the formulary. This practice demonstrates the strength of
formularies as interorganizational negotiation tools.
Critics of the process argue the focus of pharmacy and therapeutics committees is
on reducing pharmacy budgets rather than patient health. Furthermore, formularies are
proprietary products and even though efforts to standardize them using evidence-based
medicine have been made, the decision-making is still black-boxed to a certain extent,
suggesting that some differentiation between formulary listings are the result of personal
preferences rather than objective medical evidence (Neumann 2004). These facts indicate
the interests of pharmacy and therapeutics committees likely align with the logic order of
commerce.
Health Maintenance Organizations were the earliest large organizations that acted
as intermediaries between pharmaceutical corporations and patients. As Jonathan Weiner
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and his colleagues (1991) pointed out the early efforts of HMOs were designed to reduce
the cost of pharmaceuticals by discouraging high price drug usage rather than actively
negotiating lower prices with pharmaceutical corporations. Weiner el al. (1991) stated
this strategy was adopted primary because prescription drugs accounted for only a small
part of health care spending for insurers prior to the 1990s, making interorganizational
negotiation a financially ineffective method to reduce overall health care cost. Rather
than controlling patients, HMOs sought to control physicians and pharmacists by using
formularies and imposing mandatory generic substitution rules. While these practices did
lower the cost of drug usage on individual prescriptions, Weiner el al. (1991) found that
having drug coverage through an HMO actually increased overall drug usage in patients
and negated the overall cost reductions for the organization. This outcome is not
unexpected and is referred to as the moral hazard of health care coverage (Arrow 1963,
Hoffman 2006). By the end of the 1980s, HMOs and other traditional fee-for-service
health insurers were increasingly turning to pharmacy benefits managers as a more
efficient strategy for managing customer drug benefits and reducing drug cost.
Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) are third party organizations that negotiate
rebates and discounts between pharmaceutical manufactures on behalf of their clients:
HMOs, traditional health insurers, retail pharmacies, the Federal Government, hospitals,
and other organizations that provide prescription drug access (Simonet 2007, Sroka et al.
2000). Drug formularies are the primary strategy that PBMs employ as leverage to
negotiate with pharmaceutical manufactures. Since not all drugs are included in a
formulary, formularies act to either provide access to or exclude specific pharmaceutical
products from the market segments covered by a PBM’s clients. Pharmaceutical
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corporations want their products to be included in formularies and are willing to negotiate
rebates directly with PBMs based on the size of the potential market.
In addition to managing drug billing for their clients, PBMs also collect data on
patient pharmaceutical usage and physician prescription records. The collection of patient
data is valuable for managing individual health by spotting potential drug interactions or
duplications. Physician prescribing data is useful for payers to assess the success of their
control mechanisms. The PBM industry is highly concentrated with a few corporations
controlling large market segments and occupying dominant positions (Simonet 2007).
The structure of the industry, as well as the value of the data collected by PBMs, led three
of the largest pharmaceutical corporations to acquire PBMs during the 1990s as a strategy
of vertical integration; however, almost all of these acquisitions ended as costly failures
(Simonet 2007).
Daniel Simonet (2007) argued while the pharmaceutical corporations that
acquired PBMs during the 1990s publically presented the actions as intended to improve
patient quality and safety, the reality was these corporations pursued the acquisitions as a
strategy to obtain market control. “PBM ownership was a mean to obtain information on
patients and prescribers, to increase control on drug prescription, to secure an access to
markets and build entry barriers” (Simonet 2007: 19). The three major pharmaceutical
corporations that acquired PBMs were Merck, SmithKline Beecham, and Eli Lilly; each
firm acquired a large PBM with coverage ranging from 14 million patients to 56 million
patients and at costs between $2.3 billion and $6.6 billion. The pharmaceutical
corporations argued post-acquisition that these PBMs would operate autonomously from
the parent corporation in terms of formulary decision-making but in each case, there were

90

formulary changes after the acquisition that benefited the parent firm at the expense of
other pharmaceutical corporations (Simonet 2007).
This strategy of vertical integration, however, resulted in long-term failures in all
cases because of countervailing actions taken by other stakeholders in the pharmaceutical
field and unexpected internal complications from the mergers. The first external pressure
came from government regulators. The Federal Trade Commission intervened in the
Merck-Medco and Eli Lilly-PCS acquisitions to limit the ability of the parent company to
alter the PBMs formulary independently. The FTC did not place limits on the SmithKline
Beecham-Diversified agreement. Physicians also expressed hostility to these acquisitions
for several reasons: formulary usage denies individual practitioner experience, drug
pricing is not transparent which complicates formulary compliance, and the asymmetry
between PBMs and practitioners creates a situation where if practitioners ignore the
financial arrangements created by the PBM and parent company physicians would no
longer be the best patient advocates (Simonet 2007). In addition to these external factors,
PBMs proved difficult to integrate within the structure of the parent company because of
the firewalls required by the FTC.
Financially, these acquisitions did not produce the expected market gains, and by
2003, all three pharmaceutical companies had spun-off or sold the PBMs they acquired
(Simonet 2007). While the vertical integration of PBMs did not work for pharmaceutical
corporations, since Merck’s sale of Medco several major retail pharmacy chains have
pursued the strategy (Simonet 2007). The most notable examples are the 2007 acquisition
of Caremark by CVS, the second largest PBM at the time, and the recent announcement
by Rite Aid that it will complete an acquisition of EnvisionRx by 2017.
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Retail pharmacies are another key stakeholder in the pharmaceutical supply chain
because they are the delivery point to the consumer. In 2014, standalone chain and
independent pharmacies accounted for 55.5% of the total number of prescriptions filled
in the U.S. (Drug Channels Institute 2015). Pharmacy outlets in mass merchant or
supermarkets accounted for another 23.4% of prescriptions filled. Retail pharmacies
occupy an intersecting position in the supply chain because they negotiate financial
arrangements with PBMs and insurers for the right to be providers to their clients and
they negotiate supply orders with wholesalers and pharmaceutical manufactures.
The cost of a drug at a retail pharmacy is a component of two factors. First, the
size of the pharmacy, chain or independent, determines its bargaining power with PBMs
and insurers (Brooks et al. 2008). Because PBMs gain negotiation power through the
coverage size of their market, chain pharmacies get better deals than local or independent
operators. The second factor is the customer type. There are three main categories of
retail customers: government beneficiaries, private third party covered beneficiaries, and
cash-paying patients (Brooks et al. 2008). The price a customer pays is based on the
negotiation between the pharmacy and the PBM with cash customers paying the most;
therefore, the same drug has different prices within the same pharmacy. The profitability
of a pharmacy is determined by its ability to negotiate a low payment rate with the PBMs
and high rebate rates with wholesalers and manufacturers. Brooks et al. (2008) stated that
approximately 70% of pharmacy stock comes from wholesalers and the remaining 30%
from manufactures. The fact the majority of retail drugs arrive at pharmacies through
wholesale distributors is another element distorting the publically listed price for a drug
and the actual price patient’s pay.

92

3.5.3 The Federal Government as a Powerless Buyer
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) explicitly discussed the importance of considering
the role of government within a strategic action field. Unlike other fields, the Federal
government occupies two separate roles in the pharmaceutical field. The first role,
discussed earlier in the chapter, is the regulatory role in determining what products are
allowed on the market. The second role is as a purchaser of pharmaceutical products
through different government sponsored health care programs and health care benefits
provided to government employees. This makes the Federal government the largest single
purchaser of prescription drugs in the Unites States, but when congress expanded
Medicare coverage to include prescription drugs, the Federal government was explicitly
denied the ability to negotiate prices directly with pharmaceutical corporations
(Newhouse 2004).
This legislative restriction has resulted in the United States having higher average
drug prices on almost all major brand name pharmaceuticals because drug manufactures
use Medicare prices as the starting point for negotiations with purchasers. By prohibiting
the largest purchaser to negotiate on prices, the Federal government is forced into the role
of a price-taker when economic theory on market structure predicts the Federal
government should be the price-maker (Vogel 2007). Many industry critics contend
patients in the United States are in essence subsidizing drugs for the rest of the world
(Goldacre 2012, Lexchin 2006).
Medicare Part D, the prescription drug component of Medicare currently enrolls
72 percent of eligible Medicare beneficiaries (Hoadley et al. 2015). However, despite the
high enrollment, there is considerable variation in services because the program actually
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offers beneficiaries options of plans sponsored by private companies. This further
undercuts the ability of Medicare to receive favorable prices since program recipients are
spread across multiple private markets instead of being consolidated into a single
Medicare market. The other oddity of Medicare Part D is the much maligned “donut
hole” (Newhouse 2004). The drug plans offered through Medicare Part D provide
varying levels of coverage up to a certain limit; the average plan’s limit is $3,310 in 2016
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2015). After the limit is reached, the enrollee is responsible
for the majority of their drug cost until they reach a total of $4,850 (an out-of-pocket cost
of $1,540), after which Medicare and the patients’ drug coverage provider again cover
most of the patients’ drug cost.
In addition to Medicare Part D being a complicated system for patients to
navigate, the program further reveals how pharmaceutical corporations occupy the
dominant role in the field. In a 2006 letter to the New England Journal of Medicine,
Congresswoman Louise Slaughter discussed the legislative processes that occurred
during the final legislative period on Medicare Part D. According to Slaughter (2006), the
final bill was altered 24 hours before the vote during closed door meetings between
congressional leaders and industry representatives. Congresswoman Slaughter’s
assessment makes it clear her colleagues made sure the pharmaceutical industry’s
interests, in terms of drug pricing and preventing drug reimportation, were represented in
the bill at the expense of providing patients access to cheaper drugs.
In conclusion, the pharmaceutical supply chain in the United States is a complex
network of several different organizational players. Through various different
mechanisms, the stakeholders are able to negotiate favorable outcomes with
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pharmaceutical manufactures. Size is a key organizational feature that provides increased
bargaining power because size corresponds to the potential market segment a
pharmaceutical corporation can gain access too. Several large mergers and acquisitions
occurring within the past two decades have also influenced the pharmaceutical supply
chain by creating a more concentrated market. The three largest PBMs in 2003,
controlling 52% of the market, are now two larger organizations with the acquisition of
Caremark by CVS and the 2012 merger of Express Scripts and Medco Solutions.
The organizational strategies of the majority of stakeholders in the pharmaceutical
supply chain appear to align with the logic of commerce. Suppliers in the field,
pharmaceutical corporations, retail pharmacies, and wholesalers, act to keep prices high
in order to maximize profits. Purchasers in the field, pharmacy benefit managers and
health insurers, negotiate with supplies to reduce their cost but not necessarily the cost to
patients. The end consumer, patients, are insulated from these negations, which results in
most patients being unware of the total costs of prescription drugs. The fact complaints
about high drug costs are made through public media indicates patients as stakeholders
occupy a marginalized role in the pharmaceutical supply chain. That this marginalization
of patients affects the organizational strategy of pharmaceutical corporations is indicated
by the common practice of raising drug prices on acquired products.
3.6 Conclusion
This analysis shows the multitude of stakeholders within the pharmaceutical field
creates a dynamic system with pharmaceutical organizations at the center. The structure
of the field is fragmented such that pharmaceutical corporations, while occupying the
dominant field position, are subject to a variety of constraints that result in
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pharmaceutical corporations in general pursuing distinct strategy sets at each site of
stakeholder interaction. As the previous literature indicates, these strategies are not
isolated but align with the three logic orders of commerce, care, and science, which
create differing expectations and power relations.
Pharmaceutical corporations interact with the Food and Drug Administration
through the logic of science. While the FDA represents a potential countervailing actor
within the field, legislative action has created a situation where the agency is financially
dependent on pharmaceutical corporations, making anti-industry decisions uncommon.
Furthermore, the regulation of pharmaceutical products is limited to safety and efficacy
demonstrated through clinical data gathered primarily from randomized control trials, not
comparative experiments, preventing the organization from developing best practice
options for medical professionals. Finally, FDA is dependent on applicants to submit
data, allowing corporations to manage the review process further by strategically
selecting the information provided for evaluation.
Pharmaceutical corporations interact with patients through the logic of care in two
capacities. Patients are primarily consumers, and in the United States, pharmaceutical
corporations are able to market products directly to patients. This allows pharmaceutical
companies to increase demand for a product directly through advertisements and
indirectly by raising awareness on an issue as a potential health concern. The second
component of interaction between pharmaceutical corporations and patients is mediated
through partnerships with patient advocacy organizations that provide legitimacy for
awareness campaigns by framing them as educational and public health concerns.
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Pharmaceutical corporations interact with physicians through the logic of care.
This assertion may sound contradictory because the methods of communication between
theses stakeholders groups are scientific, but the underlying message of the content is on
improving patient outcomes. The point of medical journal articles from the
pharmaceutical industry perspective is not to present data for physicians to independently
evaluate but to use data to support the adoption of a specific treatment. The use of key
opinion leaders highlights how the delivery of the message is dominant in the interaction
over the actual scientific value of the results.
Finally, pharmaceutical corporations interact with payers and purchasers in the
pharmaceutical supply chain through the logic of commerce. Pharmaceutical corporations
dominate these interactions by serving as the price makers in the market. However, the
complex and fragmented structure of the general U.S. health care system weakens this
role because large purchaser organizations are able to capitalize on their position as
gatekeepers to the market and negotiate favorable prices.
While the Food and Drug Administration and physicians both act in a regulatory
capacity between pharmaceutical corporations and the end consumer, patients, their
overall power in the field has diminished from previous periods. Conversely, patients
gained power within the field in response to the larger shift in health care management
towards the logic of commerce but are unable to leverage their stakeholder position to
negotiate on drug prices. Understanding these current trends and why these stakeholders
are important within the field requires additional historical context on the formation of
the field. The next chapter is a historical analysis of the pharmaceutical field in the
United States and traces the development and changing dynamics within the field.
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CHAPTER 4
DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES PHARMACEUTICAL FIELD
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide historical evidence on the development
and changes in the United States pharmaceutical field that led to the current dynamics
discussed in the previous chapter. Historical analysis provides the context institutional
theorists argue is critical for understanding how organizational behavior is
institutionalized; specifically historical analysis reveals how changes in stakeholder
interests and power relationships within a strategic action field act as external effects on
organizational strategy. Fligstein and McAdam (2012) argue that a historical analysis is a
critical part of the process for studying strategic actions fields because it identifies
collective actions, distributions of stakeholder power, and processes of settlement
negotiation.
Power relations in the field, determined by which stakeholder constructs the
“rules of the game” (North 1990), are revealed by analyzing how settlements are reached
through negotiations during periods of contention. Changing power dynamics is one
mechanism that incorporates new institutional frameworks into an established
organizational field. For example, Scott et al. (2000) demonstrated how changing power
relations in the national health care field resulted in the organizational strategy of Bay
Area hospitals shifting to align with the institutional logic of the dominate stakeholder.
The goal of this historical analysis is to illustrate how the historical context of the United
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States pharmaceutical field has led to the current field structure of pharmaceutical
corporations as dominant stakeholders over Federal regulators, physicians, and patients
and created a field of institutional pluralism between the logics of science, care, and
commerce.
Historical analysis also highlights the value of organizational embeddedness
advocated by institutional theorists. The strategic adjustments organizations make in
reaction to environmental changes are more apparent through the history of an
organizational field. Understanding institutional effects requires evaluating how
organizations in the same industry respond to the same external mechanisms.
Institutionalized responses are indicated by strategic patterns between organizations. In a
field of institutional pluralism, historical patterns in organizational strategy should reveal
if the dominant logic order within a field changes over time and the relative influence
between logics.
Dominant logic orders are stronger indicators of legitimate strategy; therefore,
overtime the majority of organizations are predicted to change strategies primarily when
the dominant logic of the field shifts. Organizations are predicted to adopt alternative
strategies for organizationally specific reasons. Additionally, organizational strategy can
be dependent on the historical context of the organization. For example, Powell and
Sandholtz (2012) showed the professional background of a biotech startup’s founder,
academic, corporate, or financial industry, had a significant impact on the organizational
strategy of the firm. As Chandler (1977) and Fligstein (1985) demonstrated,
organizational strategy within an industry is susceptible to historical changes in
management ideology as the background of executives within a firm changes. This
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historical analysis contributes to the project goals by charting the development and
changes within the pharmaceutical field that allow contemporary organizations legitimate
options in selecting organizational strategies.
4.2 Emergence of the Organizational Field, Late 19th Century to 1910s
The use of herbs and compounds for medicinal purposes traces back to ancient
times but the defined organizational field for the pharmaceutical industry in the United
States developed around the turn of the 20th century. The pharmaceutical trade originated
in the United States during the Colonial period primarily through importation businesses.
After the Revolutionary War, the pharmaceutical trade shifted from an importation based
industry into homegrown manufacturing. While some of these early manufacturers
reached the level of national distribution, there was little collective action between
companies. In was only after the Federal government began to propose industry wide
regulations in the late-19th century that the collective action necessary for a strategic
action field began to emerge. During this time, pharmaceutical organizations as a group
acted mainly through reactionary positions to deal with the mobilization of external
actors on their businesses. This lack of strategic action resulted in the medical profession
and Federal government becoming the dominant stakeholders when the pharmaceutical
field emerged at the beginning of the 20th century.
4.2.1 The Colonial Period and 19th Century
Colonists purchased brand name drugs imported from European manufacturers,
and aside from a few local entrepreneurs capitalizing on Native American “cures,” the
production of indigenous pharmaceuticals in the colonies was non-existent (Young
1961). High import cost led to a lively business of pharmaceutical fraud whereby druggist
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would purchase or acquire the empty bottles of brand name European products and refill
them with homemade mixtures. Colonial independence did not immediately change these
practices, as industrious new American producers packaged their products in containers
resembling the imported goods to capitalize on customer loyalty (Young 1961). The
increasing consumption caused by an expanding middle class and loose, or non-existent,
regulations lead to an explosion of novel drug products on the American market during
the 19th century.
Drug manufacturing during the 19th century was not unified by the collective
behavior that defines strategic action fields but instead was divided between medical
practitioners who produced their own products or had pharmacists mix compounds by
prescription, small manufactures who produced known compounds for pharmacies to
distribute, and patent medicine companies which marketed and sold secret formula
products directly to the public (Starr 1982). Patent medicine companies did not actually
sell patented products as they are defined by current patent law, which requires patent
seekers to submit the chemical details of a product to the government, but sold
proprietary products, allowing them to keep the formulas secret. These companies varied
in scale from small firms with local distribution operations to larger firms with regional
and national distributions (Young 1961).
Patent medicine companies were direct competitors to physicians in the 19th
century by not only manufacturing drugs for curative purposes, but also publishing
guides to achieve good health and inviting people to write in to them for personal health
advice. Patent medicine companies threatened the organization of professional medicine
around the logic of science because formulas for the compounds were propriety secrets
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and companies were not required to demonstrate their efficacy or provide more than
anecdotal evidence in support of their curative claims. Patient medicine companies
employed strategies that framed their products as resulting from scientific discoveries
when in fact they rarely conducted any scientific evaluations on the products.
Starr’s (1982: 128) example of William Radam’s Microbe Killer is an example of
how patent medicine companies gained legitimacy for their products through association
with the medical community’s science based professional project during the 19th century
(Abbott 1988). Radam’s Microbe Killer was a homemade tonic consisting of water, red
wine, hydrochloric and sulphuric acid. The product’s success is attributed not to its
efficacy, but to William Radam’s skillful advertising by capitalizing on the discovery of
microbes (Young 1961, Starr 1982). The American Medical Association adopted a
classification system in the late-19th century to distinguish between drug products and
assert jurisdictional control over pharmaceutical treatment. The classification system
divided pharmaceuticals into two categories: “ethical” preparations with known
compositions advertised directly to medical professionals and available to patients only
by prescription and “patent medicines” with secret formulas marketed directly to the
public and available without physician oversight (Starr 1982). This categorization was an
attempt to prevent patent medicines from being viewed as legitimate medical treatments
by the public.
4.2.2 Patent Medicine Companies
Lydia Pinkham and her Vegetable Compound is a classic example of the products
produced by the patent medicine industry and the organizational strategies pursued by
these companies. Mrs. Pinkham was not a medical professional, she was a former
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schoolteacher who took an herbal formula that her husband had received through a debt
settlement and, with a few alterations, began selling it as a cure-all tonic (Conrad and
Leiter 2008). Originally, Pinkham made her nostrum in the basement of her home in
Lynn, Massachusetts and sold it locally but she expanded her business through the
strategic use of newspaper advertisements. First advertised in the Boston Herald in 1876,
Lydia E. Pinkham’s Vegetable Compound, was touted as a treatment for “Female
Weaknesses”, which included menstrual cramps, diseases of the kidneys, and other issues
related to female anatomy (Conrad and Leiter 2008, Starr 1982).
Pinkham marketed her product directly to consumers and advertised her product
not only as a cure for specific illnesses but also as a substitute for treatments offered by
medical professionals. Starr (1982) recounts one instance of a woman who wrote
Pinkham to inquire if Pinkham’s compound would cure her prolapsed uterus because she
wanted to avoid the operation her physician said was necessary. Pinkham’s reply was,
“By all means avoid instrumental treatment for your trouble. Use the Compound as you
have been using it – faithfully and patiently – and it will eventually work a cure” (Starr
1982: 128). This example illustrates the dominant organizational strategy of patent
medicine companies at the time: marketing is what matters. James Young (1961) argued
the patent medical industry was pivotal in creating modern mass advertising. One of the
more extreme marketing tactics used by patent medical companies that led to public
outcry and eventual regulations on advertising methods was painting cliff sides along
railroad routes (Young 1961). With no formal or legal federal regulation of drug
production, companies had considerable leeway to make health claims about their
products with risk confined mostly to public backlash when the products failed to deliver.
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Direct to consumer advertisements and the personal touch of advice letters proved
successful for Pinkham’s company. In fact, the company continued to advise women to
write Mrs. Pinkham for almost 20 years after her death. The success of Lydia E.
Pinkham’s Vegetable Compound is attributed to the company’s marketing strategy rather
than any curative properties of the tonic (Conrad and Leiter 2008). Starr (1982) argued it
was reliance on direct marketing over substantive evidence, specifically the positioning
of nostrums and tonics as alternatives to professional treatment, that lead to the eventual
decline of the patent medicine companies in the early 20th century. Young’s (1961)
detailed analysis of specific patent medicines supports this conclusion as well and
illustrates how flamboyant owners made some of the biggest patent medicine fortunes
through showmanship rather than clinical efficacy.
4.2.3 External Pressure and Collective Action
Patent medicine companies established the Proprietary Medicine Manufactures
and Dealers Association in 1881 as a lobbying organization to repeal the taxes on
proprietary drugs enacted during the Civil War (Young 1961). The Proprietary Medicine
Manufactures and Dealers Association actions focused on the business structure of the
industry, advocating mainly for lower tax rates and the freedom to make health claims in
marketing. Their competitors, physicians and other medical professionals, created
professional associations that focused on developing a cohesive institutional logic of
professionalism for their practices based on science. The result was the emergence of the
organizational field of pharmaceutical development with only one stakeholder possessing
the power of collective behavior and able to exert influence shaping the logics of the
field.
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The American Medical Association initially rejected the use of patent drugs as
valid treatment options by physicians on the grounds that medical knowledge and
techniques should belong to the profession but the organization did not have enough
political power to inforce this rule nor influence public policy regarding drugs until the
beginning of the 20th century (Starr 1982). Starr (1982) argued three changes occurred
between 1900 and 1910 that allowed professional medicine to gain dominance over the
patent drug manufacturers: muckraking journalists and other progressives joining the
cause against these products, a growing membership finally giving the AMA the
necessary financial resources to launch successful lobbying and public awareness
campaigns, and ethical drug makers beginning to recognize their dependence on
physicians as gatekeepers.
Throughout the 19th century patent medicine makers were constantly subjected to
negative publicity; however, with the large diversity of newspapers, the most successful
manufactures were able to maintain their market share by purchasing favorable editorials
from competing publishers or even disturbing their own publications (Young 1961). The
ability of patent medicine manufactures to purchase or present favorable counter opinions
started to change around the turn of the 20th century corresponding to rise of professional
journalism. Muckraking journalists began to increasingly target patent medicine
companies through exposés that revealed fraudulent products and practices. Starr (1982)
detailed the work of Samuel Hopkins Adams at Collier’s Weekly noting how his series of
articles targeted a wide range of companies and used tactics such as printing the
headstones of individuals who died of diseases shortly after taking the supposed cures.
Journalist like Adams contributed to structuring the organizational field of the

105

pharmaceutical industry by furthering the jurisdictional claims of professional medicine
as the only legitimate source for evaluating drugs in the minds of the public. “The
message underlying the exposés was that commercial interests were dangerous to health
and that physicians had to be trusted” (Starr 1982: 130).
Financially both the popular press and medical journals remained dependent on
the patent medicine industry for the substantial amount of income brought in by their
advertisements. This relationship was altered with the American Medical Association
1906 publication New and Nonofficial Remedies (Conrad and Leiter 2008, Starr 1982).
This publication was tied to the passage of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act that created
the Bureau of Chemistry to test products for adulteration and contamination following the
widespread revelations of the practices in the food processing industry popularized in
Upton Sinclair’s 1906 novel The Jungle. The AMA also established its own lab to test
drugs and a Council on Pharmacy and Chemistry to set acceptable standards for the
compounds listed as ethical drugs that physicians used to prescribe from (Starr 1982). It
is interesting to note here that neither AMA nor federal approval guaranteed a drug was
safe or effective but only meant “that the drug companies would be honest about the
contents of their wares, would not knowingly make fraudulent claims about their
efficacy, and would not bypass physicians’ authority” (Conrad and Leiter 2008: 828).
While not a formal legal agreement between physicians and drug companies,
Conrad and Leiter (2008) use the term gentlemen’s agreement, these actions further
structured the field because the AMA took an exclusionary stance. Drug manufacturers
could submit to testing and be allowed to continue advertising directly to physicians in
medical journals or not submit to testing and be denied access to medical journals but
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could continue advertising and selling directly to the public. In essence, the AMA
established itself not only as a gatekeeper between drug companies and potential patients
but also acted as an internal governance unit2 within the field by signaling the legitimacy
of the approved drugs to physicians and patients. The AMA’s success in legitimizing its
claims can be judged by the actions of newspapers which began cutting back on
advertisements for patent drugs listed as fraudulent by the AMA despite the fact that this
meant a reduction in revenue.
Patent medicines did not disappear from American life quickly. The initial federal
regulatory laws of 1906 proved weak and allowed manufactures of over-the-counter
drugs and other goods to continue asserting unfounded health claims about their products
and positioning them as alternatives to expensive physician visits and treatments (Tomes
2001, Young 1961). Moreover, as Nancy Tomes (2001) pointed out, the high cost of care
during the “Golden Age” of medicine, between the 1920s and 1960s, resulted in many
people being priced out of the brand name prescription drug market and continuing to
rely on patent medicine products as a source of care. However, the strengthening of
federal regulation around the middle of the 20th century combined with the scientific
advancements made in pharmaceutical development successfully removed patent drugs
from the organizational field of the pharmaceutical industry.
In summation, the organizational field of pharmaceuticals in the United States
emerged at the beginning of the 20th century largely as the result of professional
medicine’s attempt to gain social legitimacy by expanding its jurisdiction over all aspects

Fligstein and McAdam (2012) define internal governance units as organizations “charged with overseeing
compliance with field rules, and in general, facilitating the overall smooth functioning and reproduction of
the system.” (13)
2
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of health care. The structure of the field at this time was one dominated by a single
stakeholder, medical professionals. With the passage of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug
Act, the Federal government also emerged as a stakeholder in the field. Ethical drug
producers became dependent on medical professionals for access to the market because
physicians, with the assistance of the American Medical Association and federal laws,
had become the gatekeepers to patients.
Patent medicine companies were a diverse group of organizations with only a few
tenuous connections between the largest and most profitable firms. Patent medicine
companies pursued profit maximizing strategies; however, like other commercial
organizations at the time, these strategies were highly variable due to the fragmented
legal and market system of the country. Ethical drug manufactures of the time also lacked
a structure for engaging in collective action, but these organizations did have more
uniform organizational strategies that aligned with the goals and expectations established
by the AMA. The structure of the field was shaped further during the early decades of the
20th century by serval diverse mechanisms: the development of in-house research labs at
pharmaceutical corporations, a rise in academic-corporate research connections, highly
public drug disasters leading to calls for enhanced government regulation, changes in
patent laws regarding research conducted using government grants, and scientific
advancements in biochemistry and pharmacology.
4.3 Laboratory Development and Industry-Academic Collaboration, 1920-1940
The primary dynamic altering the pharmaceutical field during the interwar period,
1920-1940, was changes in organizational strategy as pharmaceutical companies in the
United States began creating in-house research departments and forming collaborative
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research relationships with universities. Prior to World War I, most large pharmaceutical
manufactures in the United States had no interest in developing new drugs and were
concerned primarily with the profitable production of known chemical compounds
discovered by European chemists (Swann 1990). This led to a negative relationship
between industry and research universities highlighted by the American Society for
Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics’ ban on membership for individuals
employed by industry that lasted from the association’s founding in 1908 until 1941.
One reason American firms had little interest beyond reproduction based manufacturing
was that the German and British pharmaceutical industries dominated drug development
and production, but when World War I cut off the supply of European medicines,
American pharmaceutical corporations realized that increasing production capacity could
be economically beneficial (MacGarvie and Furman 2005). The strengthened patent and
intellectual property laws combined with the auctioning off of German intellectual
property at the end of the First World War served as additional factors influencing the
creation of in-house research laboratories within America pharmaceutical corporations.
4.3.1 In-House Research Laboratories
Swann (1990: 79) wrote, “If American firms learned anything from their German
counterparts after the war, they learned that to remain at the cutting edge of practical
therapeutics research was essential.” Pharmaceutical companies after the war began
strategically investing internally by building in-house laboratories and hiring trained
scientific staff to conduct research on new products. By the early 1930s, the annual
investment in research and development at the largest firms in the country was regularly
over $100,000 (Swann 1990). Initiating successful strategies for developing research labs
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proved challenging since many of the executives at large firms had business
backgrounds, as opposed to scientific backgrounds, which meant that they understood
little about the research process. To overcome this lack of knowledge, industry leaders
adopted two strategies: recruiting heavy from the already developed research programs in
the university system and developing collaborative research relationships with
universities.
Jeffrey L. Furman and Megan MacGarvie’s (2005, 2008, and 2009) detailed
analysis of industry-university relationships during this time revealed several key
mechanism shaped the strategies of these collaborations. Furman and MacGarvie (2009)
noted geographic proximity influenced these relationships through:
“a pattern in which firms with limited (or no) R&D capabilities are
generally constrained to work with local partners while firms with greater
internal R&D capabilities seek primarily local partners for smaller-scale
projects and projects for which general skills are appropriate and distant
partners for larger-scale projects an extraordinary projects.” (p. 937)
At the same time, the rise of in-house research labs also benefited local universities by
providing jobs for graduates. This labor market connection between universities and
industry served to strengthen the scientific legitimacy of industrial research and
development as evidenced by membership movements within the American Society for
Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics during the 1920s to end the ban on
industry employees (Parascandola 1990).
The developing relationship between industry and academics was reciprocal.
Industry shaped academic strategies directly by funding research at universities through
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faculty fellowships, grants, and renting laboratory space (MacGarvie and Furman 2005).
Not all corporate financial donations were unrestricted; companies acted strategically in
some cases by dictating the research agenda to grant recipients as a method for
supplementing or substituting for in-house research and by constructing grant agreements
that established the company’s legal claim over discoveries (Swann 1990). Despite the
fact such tactics reinforced the negative image of the industry researcher in academic
circles, a sentiment famously portrayed in Sinclair Lewis’s 1925 novel Arrowsmith,
universities welcomed the money to expand their research programs. In the other
direction, hiring trained academics led to changes in organizational strategy within
pharmaceutical companies as these new employees brought scientific ideology into
commercial research and development. At some companies, former academics had
considerable leeway in setting up the laboratory and determining the research agenda
(MacGarvie and Furman 2005).
4.3.2 Increasing Federal Regulation
A highly publicized incident of product adulteration marked the end of this
period. The deaths of over 100 individuals by a contaminated patent medicine facilitated
to the passage of the 1938 Food and Drug Administration Reform Act, which
significantly restructured the field by strengthening the federal government’s role as a
regulator. Sulfanilamide product use, established by the late 1930s for the treatment of
common colds, pneumonia, and venereal diseases, was common throughout Europe and
the United States. Dr. Massengill’s Elixir Sulfanilamide was a patent medicine produced
in Bristol, Tennessee and distributed across the country, with higher usage among blacks
in the Tennessee and Midwest plains region (Carpenter 2010). Even though the S.E.
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Massengill Company was a patent medicine company, the Elixir Sulfanilamide was
distributed to patients by prescription.
During the summer of 1937, the S.E. Massengill Company began producing and
distributing a liquid form of Elixir Sulfanilamide that contained diethylene glycol, an
anti-freeze component, to improve the taste. In the following months over 100 people
died from using the product. The media coverage and public outcry that followed this
incidence focused on how no product safety evaluation was required prior to sale so the
only law the S.E. Massengill Company violated was fraudulently mislabeling the elixir as
containing alcohol.
This incident illustrates the larger dynamics between stakeholders in the field at
the time, because physicians made the first reports of illness and death directly to the
AMA, not the FDA (Carpenter 2010), underscoring the dominant role of the AMA in
drug regulation. The AMA immediately sent a request to the company for product
samples and tested them at the AMA Chemical Laboratory, which concluded the
diethylene glycol additive was the cause of the death. The FDA started its own
investigation three days after the AMA received the first death notification, and the
agency’s analysis of the elixir reached the same conclusion.
Coincidently, debate on a bill reforming the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act had
begun in early 1937 but had failed to lead to any legislative changes. The coverage of the
sulfanilamide incidence generated publicity that the FDA capitalized on to lobby for
stronger provisions than those contained in the initial revision proposals. While Carpenter
(2010) cautioned against assigning too much credit to this sulfanilamide incidence for
influencing congress, the passage of the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act expanded
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the FDA’s power by giving the agency the authority to formally regulate drugs through
pre-market review. Nonetheless, industry lobbying efforts were successful in limiting this
provision to the evaluation of product safety only, leaving the evaluation of efficacy
solely to the AMA (Carpenter 2010, Greene & Podolsky 2009).
In summation, during the interwar years the dominant strategy of American
pharmaceutical companies shifted from manufacturing known chemical compounds to
researching new products. This change was made possible in part because of the prior
investments by universities in building research programs which provided the industry
with access to the skilled scientist necessary to construct and run in-house research
departments. This new strategy provided the possibility for logics of science to be
incorporated within a pharmaceutical corporation. The differing capabilities of
pharmaceutical companies to invest in scientific research also led to the emergence of a
strategic division within the industry between research organizations and compound
manufactures (Chandler 2005). The coexistence of different organizational strategies
within the same organizational type is an indicator institutional pluralism within the field.
Despite the creation of the FDA in 1906 through the Pure Food and Drug Act, the
organization lacked the authority to directly influence field development and occupied a
mostly reactionary role during this period. The passage of the 1938 Food, Drug, and
Cosmetics Act laid the foundation for the FDA to gain authority and direct influence in
the field. The stakeholder interests of the FDA and professional medicine aligned during
this period with both advocating for stronger scientific evaluations on pharmaceutical
products against industry arguments based around the logic of commerce. Public concern
over the safety of pharmaceutical products also indicates a source for legitimizing
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organizational strategies based on the logic of care. The developing power of the FDA
was an important mechanism that shaped the field during the next few decades, but
significant scientific advancements also heavily influenced the next period of field
restructuring.
4.4 Scientific Advancement and the Rise of the FDA, 1945-1962
The field dynamics in the years following the Second World War were
characterized by scientific advancements that led to an increase in novel drugs on the
market, the increased adoption of market based competitive practices by pharmaceutical
corporations, the FDA assuming the dominant stakeholder position as a regulator, and the
declining influence of medical professionals. The adoption of penicillin use early in
World War II demonstrated the commercial viability of antibiotics, and drug innovations
in general, spurring extensive research into antibiotics during the war and resulting in
multiple new antibiotic products coming on the market after the war. By 1949, antibiotics
were the largest prescription sales category and accounted for 10.8% of new prescriptions
sold that year (Lee 2003). The successes of antibiotics lead to an increased focus on drug
innovation by pharmaceutical corporations, and by the 1950s research and development
competition had produced such a large number of marketable new drugs it is now
considered the heyday of drug discovery (Lee 2003).
4.4.1 Organizational Changes in Pharmaceutical Corporations
The focus on research and development, however, was not spread evenly between
organizations within the industry. Differences in research capabilities led to increased
field heterogeneity as drug manufacturers segmented further between firms developing
innovative, novel drugs and firms manufacturing generic and over-the-counter medicine
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(Chandler 2005, Lee 2003, Mazzoleni 2013). Jeho Lee’s (2003) research identified
several key factors that led to this market segmentation. During the interwar period, there
was not much differentiation between innovator and imitator pharmaceutical firms other
than firm size. Innovator firms would develop new products but the simplicity of the
chemical molecules allowed imitator firms to develop similar compounds. World War II
resulted in innovator firms making strategic decisions to commit more resources to
research; specifically Lee (2003) showed that innovator firms hired more biologists and
scientists to expand their in-house research departments while imitator firms maintained
roughly the same percentage of research staff.
The development of multiple new drugs within the same therapeutic class led to
more market based competition between firms because of the lack of clear differences in
outcomes between treatments. The 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act increased
restrictions on what drugs could be sold directly to the public and states began passing
no-substitution3 laws for filling prescriptions in the 1950s, four states in 1953 and 44 by
1959 (Mazzoleni 2013). As a result, physicians became more important to the industry in
their role as gatekeepers to the customer. These factors led pharmaceutical companies to
develop strategies for influencing physicians directly, and “Over the course of the 1950s,
pharmaceutical companies developed sophisticated promotional structures for their
products, linking advertising, salesmanship, and direct mail with public relations, journal
publications, conference presence, and even the research process itself” (Greene &
Podolsky 2009:338).

3

No-substitution, or anti-substitution, laws were an attempt by pharmaceutical corporations to protect the
market of their brand name products by making it illegal for pharmacists to substitute a physician’s brand
name prescription with a generic product. The laws were eventual repealed during the 1970s (see
Facchinetti and Dickson (1982) for a concise discussion on establishment and repeal no-substitution laws).
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Jeremey Greene and Scott Podolsky (2009) analyzed this changing dynamic
between pharmaceutical companies and physicians in detail. One of the factors
influencing the restructuring of the relationship was that the sheer volume of new drugs
coming on the market made it impossible for the average practicing physician to keep up
with the research. Aware of this fact, pharmaceutical companies began expanding their
sales forces, known at time as detail men, who would go to physicians’ offices and
“educate” them about new products. One example Greene and Podolsky (2009) cited to
support this change in organizational strategy was Pfizer increasing its number of detail
men from eight in 1950 to 2,000 by 1958.
The use of detail men (at this time they were all men) was a contested issue within
professional medicine. One group of medical professionals argued that these men
purposely misled physicians by presenting only the benefits of the products that they
represented. Other medical professionals countered that it was the physician’s job to
verify the information presented and since the FDA reviewed marketed drugs for safety
there was minimal risk to patients in choosing one product over another. Sociological
research at the time revealed that while most physicians were conscious of the sales
dynamic behind their interactions with detail men, they primarily found them a valuable
way for learning about new products (Fox 1961, Greene and Podolsky 2009). At the field
level, pharmaceutical companies were using detail men to shift the role of physicians as
stakeholders within the field from self-reliant gatekeepers to consumer gatekeepers.
Another factor contributing to the high output of pharmaceutical development was
the increased financial support for academic research from federal grants. Funding for the
National Institute of Health climbed from less than one million dollars in 1940 to 52
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million by 1950 and reached 400 million in 1960 (Mazzoleni 2011). This increased
federal funding changed the field dynamics of the previous period where industry money
dominated the sponsorship of academic research to one where industry money was
eventually dwarfed by federal expenditures. This change threatened to disrupt the
collaborative structure of the industry-academic relationship as academics were no longer
dependent on industry money to fund their labs and the ownership of work resulting from
public funding became contested (Berman 2008).
4.4.2 The Rise of the FDA
Like the interwar period, this period in field restructuring also ended with a highly
publicized drug accident followed by new federal legislation redefining the authority and
responsibility of field stakeholders. Thalidomide, used as a sedative and anti-nausea
medication and commonly given to pregnant women to treat morning sickness, was
released in the European market starting in 1957 but was rejected for the U.S. market by
the FDA. Millions of European women used the drug and by end of 1961, Thalidomide
use had become linked to a dramatic increase in birth defects. While the drug was never
available in the U.S., a front-page Washington Post article on July 15, 1962 by Morton
Mintz brought the issue national attention and made Frances Kelsey, the FDA staff
member who rejected the application, a household name. President Kennedy would
eventually honor Ms. Kelsey for her role at the FDA in preventing thalidomide tragedies
in the United States, crystallizing a new public image of the FDA as the guardian of
public health (Carpenter 2010).
Prior to Mintz’s article there was very little press coverage on the Thalidomide
births despite how widespread the tragedy was in Europe. Nonetheless, the Post article
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was not the result of a concerned journalist’s investigation, it was a strategic ploy by
Senator Estes Kefauver, whose antitrust subcommittee provided Mintz with the details
and Kelsey’s name (Carpenter 2010). Senator Estes Kefauver had started a series of
hearings on the practices of the pharmaceutical industry in 1959. Originally focused on
the pricing of prescription drugs, which had skyrocketed in the increasingly competitive
post-World War II market, the hearings became a platform for Senator Kefauver to argue
that broader reforms of the industry were needed. Senator Kefauver’s purposed
amendments would strengthen the FDA regulatory statues in the 1938 Food, Drug, and
Cosmetics Act but industry opposition to Kefauver’s provisions on restricting patent
protections and AMA opposition over allowing a government agency to determine
efficacy had stalled legislation until the 1962 coverage on the thalidomide incident began
(Carpenter 2010). Newspaper articles calling for drug reforms escalated after the FDA
further revealed on July 28, 1962 that while thalidomide had never been commercially
available in the U.S. it had been widely distributed to American patients on an
experimental basis.
The strong public outcry that followed provided the advantage Senator Kefauver
and the FDA needed to move a new reform bill through congress. President Kennedy
signed the Drug Amendment of 1962, also called the Kefauver-Hatch Act, on October 10,
1962. This marked a significant shift in the dynamics of the organizational field as the
bill expanded the role of the FDA by granting it the authority to conduct pre-market test
on drug efficacy in addition to safety. The burden of proof was placed on the drug
application’s sponsor to provide the FDA with the data necessary for evaluation. The
result of these provisions allowed the FDA to establish extensive rules and guidelines for
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clinical trials. It is the Kefauver-Hatch Act that led to randomized control trials (RCT)
becoming the gold standard for drug evaluation in the United States.
The Kefauver-Hatch Act had several key effects on the process of drug
development in the Unites States. The most notable effect of the 1962 legislation was the
increased burden of testing required by the FDA that further fragmented the field of drug
companies between innovators and imitators. The increased cost in developing innovative
drugs reduced the competitive prospects of small and medium sized firms to be
innovators allowing large, integrated corporations to dominate the novel drug market
(Mazzoleni 2011). At the same time, the increased regulatory process lengthened the time
it took for a drug to enter the market, conversely reducing the patent protection period of
new drugs and thereby their profitability.
In conclusion, the period between the Second World War and 1962 brought
scientific advancements and increased regulatory measures to the pharmaceutical field.
Scientific advancement created progress in the treatment of disease but also furthered the
division of organizational strategy between research and development firms and basic
manufactures. While this fragmentation between organizational strategies might be
expected to decrease the authority of pharmaceutical corporations as stakeholders in the
field, the large corporations that were created managed to gain more power within the
field over the following decades. Industry opposition to the Kefauver-Hatch Act indicates
that while logic of care had been incorporated into the field it was not the dominant
strategy of pharmaceutical corporations.
The Kefauver-Hatch Act gave the FDA increased regulatory authority and
dominance within the field. The FDAs new authority allowed the organization to function
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as a gatekeeper to both physicians and patients. The public perception of the FDA’s role
further supported the organizations increased authority and legitimatized Federal
regulation under the logic of care, in addition to the existing logic of science. However,
tensions between pharmaceutical corporations and FDA would result in the regulatory
dominance of the field being short.
4.5 The Biotechnology Revolution and Organizational Change, 1970s – 1990s
The biotechnology revolution during the 1970s had a major impact on
pharmaceuticals not only through scientific advancements in disease treatment but also
by reshaping the structure of the industry. Biotechnology resulted in the emergence of a
distinct subfield of new organizations and organizational forms, as well as, new
relationships between pharmaceutical corporations and financial firms (Cockburn 2004,
Henderson et al. 1999, Powell and Owen-Smith 2012, Powell and Sandholtz 2012). The
biotechnology revolution provides the strongest historical evidence that multiple
organizational strategies are legitimate within the pharmaceutical field.
By the early 1990s, established pharmaceutical corporations also faced mounting
drug development cost stemming from the increased regulatory requirements, increased
financial burdens from following the general trend of American corporations to become
multi-divisional conglomerates, and mounting revenue pressure from firms’ increasing
reliance on blockbuster drugs to generate income (Aitken et al. 2009, Chandler 2005,
Kaplan 2006, Scherer 2001, Vogel 2007). The combination of these endogenous and
external factors changed the dynamics within the field, specifically resulting in changes
to the organizational structure and strategy of the major pharmaceutical corporations.
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4.5.1 Scientific Advancements and Biotechnology
Prior to the 1970s drug development followed a process called random screening
where natural and chemical compounds were tested randomly in laboratories for their
possible therapeutic qualities (Chandler 2005, Cockburn 2004, Henderson et al 1999).
This process of research relied primarily on basic science and allowed pharmaceutical
corporations to build cost efficient in-house laboratories capable of the large scale testing
that was necessary to find a few successful candidates for development from thousands of
possibilities.
Following World War II this process proved highly profitable for pharmaceutical
corporations in the United States who were able to produce a steady output of new drugs
and become major players in the global pharmaceutical market (Chandler 2005). Some
scholars refer to this time as the golden age of the pharmaceutical industry because of the
sheer number of new products that emerged. However, other researchers are careful to
point out the expansion of productivity between 1950-1990 benefited from the exogenous
structural effects of research opportunities combined with unmet consumer need, as much
as, internal management strategy (Henderson et al. 1999). Random screening was
profitable only as long as large pharmaceutical corporations benefited from scale and
scope: scale benefits occurred from having the resources to test thousands of chemical
compounds to find a handful of therapeutically viable ones and scope benefits occurred
from conducting research in a field with many potential discoveries. Stated less
technically, the golden age of pharmaceuticals was really a period when companies were
able to pick many low hanging fruits and this mitigated the differences in organizational
strategy.
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In the late 1960s, pharmaceutical corporations began to benefit from scientific
advancements in microbiology and enzymology resulting from the increased public
funding of university research following WWII (Chandler 2005, Henderson et al. 1999).
This new biochemical knowledge allowed pharmaceutical researchers to shift from
random screening towards guided discovery or discovery by design research processes.
Under random screening process, researchers could not effectively hit therapeutic targets
and regularly discovered treatments for diseases that they were not actively searching for.
The discovery by design process allowed researchers to test molecular compounds for
specific therapeutic effects within the laboratory. This knowledge affected the field by
reducing the benefits of scale gained by large firms and increased the benefits of strategic
management within research programs.
The development of discovery by design research technology opened up the
possibility that small firms could develop a marketable new product by strategically
investing their limited research resources. However, adoption of this process for drug
development was not evenly distributed throughout the industry (Chandler 2005).
Incumbent firms with profitable portfolios were able to incorporate discovery by design
techniques sooner because of the increased cost requirements for updating facilities and
hiring new scientific personnel.
By 1993, the American companies of Merck, Pfizer, Abbot Laboratories, Eli
Lilly, and Bristol-Myers Squibb were global leaders in the pharmaceutical field through
the adoption of research by design strategies and each brought in over five billion dollars
a year in revenue (Chandler 2005). Large corporations like these are now collectively
referred to as Big Pharma. Combined with the increasing cost of regulatory approval, the
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other field level effect from the adoption of discovery by design was a consolidation of
large pharmaceutical companies producing new molecular entities (Munos 2010).
However, the biotechnology revolution of the early 1970s also resulted in the emergence
of many small firms and a new organizational form that had an even greater impact on
the structure of the field and the established corporations.
The biotechnology revolution began with academic discoveries in molecular
biology, specifically recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology, and created advancements in
pharmaceutical research by allowing for mass production of large molecule proteins with
known therapeutic qualities and by providing tools to increase development efficiency for
small molecule chemical drugs (Henderson et al. 1999). Unlike the scientific advances in
biochemistry, established pharmaceutical corporations did not readily adopt molecular
biology research in part because the successful development of these new products
required significant investments in both new knowledge and changes to the
manufacturing process. Large firms were also hesitant early adopters because the
surrounding scientific uncertainty over whether these molecules would be profitable to
manufacture on a commercial scale and the public concern over the perception of
biomolecular research as genetic engineering (Henderson et al. 1999, Whittaker and
Bower 1994). What occurred in the pharmaceutical field during the late 1970s was a rare
event in an established industry: the emergence of a new organizational form.
Walter Powell and Kurt Sandholtz’s (2012) work details the institutional forces
leading to the emergence of what they refer to as the Dedicated Biotechnology Firm
(DBF). One of the unique factors creating these firms was the tightness between
academic research centers and corporate organizations. The academic researchers who
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were making the discoveries within the fields of microbiology founded many of the new
DBFs. Genentech, the first DBF to go public, was founded in 1976 by venture capitalist
Robert Sawson and Herbert Boyer, a faculty member at the University of California San
Francisco and one of the discoverers of the rDNA replication technique. Other early firms
with academic founders who maintained their university connections were Cetus 1971,
Biogen 1978, Hybritech 1978, Centocor 1979, and Chiron 1981 (Powell and Sandholtz
2012).
Powell and Sandholtz (2012) argued these early DBFs were divided into two
models of operational strategy: those with scientific orientations and those with
commerce orientations. DBFs with scientific orientations were distinct within the
pharmaceutical field not only because of the ties that they maintained with academic
research centers but also because they emphasized the publication of their findings in
peer reviewed journals. Commerce oriented DBFs were defined by having serial
entrepreneur founders and poaching senior executives from established health care or
traditional pharmaceutical corporations in the early stages of their development.
Dedicated biotechnology firms had a huge impact on the structure of the pharmaceutical
field itself through the relationship structure of their tie formation with large established
pharmaceutical corporations.
As stated earlier, large pharmaceutical corporations did not take initiative at the
start of the biotechnology revolution to build their own molecular biology programs but
neither did these firms ignore this scientific breakthrough. Large pharmaceutical
companies played a pivotal role in the down-stream process of developing marketable
biotechnology products (Chandler 2005, Cockburn 2004, Galambos and Sturchio 1998).
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As small firms, DBFs were able to secure the money needed for basic research through
public funding and venture capital investments but these sources were not able or willing
to provide the necessary capital to build the manufacturing capacity required for
commercialization. This allowed established pharmaceutical firms to form collaborative
alliances with DBFs that provided Big Pharma firms with exposure to the new research
technologies and DBFs with a pathway to the market. Collaborative relationships
between DBFs and Big Pharma ranged from joint venture research and development
projects to in-licensing4 products depending on the needs of the organizations involved
(Chandler 2005, Cockburn 2004, Galambos and Sturchio 1998, Henderson et al. 1999,
Powell and Sandholtz 2012).
Powell and Jason Owen-Smith (2012) analyzed the effects of the network
structure of DBFs and determined not only did the type of tie formation indicate three
distinct periods of field development between 1988 and 2004, but that the overall
network became increasingly consolidated around a few key DBFs with new tie
formation peaking in 1997. This work corresponds to the findings from other researchers
(Chandler 2005, Powell and Sandholtz 2012, Sowlay and Lloyd 2010) who noted many
of the early DBFs failed or were acquired by their Big Pharma collaborators. Of the 11
prominent early biotech firms identified by Powell and Sandholtz (2012) only one,
Amgen currently the world’s largest independent biotechnology corporation, is still an
independent company, the remaining 10 firms have all been acquired. Chandler’s (2005)
list of top eight biotechnology corporations in 1994 has considerable overlap with Powell

4

In-licensing is when one company carries out the research and development but another company is
responsible for the manufacturing and marketing of a product, or when a company acquires the intellectual
property rights to manufacture and sell a product developed by another company.
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and Sandholtz’s (2012) list but shows the same results. Of Chandler’s (2005) top eight
biotechnology companies posting over $100 million in revenue in 1994, only Amgen is
still an independent corporation.
Another important factor about the biotechnology revolution was its highly
localized structure, not only globally but also nationally. Henderson et al. (1999) argued
there were four key institutional factors that resulted in the U.S. emergence and
domination in biotechnology: public support of health related research, strong intellectual
property protection, regulatory procedure for product approval, and a lucrative system of
health care reimbursement. The global effect of American domination in biotechnology is
seen through the rate of alliances between American DBFs and foreign Big Pharma
(Chandler 2005, Rasmussen 2002, Whittaker and Bowen 1994). The biotechnology
revolution was also highly localized within the United States. Powell et al. (2012) and
Cooke (2004) discussed how difference in local resources lead to the emergence of hightech clusters or bioscience mega centers in Boston, San Francisco, and San Diego while
hindering their development in other areas.
The scientific advancements of the 1970s had profound effects on the dynamics
between pharmaceutical organizations within the field. Large corporations successful in
adopting the new processes of research and development for chemical compounds raised
the barriers of entry for other manufactures seeking to develop innovative products.
Rather than disrupting the field, the biotechnology revolution resulted in the emergence
of a new sub-field of dedicated biotechnology firms. The high cost of mass production
acted as a barrier to entry for these firms to challenge the incumbent pharmaceutical
corporations; instead, the use of a variety of collaborative arrangements created a
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network between firms. The strategy of acquisition of DBFs pursued by Big Pharma
presents a possible avenue for the change of dominant logics within an established
corporation. Depending on company sizes and how many personnel are retained, merges
can alter established organizational culture. This indicates pharmaceutical corporations
that engage in more merger and acquisitions are at an increased risk of change in
organizational strategy compared to companies that rarely, or never, engage in these
practices. During the 1980s, several key legislative acts, like the Orphan Drug Act,
further reshaped the field dynamics.
4.5.2 Legislation Indicating Shifting Power in the Field
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) stated that “it is impossible to evaluate any form of
strategic action field without considering the history of state intervention in that particular
field” (174). As noted in the previous chapter, the state holds two stakeholder positions
within the pharmaceutical field: one as a regulator through the FDA and the other as a
consumer through government sponsored health care plans, but the questions arises does
the state also hold a third stakeholder position through Congress. This is a complicated
question to answer because as Fligstein and McAdam (2012) pointed out the state is a
strategic action field of its own, meaning that legislation is the results of actions by
stakeholders within the field of state with their own interest. Unlike the stakeholders
discussed in Chapter 3, I argue that Congress is not a direct stakeholder within the
pharmaceutical field. While Congress has taken action to shape the field, the legislation
process is a mediated response between other stakeholders in the field. For example, the
1906 Pure Food and Drug Act is representative of professional medicine’s interests over
patent medicine companies. Likewise, while the Kefauver-Hatch Act originated with
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Senator Kefauver’s hearings, its passage was due more to legislators appealing to the
public’s interest rather than drug safety. While Congress is not a stakeholder in the field,
legislative acts are a good indication of the shifting power dynamics within the field
(Fligstein and McAdam 2012). For this reason, I discuss three pieces of legislation from
the 1980s that indicate how the interest of pharmaceutical research organizations and the
logic of commerce became dominant within the field.
In the early 1980s, the Bayh-Dole Act, the Orphan Drug Act, and the HatchWaxman Act changed the dynamics within the pharmaceutical field. These legislative
acts were passed during the period of deregulation in the Regan administration. While
these Acts did not directly undercut the authority of the FDA as the regulatory body
within the field, the history of each act reveals that the logic order of commerce was
gaining dominance over the logics of care and science. All three Acts were designed to
change the research strategies of pharmaceutical corporations through external
inducements. Each Act was designed to motivate pharmaceutical development in a
direction beneficial to patients but proponents of the Acts contend the practices used to
stimulate research indicate corporate interests were really the legislators’ primary
concern.
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 allowed nonprofit organizations to receive patents
and property licenses on research conducted with federal funds. Prior to the Bayh-Dole
Act, universities were patenting results from research funded through federal money;
however, without a uniform process, universities, and other nonprofit organizations
seeking patents, had to deal with a variety of agencies with different requirements and
rules depending on the funding source (Berman 2008, Mazzoleni 2011). The Bayh-Dole
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Act streamlined the process for patenting discoveries made with feral money and resulted
in a dramatic increase of university patents. In the 12 years leading up to Bayh-Dole,
1968-1980, university patents rose from 100 a year to about 350, but the number of
universities patents per year was around 3300 14 years after Bayh-Dole (Berman 2008).
Elizabeth Berman (2008) applied institutional theory to study university patenting
in the United Stated from World War II to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act and argued
that the Bayh-Dole Act was not as much a turning point as other scholars contend but was
the outcome of institutionalization started in the 1950s. The Bayh-Dole Act was brought
about by skilled actors and a professional project, the development of university patent
administrators, who argued government licensing of research conducted with federal
money was necessary for innovation because if the government retained the title over
scientific discoveries they would go unused (Berman 2008).
Support for the argument that government retained ownership would discourage
innovation came from two independent studies published 1968 on the outcomes of
chemical discoveries. These studies concluded, “because HEW [Health, Education, and
Welfare Department] patent policy did not allow for exclusive licenses, however, no
pharmaceutical companies were willing to participate in the screening of these
compounds with an eye toward their eventual development.” (Berman 2008: 846).
Creating organizational motivation to apply research was the framework proponents for
Bayh-Dole adopted; university patenting would make findings available to private
corporations who would use that research to develop profitable and innovative outcomes
(Berman 2008, Rai and Eisenberg 2003). While the Bayh-Dole Act is not responsible for
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starting university patenting, it increased the trend by legitimating the practice through
institutionalization.
The Orphan Drug Act, passed in 1983, was designed to create incentives for
pharmaceutical companies to research new drugs for rare illnesses. This act was seen as
necessary because the rising cost of drug development meant that companies were
unlikely to invest in small product markets where they would be unable to recoup
development cost. Orphan diseases are officially defined as a condition or illness with a
patient prevalence rate of 200,000 or less within the United States (Grabowski 2005,
Wellman-Labadie and Zhou 2010). The FDA designates orphan drug status and has
approved over 400 drugs since 1983 compared to an approval rate of only 10 for similar
drugs between 1973 and 1983 (Food and Drug Administration 2015). Grabowski (2005)
stated that the success of the act was due to its combination of “push” and “pull”
economic incentives: the push program components include tax incentives, research
grants, and accelerated approval times; the pull program component is seven years of
market exclusivity. The period of market exclusivity is seen as one of the strongest and
desirable components of the law (Grabowski 2005, Wellman-Labadie, and Zhou 2010).
In general, the Orphan Drug Act is considered a successful piece of legislation.
Grabowski (2005) compared the outcomes in orphan drug development between the U.S.,
Japan, and European Union, regions that all passed similar legislation, and found the
pharmaceutical companies in United States had produced more orphan drugs. There is
evidence that the Orphan Drug Act also effected organizational strategy more directly.
Chandler (2005) attributed the success of the DBF Genzyme to its initial research
strategy in pursuing orphan drugs. Despite the majority of scholars concluding the Act as
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primarily positive on drug research and development, recent work by Olivier WellmanLabadie and Youwen Zhou (2010) raised the question of whether the Act needs to be
reformed.
Wellman-Labadie and Zhou (2010) noted that the paradox of the exclusivity
clause, once an orphan drug is approved no other drug can be approved for that disease
during the seven year period but orphan drug approval does not mean the same drug
cannot be approved for other treatments during that time period, has resulted in multiple
drugs gaining orphan approval despite the fact that the drugs total treatment population is
over 200,000 U.S. patients. This raises the question of whether companies are
undermining the intent of the Act by taking successful drugs and expanding their
profitability using orphan drug approvals. Instead of developing a new drug, a company
takes and existing drug and applies to Orphan status. This practice gives the company
market exclusivity on the treatment of a condition without requiring much additional
research and development cost and does not result in new drugs coming to the market.
Financial expectations also appear to be shaping orphan drug research strategy.
Wellman-Labadie and Zhou’s (2010) findings show oncology was the top therapeutic
category with 650 drugs receiving an Orphan designation between 1983 and 2009; the
second highest therapeutic category was infections drugs with only 212 designations.
Wellman-Labadie and Zhou (2010) argued that the focus on oncology drugs is because
they are more profitable than other categories not because there are more orphan diseases
in this therapeutic class. Given the funding and tax incentives of the Orphan Drug Act,
the high prices for the oncology drugs that are developed suggest patients are paying
twice for the same product.
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Despite these criticisms, the Orphan Drug Act does address one issue raised often
by critics of the global pharmaceutical structure, the focus of pharmaceutical companies
on developing drugs for industrial nations while ignoring problems common in the
developing world. Because the official definition of an orphan condition only applies to
its prevalence rate in the United States, pharmaceutical corporations can receive the
financial benefits of the act by developing a drug for a condition with higher prevalence
rates in other parts of the world. However, the low profitably of developing markets
appears to be a greater deterrence than the incentives of the Orphan Drug Act can
overcome (Civan and Maloney 2006). Similar to the Bayh-Dole Act and Orphan Drug
Act, the Hatch-Waxman Act was also designed to encourage pharmaceutical
development.
The Hatch-Waxman Act, passed by congress in 1984, was intended to speed the
entry of generic drugs into the market, thereby lowing overall drug prices, and to
strengthen the intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical corporations as an incentive
for innovation (Grabowski and Kyle 2007, Young and Andrus 2004). The act established
the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) process at the FDA that requires
manufacturers of generic medications only need to demonstrate bioequivalence between a
new product and an existing marketed drug. The ANDA process reduced the amount of
time and money necessary to introduce a generic drug by eliminating the requirement of
lengthy clinical trials to demonstrate safety and efficacy. The act also shortened the time
between patent expiration and generic entry by allowing companies to begin product
development prior to patent expiration, meaning companies could file ANDA claims
when a patent expires.
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The Hatch-Waxman Act contained two market exclusivity provisions to gain
industry support for the legislation. The first provision gives the expiring patent holder 45
days to file an infringement suit against the ANDA filer. If this occurs, the FDA grants a
one time 30-month extension to the original patent holder during the course of the
litigation. The second provision was designed to encourage ADNA filers by granting the
first filer a six-month period of market exclusivity from other generic competitors.
A large portion of criticisms against the Hatch-Waxman Act has centered on the
misapplication of these two provisions as barriers to entry. Researchers have argued that
the automatic 30-month exclusivity period discourages ANDA filers (Young and Andrus
2004). Since the six-month market exclusivity period is trigged only when litigation ends
or the generic manufacturer begins marketing the product, there have been instances
where a brand name manufacturer paid a generic manufacturer to not bring their product
to market, effectively preventing any other generic manufacturer from entering the
market (Young and Andrus 2004).
Despite these problems, the Hatch-Waxman Act has created more competition in
the market. Henry Grabowski and Margaret Kyle’s (2007) analysis of generic entry
between 1995 and 2005 indicated that the market exclusivity period for brand name drugs
has steadily declined since the early 1980s due to the rise of generic drugs. Their research
also revealed generic manufacturers strategically target the most profitable brand name
drugs. Comparing generic entry one year after patent expiration of new molecular entities
by market size, measured as revenue per year, they found drugs in the smallest market,
less than $50 million, faced generic entry from only 1.7 products while drugs in the
largest market, over $500 million, faced an average of 7.2 generic competitors.
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Grabowski and Kyle (2007) attributed part of this difference to the Hatch-Waxman Act
allowing generic manufactures to engage in a ‘prospecting’ approach by challenging
patented drugs early in their product life cycle.
The three legislative acts discussed above collectively encouraged pharmaceutical
innovation by protecting the intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical corporations
through various provisions. Proponents of the pharmaceutical industry argue patents are
necessary for continued innovation because of high research and development cost.
Critics argue the current patent laws allow pharmaceuticals to engage in profiteering that
result in higher prices for consumers while creating barriers to entry for generic
manufactures. Regardless of these arguments, the evidence is clear that the United States
patent law has created dynamics within the pharmaceutical field leading to novel drug
developments at higher rates than in countries with less secure intellectual property rights
(Henderson et al. 1999, Grabowski and Kyle 2007, Mazzoleni 2011). At the same time,
strong patent laws have also shaped the organizations in the field by leading to huge
profits for a small group of products and the rise of Big Pharma.
4.6 The Organizational Strategies of Big Pharma
By the late 1970s, the barriers to entry in the pharmaceutical field resulted in a
division between firms developing prescription drugs and those focused on over-thecounter products (Chandler 2005). Organizations developing prescription drugs could be
further divided between firms researching novel products from generic manufacturers.
Big Pharma, large, vertically integrated research corporations, dominated the
pharmaceutical field (Chandler 2005, Cockburn 2004). These firms were multidivisional
with in-house research laboratories, manufacturing facilities, and marketing departments
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focused on the down-stream (consumer market) development of pharmaceutical products.
At the same time Big Pharma companies were pursuing strategies of vertical integration,
they were also becoming conglomerates through the acquisitions of a variety of nonpharmaceutical entities.
By the 1980s, this corporate strategy had become increasingly cumbersome and
many Big Pharma companies began to engage in strategic divestments to both increase
the efficiency of their primary function as pharmaceutical firms and avoid the corporate
raiders of Wall Street. Chandler’s (2005) history of the industry provides excellent details
on the activities of some of the largest pharmaceutical companies during this time. For
example the path of American Home Products, renamed Wyeth Corporation in 2002, at
its conglomerate height sold products ranging from canned and packaged foods to
furniture polish before undergoing massive divestitures to refocus on its pharmaceutical
roots only to then be acquired by Pfizer in 2009.
4.6.1 Strategic Alliances, Mergers, and Acquisitions
The organizational structure of Big Pharma firms partially explains the rise of the
DBF as an innovative organizational form and the strategy of Big Pharma firms to
develop collaborative alliances with DBFs. Up-stream research, which consists of basic
scientific exploration and discovery, was mostly confined to academic centers and nonprofit organizations but integration and spillover into industry did occur indicating
interorganizational ties created porous organizational boundaries within the field
(Cockburn 2004, Powell and Owen-Smith 2012).
In order to remain innovative, Big Pharma needed to gain access to the scientific
advancements of biotechnology previously discussed or risk declining profitability or
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failure. Hess and Rothaermel (2011) discussed two strategies pharmaceutical
corporations used to access up-stream knowledge: strategic alliances and star scientists.
Their findings indicated that within the pharmaceutical industry these strategies are
substitutive and subject to contingency effects. Specifically “any performance effects of
star scientists on firm innovation are contingent upon the stars’ connections to other firmspecific resources” (Hess and Rothaermel 2011: 906). Many Big Pharma corporations
pursued alliances with DBFs as a method of accessing new knowledge (Chandler 2005,
Powell and Owen-Smith 2012, Powell and Sandholtz 2012).
Nadine Roijakkers and John Hagedoorn (2007) stated there were two primary
types of collaborations in the pharmaceutical field, joint ventures and contractual
partnerships. Joint ventures raise interdependence between organizations whereas
contractual partnerships are flexible. The majority of alliances between pharmaceutical
corporations and biotechnology companies were contractual partnerships, indicating that
one firm was performing a service for the other. However, the rise of joint ventures
during the late 1980s indicated that rather than continuing to rely on biotechnology
companies to conduct research, established pharmaceutical corporations were also
developing internal biotechnology research and development capabilities (Roijakkers and
Hagedoorn 2007). Through network analysis, Roijakkers and Hagedoorn (2007)
concluded the new biotechnology firms acted as innovators within the field while
established pharmaceutical corporations occupied the dominant position in traditional
pharmaceutical sub-sectors by guiding products through the regulatory and marketing
process.

136

Research by Erica Whittaker and Jane Bower (1994) and Bruce Rasmussen
(2002) offers further explanations on why roles in pharmaceutical alliances varied by
organizational type. The fact established pharmaceutical corporations were engaged in
multiple biotechnology alliances while also building internal research programs suggests
these companies saw two strategic benefits to alliances (Whittaker and Bower 1994).
First, alliances provided access to young scientists attracted to working at new
biotechnology companies for the science based organizational culture and financial
opportunities provided through stock options. Second, alliances allowed established firms
to externalize the risk of conducting research. Rasmussen’s (2002) data supports the
strategy of risk shifting by noting that the dominant contractual form of alliances was
between established pharmaceutical corporations in-licensing the products developed by
biotechnology firms. Alliances are not the only organizational strategy pharmaceutical
corporations employed to gain access to innovation technology or new products; mergers
and acquisitions are also common practices in the field.
Mohan Sowlay and Scott Lloyd’s (2010) research indicated that mergers and
acquisitions between biotechnology firms and Big Pharma firms can be the result of
strategic planning on the part of either corporation involved rather than a desperate move
by a failing firm. Biotechnology companies benefit in a merger or acquisition with a Big
Pharma firm as a method of cashing out that avoids the expense and organizational
requirements of an initial public offering. This is an attractive strategy particularly for
small firms without the capital to bring a product to market (Sowlay and Lloyd 2010).
Fabio Pammolli and Massimo Riccaboni (2004) further highlight how a merger can be a
strategic exit strategy for DBFs because innovation is path dependent, meaning it is
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difficult for small, specialized research firms to take the knowledge gained in one
therapeutic area and transfer it successfully into the development of another product.
Big Pharma firms also benefit in acquiring biotechnology firms to gain products.
Because the Hatch-Waxman Act does not cover biological products and the difficulty in
creating therapeutically equivalent biologics5, there is limited competition in this market
segment making biotech acquisitions a strategic method that Big Pharma firms can use to
expand their product portfolios (Sowlay and Lloyd 2010). Biologics are particular
attractive acquisitions because of their higher reimbursement rates although recent work
by Ernst Berndt (2015) and his colleagues suggests the average net lifetime returns on
biologics peaked between 1995 and 1999. Firm acquisition is also a strategy large firms
employ when faced with a declining product portfolio due to patent expirations (Danzon
et al 2007).
Despite all of the mergers and acquisitions occurring within the industry,
researchers have not found consistent outcomes from the practice. Matthew J. Higgins
and Daniel Rodriguez (2006) found that firms with prior relationships to the firms they
acquired experienced positive long term outcomes because they were better able to
evaluate the fit of the target firms products within their portfolios. Using a larger sample
not restricted by prior relationships, Patricia Danzon and her colleagues (2007) found no
evidence mergers created positive long term outcomes; furthermore, their findings
suggest that “mergers that are motivated to address R&D gaps through cost savings and
economies of scale are unsuccessful in the long run” (325). Finally, John LaMattina
(2011) argued that the amount of total merger activity within the industry is having a

5

Biologics include a variety of products, often developed from organic processes, and differ from chemical
pharmaceuticals because they are more complex mixtures with properties that are not easily identifiable.
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negative impact by reducing innovation. His argument is based on data from large
mergers that resulted in the elimination of entire research sites and aggregate level data
showing declining research and development spending among Big Pharma firms.
LaMattina’s (2011) conclusions are supported by the work of Sarah Kruse and her
colleagues (2014) who found pharmaceutical executives and other insiders anonymously
indicated that the short term strategies of mergers and alliances aimed at increasing
profitability were undermining long term research productivity. Research productivity,
particularity the development of new drugs, is another important issue to address because
as a high technology industry pharmaceutical firms are dependent on innovation for
survival.
4.6.2 Strategies of Innovation and Productivity
There has been considerable discussion about the state of pharmaceutical
innovation and research for more than 40 years (Fisher et al. 2015, Grabowski et al.
1978). Pharmaceutical innovation is typically measured as the number of New Molecular
(sometimes Chemical) Entities (NME/ NCE) approved per year by the FDA (DiMasi et
al. 2003, Munos 2010, Paul et al 2010). Total industry productivity is measured by either
the number of products in the research pipeline (Fisher et al. 2015) or the number of New
Drug Applications (NDA) approved per year by the FDA (Munos 2010).
Figure 4.1 shows the trends for NDA and NME approvals between 1944 and 2014
(Total NDA data from 1953 is missing because human and animal approvals were
counted together). NDA applications peaked during the 1950s and average 120 per year
with a standard deviation of 77. The large number of approvals that occurred during the
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late 1940s and 1950s was the result of regulatory changes that encouraged companies to
submit applications for drugs that had already been on the market combined with the
400
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Figure 4.1 Approved FDA Submissions by Application Type, 1944-2014
increased organizational focus on developing new drugs. The trend for NME submissions
has been more stable with an average of 22 per year and a standard deviation of eight.
Interpreting the organizational strategy for NME submissions requires further discussion
on the changes in research and development cost.
The cost of bringing a new drug from concept to market has risen exponentially
over the past decades from $138 million (Hansen 1979) to $318 million (DiMasi et al.
1991) to $802 million (DiMasi et al. 2003) and is now estimated at $1.8 billion (Paul et
al. 2010). These estimates combine the out-of-pocket cost for bringing a drug to market
with the capitalized cost, the expected return on investment required by investors with
alternative investment opportunities (DiMasi et al. 2003, Paul et al. 2010, Vogel 2007).
The high cost of research is argued to be due to the high failure rate of drugs during the
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development process; reported cost estimates are derived from the aggregate cost of
research on all products and divided by the number of successful products.
Current calculations for the NME success rates range from 8% (Paul et al. 2010),
11% (Kruse et al. 2014), 11.5% Munos 2010), to 13% (DiMasi et al. 2010). The fact that
there is variation is not surprising because calculations are limited by available data on
pharmaceutical pipelines with some scholars having access to propriety information
while others rely on publically reported information. The FDA collects data and reports
on compounds only if they begin phase I clinical testing but does release reports on preclinical testing, leaving researchers working with public data no information on drugs
that never reach human testing.
DiMasi et al.’s (2010) work on pharmaceutical research is particularly insightful
because they calculated success rates for both NMEs and biologics tested in humans
between 1993 and 2004 using proprietary information. Their data indicated NMEs had a
success rate of 13% while biologics had a success rate of 32%. DiMasi et al. (2010) also
analyzed success rates by company origin and therapeutic class for the total combined
sample of NMEs and biologics. Stratifying the sample by self-originating and in-licensed
compounds, they found drugs that were in-licensed had higher success rates than selforiginated compounds: 27% to 16%. Furthermore, the data showed many of the inlicensed drugs were acquired after phase I or II testing, indicating pharmaceutical firms
wait to form alliances after a product demonstrates potential. Finally, by comparing the
drugs in eight therapeutic classes they found that systemic anti-infective agents, which
include antivirals and vaccines, had the highest success rate at 15.6%.
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Researchers argue that the effect of high development cost on the industry is a
reduction in innovation (DiMasi et al. 2003, Paul et al. 2010, Vogel 2007), and
compounded by the reduction in research programs and facilities due to mergers and
acquisitions, some researchers even worry the industry is at risk of dying (Berndt et al.
2015). Pammolli and Riccaboni (2004) point out that the paradox within the industry is
that increased research has not lead to an increased flow of new drugs, findings which
Munos (2010) reiterates and adds too by stating the rate of new biologics fails to deliver
on the promised innovations of the biotechnology revolution. The trend line for NME
approvals in Figure 4.1 supports their findings. Both Munos (2010) and Paul et al. (2010)
reported companies claim they need between 2-3 new drug approvals a year to remain
profitable; a target that both researchers noted firms historically have never met.
The odds of a pharmaceutical company receiving a NME approval in any given
year are small. The number of NME approvals per year follows a Poisson distribution
with most pharmaceutical corporations not receiving a NME approval during any given
year (Munos 2010). Figure 4.2 shows the number of NMEs approved per year plotted
with the 95% confidence interval around the population mean. The data in Figure 4.2
does not indicate a declining trend in innovation as measured by the number of NME
approvals per year. In fact, the number of NME approvals in 2012, 2013, and 2014 were
all above the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval. Scholars consider the largest
outlier in the data, 1996, a historical artifact. The increase in both NDA and NME
approvals in 1996 is argued to be the result of the FDA clearing out backlogged
applications after the passage of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act in 1992 rather than a
true period of increased productivity.
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In addition to declining innovation, industry researchers have also expressed
concern about the impact of declining revenue. Pharmaceutical corporations in the United
States have pursued a blockbuster profit model where a small handful of products
account for the majority of a firm’s revenue stream (Aitken et al. 2009, Grabowski and
Kyle 2007). According to Berndt et al.’s (2015) calculations, the industry faces hazardous
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declines tied to the reliance on blockbuster drugs for income. Vogel (2007) provided data
that further underscored the precarious financial position of this profit model by citing
research showing only 3 out of 10 NMEs generate enough income to cover their research
and development cost. Finally, Aitken et al. (2009) pointed out the shift in prescription
drug spending from brand name drugs to generics is making it harder for researchoriented pharmaceutical firms to predict future income streams because the market for
blockbuster products is shrinking.
In conclusion, the organizational strategies of Big Pharma firms have been
impacted by the dynamics of the modern pharmaceutical field. Scientific advancements
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strongly influenced the field in the 1970s and 1980s leading to the emergence of new
organizational forms with settlements between incumbents and challengers achieved
through collaborative negations. Changes in politics created favorable conditions for a
series of legislative acts that while designed to foster innovation, also strengthened the
position of large corporations. Finally, rising concerns on cost and generic competition
have encouraged mergers and acquisitions as strategies to retain market share but leave
industry analysist wondering if there is a sustainable future.
4.7 Conclusion
Table 4.1 Key Changes in the Pharmaceutical Field, Early 20th Century – 1990s
Period

Dominant
Logics

Dominant
Stakeholders

Active
Stakeholders

Early 20th
Century

science

medical profession

FDA, patients

science

medical
profession,
pharmaceutical
research
corporations

FDA, generic
manufactures,
research
universities

patients

care & science

FDA,
pharmaceutical
research
corporations

medical
profession,
patients

generic
manufactures

science &
commerce

pharmaceutical
research
corporations (Big
Pharma)

biotechnology
firms, FDA,
managed care
organizations,
financial
investors

patients, medical
profession, generic
manufactures

commerce

pharmaceutical
research
corporations (Big
Pharma)

FDA, managed
care
organizations,
financial
investors

patients, medical
profession, generic
manufactures

1920s – 1940s

1940s – 1960s

1970s – 1990s

1990s – Today
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Reactive
Stakeholders
patent medicine
companies, ethical
compound
manufacturers

The historical analysis in this chapter indicates how different institutional logics
were incorporated into the pharmaceutical field over time. Table 4.1 shows the broad
changes in dominant logics and stakeholders. Dominant stakeholders are the stakeholders
with the most power during a period and subsequently determine the dominant logic of
the field. Active stakeholders hold enough power to influence the direction and structure
of the field but do not define the field. I use the term reactive stakeholder, as opposed to
passive stakeholder, for the final group because while these stakeholders still demonstrate
agency, they do not engage in collective action to alter the field but act collectively only
in response to the actions of the other stakeholders.
In general, the historical analysis demonstrates the importance of existing
structures and external shocks in shaping an organizational field. Medical professionals
who applied the logic of science by classifying drugs as either ethical preparations or
patent medicine were able to dominate the early field. Highly publicized incidents of drug
contamination in the early and mid-20th century allowed federal regulators at the Food
and Drug Administration to gain dominance by using the logic of care as a strategy for
arguing the necessity for increased regulation. Finally, the rising financial power of
American corporations combined with an anti-government political movement facilitated
pharmaceutical corporations’ ascension to the position of dominant stakeholder during
the 1980s. In the next chapter, I analyze data gathered on pharmaceutical corporations
and drug approvals between 1997 and 2014 to determine if the three logics within the
field effect pharmaceutical organizations by creating distinct organizational categories.
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CHAPTER 5
A QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY
5.1 Introduction
The historical analysis in the preceding chapter demonstrates that while
pharmaceutical corporations display organizational similarities, it is a mistake to
conclude that the field is composed of a homogenous organizational model. Existing
research shows that the institutional constraints of regulation and pharmacology do not
fully explain the different organizational forms observed in the historical analysis. For
example, Arora et al. (2014) categorized pharmaceutical corporations by the structure of
their research process as either centralized, hybrid, or decentralized firms and found that
this organizational characteristic influenced innovation strategy. While all of the firms in
their sample pursued a mix of innovation strategies, centralized firms relied more on
internal research and decentralized firms more on acquiring external research. The fact
that this structural characteristic resulted in similar commercial outcomes between
research strategies indicates that while the research process connects to the organizational
model it is not explainable by outcome-based efficiency, suggesting that a latent
construct, such as logic orders, influences the original selection of organizational models
and research strategies.
Innovation strategy is one possible measures of organizational behavior that can
be used to categorize pharmaceutical companies, and the historical analysis in Chapter 5
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presented several others. Organizations can be divided between companies developing
novel pharmaceutical products and those manufacturing generics. Alternatively,
companies can be categorized by whether or not they are engaged in research and
development on biologics. On the other hand, companies could be grouped by basic
structural characteristics; for example, diverse Big Pharma compared to small research
firms. While these organizational differences may be the result of institutional effects,
using them as a priori categories for comparative analysis will not evaluate the casual
proposition that institutions effect organizational strategy. Indeed, Arora et al. (2014)
noted a limitation of their work was that it did not demonstrate causality between
organizational strategy and structure; i.e. they could not answer the question of whether
the centralized structure results in a strategy focused on internal research or if a strategy
of internal research results in a centralized structure. To answer this question, general
practices can be analyzed first for latent constructs and then the components from these
constructs can be used as measures to determine organizational categories through a
casual modeling technique. The organizational strategies can then be compared between
the emergent groups against theoretically predicted logic orders to assess if the identified
latent constructs are institutional effects.
Based on the historical analysis, the characteristics defining organizational
differences in the field can be classified into two broad categories: organizational
structure and research path components. Measures of organizational structure are
variables such as firm size, centralization, and ownership. Measures of research paths are
variables such as generic production, portfolio diversity, and biologic research. This
chapter applies quantitative analyses to corporate financial data and FDA drug approval
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data as sources of organizational structure and research paths measures to determine if
latent constructs exists in the field and cause unobserved organizational categorization.
The study design treats field level effects as the independent variable and
organizational outcomes as dependent variables, which aligns with the recent
methodological argument made by Royston Greenwood and his colleagues (2014) on the
current direction needed in institutional logics research. Figure 5.1 illustrates the general
theoretical model for this analysis drawn from the discussion in Chapter 2 and the
findings from Chapter 4. The source of the latent constructs within the organizational
field is unspecified in the model because it is the focus of the qualitative analysis. The
variables sets in the model are operationalized as the corporate and FDA data.

Figure 5.1 Model of Theoretical Prediction for Latent Class Formation
The goal of this chapter is to determine if these organizational measures result in
the emergence of classes within the sample by building a model reflecting the theoretical
position of Figure 5.1 and using that model to conduct a latent class analysis. While
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previous research has analyzed drug approval data collected from the FDA (for examples
see Grabowski and Kyle 2007 and Kapczynski et al. 2012), to my knowledge no prior
research has applied this data to analyze latent organizational strategies, making the use
of this data as an operationalization of latent strategy a novel contribution of this project.
To accomplish the goals stated above, I used three techniques for latent variable
analysis: exploratory factor analysis, structural equation modeling, and latent class
analysis. These methods are a progression of increasingly sophisticated statistical
techniques for identifying latent constructs within data. Each analysis follows a model
fitting strategy whereby the measures that fail to be significant are excluded from the
final model. Using this method allows me to build models that are more parsimonious by
eliminating variables and constructs that fail to fit in the next level of analysis. At the
same time, this multi-method approach also serves as a validity assessment because the
failure to find latent constructs at lower level does not support moving on to the next
analysis.
5.2 Data
The purpose of this section is to detail the process used to construct the
quantitative dataset and demonstrate that these data are valid operationalization of
organizational structure and research paths. The dataset combines information from two
secondary sources: (1) the Food and Drug Administration’s public database of drug
approvals, and (2) Mergent Online database of corporate financial reports. Information
was collected for the years between 1997 and 2014 because 1997 was the earliest date
information was available in the Mergent database and 2014 was the most recently
available data. As is common in organizational research using secondary data or data
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from third party sources, after the data was collected ad hoc sampling criteria were
applied to generate a final sample with complete information. For examples of prior
organizational research using similar ad hoc sampling procedures see Authors et al. 2008,
Bidwell 2011, and Reyt and Wiesenfeld 2015.
5.2.1 Food and Drug Administration Data
The FDA database is publically available on the FDA’s website:
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Reports.Re
portsMenu. The FDA database provides details on each new drug application and
biologic license application approved in the United States in downloadable Excel files.
Table 5.1 shows the list of variables gathered from the FDA database. Adhering to the
strategy-as-practice literature (Vaara and Whittington 2012), each application is viewed
as the outcome of an organizational decision that potentially represents a cohesive
underlying organizational strategy. Specifically, the variables new drug application
chemical type, biological licensing application, orphan drug, and review type contain
information that indicate strategic decisions within the drug development process. This
data, then can reveal if distinct organizational research paths exists because organizations
have agency in application process (Babiarz and Pisano 2014).
Table 5.1 Variables from the Food and Drug Administration Database of Approved
Drug Applications, 1997-2014
Variable Name

Description

Value Format

New Drug
Application Number

Unique numerical code assigned to
application by the Food and Drug
Administration

six digit numeric code

Drug Name

Brand name of submitted drug
assigned by the application company

string variable

Active ingredients

List of primary active chemicals in
drug

string variable
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New Drug
Application
Chemical Type

Numeric code assigned the by Food
and Drug Administration to indicate
the type of approval application is
seeking

1 = New molecular entity
2 = New active ingredient
3 = New dosage form
4 = New combination
5 = New formulation or new
manufacturer
6 = New indication
7 = Drug already marketed
without an approved New
Drug Application
8 = Over-the-counter switch
10 = New indication submitted
as distinct New Drug
Application

Biological License
Application

Dummy variable indicating if the
application is for a biologic agent

1 = Biological license
application

Orphan Drug

Dummy variable indicating if the
application is for an orphan drug

1 = Orphan drug application

Review Type

Binary variable indicating the review
status of the application

Application
Company

Company listed as the application
company

string variable

Application Day

Day of the month the application was
approved

two digit numeric code (01 31)

Application Month

Month of the year the application was
approved

Application Year

Year application was approved

two digit numeric code (01 12)
four digit numeric code (1997
- 2014)

0 = Standard review
1 = Priority review

Biological license applications (BLA) are for biological products isolated from
natural sources, not chemically derived, and therefore are not classifiable by new drug
application (NDA) chemical types. Review classification also only applies to NDAs and
contains two categories: priority review or standard review. The FDA determines if an
application receives priority review status but the company submitting the application can
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request priority review. Priority review status indicates that the drug represents an
advancement over the current available therapy; officially defined as:
“evidence of increased effectiveness in treatment, prevention, or diagnosis
of condition; elimination or substantial reduction of a treatment-limiting
drug reaction; documented enhancement of patient compliance that is
expected to lead to an improvement in serious outcomes; or evidence of
safety and effectiveness in a new subpopulation.” (FDA 2014)
Priority review results in the FDA making an approval decision within 6 months
compared to the 10 months granted for standard review. Standard review is the default
status and indicates that the drug has similar therapeutic qualities to those currently on the
market. Orphan drug status can apply to both NDAs and BLAs. The categories of priority
review and standard review are mutually exclusive but orphan drugs can categorized by
either review process.
There are 557 unique company names listed in the sample. Correcting for
inconsistencies in the coding (for example listings for Aqua Pharms and Aqua Pharms
LLC were recoded to Aqua Pharms) reduced the number of companies to 397 unique
entries with a mean of 4.66 submissions per company. The data is right skewed with a
median of two submissions and a range of 4 to 67 submissions in the upper quartile. To
ensure enough data at the organizational level, a cutoff of five submissions was applied to
generate a sample of 92 companies to collect financial data on. Using the number of
submissions as a sampling criteria biases the sample towards large and older
corporations. Previous researchers have explicitly used organizational size and age as
sample restrictions (for examples see Chandler 2007 and Powell and Sandholtz 2012),
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however, number of submissions is more appropriate for this study because it maximizes
the data on actions needed for analyzing strategy.
5.2.2 Corporate Financial Data
Annual corporate financial information was retrieved from the Mergent Online
database, an online database of financial information on publically traded corporations.
Database access is available through the Thomas Cooper Library at the University of
South Carolina for students, faculty, and staff. The information in this database covers the
end of fiscal years 1997 to 2014. The Mergent database allows users to build reports on
singular companies that are downloadable as Excel files. Table 5.2 shows the variables
gathered from this database. Consistent with prior organizational research, expense
variables are operationalized as information on strategic actions, income variables as the
outcomes of strategic actions, and demographic variables as controls and descriptors.
These are widely used measures in the research to operationalize organizational structure
(for examples see Arora et al. 2014, Chandler 1977, and Funk 2014).
Table 5.2 Variables from the Mergent Online Database of Annual Corporate Reports,
1997-2014
Variable Name
Company
Total Revenue
Marketing and
Administrative
Expenses
Research and
Development
Expenses
Operational Costs
Total Expenses
Litigation
Expenses

Description
Name of publically traded corporation
Reported annual total revenue in millions of
US dollars
Reported annual, marketing, selling, and
general administrative expenses in millions of
US dollars
Reported annual research and development
expenses in millions of US dollars
Reported annual operational expenses in
millions of US dollars
Reported annual total expenses in millions of
US dollars
Reported annual litigation expenses in
millions of US dollars
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Format
string variable
numeric value
numeric value

numeric value
numeric value
numeric value
numeric value

Acquired in
Process R&D
Joint Venture
Income
Net Income
Net Income per
Basic Stock Share
Total Number of
Employees
Return on Assets
Report Date

Reported annual expenses on continued
research and development projects acquired
through a merger of acquisition in millions of
US dollars
Reported annual revenue from joint venture
projects in millions of US dollars
Reported annual net income in millions of US
dollars
Reported annual income per basic share of
common stock in US dollars
Reported number of employees employed
during the fiscal year
Reported return on assets of company,
calculated by Mergent

numeric value

numeric value
numeric value
numeric value
numeric value
percentage
four digit numeric code
(1997 - 2014)

Year of annual report

Additional
variables
Merger and
Acquisition

Dummy Variable to indicate if application
company is an acquisition or merger with
parent company

Subsidiary

Dummy Variable to indicate if application
company is a subsidiary of parent company

Standard
Industrial
Classification
Code

Four digit industry code

Foreign

Dummy Variable to indicate if company is
incorporated outside of the United States
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1 = application company
is an acquired
component of parent
company
1 = application company
is subsidiary of parent
company
2834 = pharmaceutical
preparations
corporations
2836 = biological
products, excluding
diagnostics,
corporations
2841 = surgical and
medical instruments
corporation
3851 = ophthalmic goods
corporations
2821 = plastics,
materials, and resins
corporation
2824 = organic fibers
non-cellulosic
corporation
1 = company is
incorporated outside
of the United States

The Mergent database did not contain data on private companies, which required
the exclusion of 13 organizations because they were private companies during at least a
portion of the study period. Consistent with prior research (Funk 2014), subsidiaries were
treated as components of the parent corporations instead of individual organizations and
drug approvals from subsidiaries and acquired companies were recoded to the parent
company. Through this process, the sample was refined to a final set of 59 organizations.
Two demographic variables were added to the dataset: Standard Industrial Classification
Code and Foreign. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code does not change for
individual organizations but seven companies either changed their incorporation location
or used foreign subsidiaries to submit some applications during the study period which
results in the variable being a continuous variable ranging between 0 and 1 when the
dataset is collapsed by company and year.
5.2.3 Therapeutic Class
The last data added was a variable for therapeutic classification types. Two
sources were used to determine the therapeutic classification of each drug: the 2014
Prescription Medications – Drug Information file from the National Health and Nutrition
Examination Survey (NHANES) and the World Health Organization’s Anatomical
Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) database. The classification system in the NHANES file,
Lexicon Plus, originated from the private data collection corporation Cerner Multum. The
WHO (ATC) system was developed through international collaboration and the detailed
history is available on the WHO website (http://www.whocc.no/atc_ddd_methodology
/history/). The Lexicon Plus system is based on the ATC system but there are some
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proprietary differences that result in more therapeutic categories. Table 5.3 lists the
therapeutic categories of the variable.
Table 5.3 Therapeutic Class Categories
Anti-infective Agents
Antineoplastic
Antiparasitic Agent
Blood and Blood Forming Organs Agent
Cardiovascular System Agent
Nervous System Agent
Dermatological Agent
Gastrointestinal Agent
Genitourinary Agent
Hormones and Hormone Modifier
Immunological Agent
Metabolic Agent
Miscellaneous Agent
Ophthalmic Agent
Psychiatric Agent
Respiratory System Agent

5.2.4 Complete Dataset
The final dataset contains 1,202 drug approvals matched with financial data from
59 companies. Two-tailed t-test were used to compare the means of the approved FDA
chemical types between the sample and excluded cases. Table 5.4 shows the means and
test statistics for this comparison. To asses if the companies with more than five
submissions that were excluded from final sample due to extraneous criteria drove these
results, the t-test were rerun with these companies dropped. Using the reduced data, NME
was no longer significant but OTC switches, already marketed and new formulation
remained significant at the same alpha levels.
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Table 5.4 Comparison of Sample To Excluded Cases of FDA Approvals, 1997-2014
Excluded
Cases

Sample

Test Statistic

0.214
0.020
0.404
0.088
0.154
0.032
0.028
0.003
0.049

0.265
0.020
0.398
0.113
0.078
0.042
0.012
0.013
0.051

-2.44*
0.01
0.25
-1.70
5.12***
-1.46
2.54*
-2.14*
-.014

NDA Chemical Type
New molecular entity
New active ingredient
New dosage form
New combination
New formulation or new manufacturer
New indication
Drug already marketed without an approved NDA
Over-the-counter switch

Biological License Application (BLA)
* = p<0.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001

Time was an important factor to consider in this analysis. The first problem of
time that needed to be address was that research and development expenses in a given
year do not typically reflect the pharmaceutical output of that year; pharmaceutical
development is a complicated multiyear process (Angell 2004, Applbaum 2009, Azoulay
et al. 2010, Vogel 2007). Some scholars argue that research and development cost should
be lagged to reflect the delayed outcome of the expense (Cullman and Zloczysti 2014).
Using a lagged variable has a data cost by creating missing cases for the earliest years of
each corporation but was applied here to address the issues raised in previous research.
Two lagged variables for research and development costs: a 2-year lag and a 3-year lag,
were created and tested through Poisson regressions (Appendix A and B) using new
molecular entity and biological license applications as dependent variables. These
analyses indicated that the 2-year lagged variable is the best fit.
Drug approvals are rare events, which results in sparseness in the dataset. To
address this issue, the data was collapsed by company and year prior to analysis. The
financial variables collapse as means and the chemical type and therapeutic class
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variables were broken into dummy variables to collapse as counts. To avoid skewing the
analysis because of size differences in both number of submissions and revenue, all of the
non-demographic variables were converted into rates. The financial expense variables
were converted rates using total expense as the denominator. Rates for mergers and
acquisitions, and subsidiary submissions were calculated using the total number of drug
(NDA combined with BLA) approvals as the denominator. Rates for chemical type and
therapeutic class were calculated using the total number of drug approvals as the
denominator. I also converted firm size using the natural log because the variable had a
non-parametric distribution. Table 5.5 shows the descriptive statistics for the final
sample.
Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics by Company, N = 59
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Marketing and Administrative Expenses Rate

0.38

0.12

0.07

0.64

Operational Costs Rate
2 Year lagged Research and Development
Expenses Rate
Acquired in Process R&D Rate

0.35

0.16

0.04

0.74

0.17

0.08

0.05

0.39

0.01

0.02

0.00

0.07

Litigation Expenses Rate

0.01

0.03

0.00

0.19

Merger and Acquisition Submission Rate

0.02

0.06

0.00

0.32

Subsidiary Approval Rate

0.13

0.24

0.00

0.97

Joint Venture Income Rate

-0.01

0.07

-0.44

0.17

5.05

11.41

-41.36

20.03

-9.78

95.25

-725.48

73.41

11,384.98

13,696.34

56.95

52,823.94

1,755.38

2,485.49

-52.17

9,866.69

16.93

16.35

2.00

29,384.99

33,796.06

112.50

Firm Size (log of Employees)

9.09

1.95

4.43

70.00
114,512.5
0
11.65

Anti-infective Agent Rate
Antineoplastic Agent Rate

2.12
0.09

3.28
0.13

0
0.00

13
0.60

Antiparasitic Agent Rate

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.01

Blood and blood forming organs Agent Rate

0.05

0.12

0.00

0.76

Cardiovascular System Agent Rate

0.05

0.08

0.00

0.36

Return on Assets
Net Income per Basic Stock Share
Total Revenue
Net Income
Total Approvals
Total Number of Employees
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Nervous System Agent Rate

0.15

0.22

0.00

0.80

Dermatological Agent Rate

0.03

0.09

0.00

0.57

Gastrointestinal Agent Rate

0.10

0.20

0.00

1.00

Genitourinary Agent Rate

0.01

0.04

0.00

0.19

Hormones and Hormone Modifiers Rate

0.09

0.15

0.00

0.67

Immunological Agent Rate

0.03

0.11

0.00

0.71

Metabolic Agent Rate

0.07

0.14

0.00

0.76

Miscellaneous Agent Rate

0.03

0.08

0.00

0.50

Ophthalmic Agent Rate

0.05

0.15

0.00

0.71

Psychiatric Agent Rate

0.05

0.16

0.00

1.00

Respiratory System Agent Rate

0.08

0.16

0.00

0.75

New Molecular Entity Rate

0.26

0.22

0.00

1.00

Biological License Application Rate

0.07

0.16

0.00

0.88

New Active Ingredient Rate

0.03

0.10

0.00

0.67

New Dosage Rate

0.40

0.21

0.00

0.90

New Combination Rate

0.07

0.10

0.00

0.40

New Formula Rate

0.10

0.13

0.00

0.57

New Indication Rate
Already Marketed without New Drug Application
Approval
Other-the-Counter Switch Rate

0.05

0.07

0.00

0.33

0.02

0.05

0.00

0.29

0.01

0.02

0.00

0.14

5.3 Methodology
The methodological approach follows the process of structuration6 applied by
Weber et al (2013) and developed from Weick’s (1995) work on sense-making within
organizations. The structuration process states institutionalization occurs over time as
distinct practices become interconnected through repetition and form coherent
institutional frameworks. Applied to Figure 5.1, the theory predicts combinations of
specific actions form organizational strategies in an established field subject to
institutional pressure. As an established field, the theoretical assumption for the

6

Structuration comes from the work of Anthony Giddens (1984) and is a recursive conceptualization of
social structure whereby the actor’s perception and abilities are determined by the social structure that the
actor’s actions produce and reproduce.
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pharmaceutical industry is that institutionalization has already occurred and, therefore,
outcomes from general practices can identify the latent connections between actions.
The dataset contains a large number of items and it is unlikely that all of them
operationalize a latent institutional framework; both the practice-as-strategy and
structuration argument hold that not every practice is a component of an institutional
framework. Applying a multi-step analysis is a method to achieve parsimony in the
model and determine what measures contribute to the formation of organizational
subgroups in the pharmaceutical industry. Exploratory factor analysis is the first step to
identify existing connections between organizational actions. An exploratory factor
analysis will address the basic question of whether latent constructs exist within the data
as well as the specific measurement items that are connected. Structural equation
modeling is the second step to assess if the identified factors interconnect through a larger
relational structure. The structural equation model will determine if the measures form a
coherent framework and if there are causal relationships between the latent constructs.
A logical method for evaluating organizational strategy is to study the decisionmaking processes behind an organization’s central objective, the process known as
strategy-as-practice (Schraven et al 2015, Vaara and Whittington 2012). For
pharmaceutical companies practice is developing and selling pharmaceutical products.
The application of drug approval data a measure of organizational strategy is a novel
contribution of this project but supported by prior research showing that these decisions
are strategic actions. The advent of discovery by design research processes and studies on
the pharmaceutical pipeline (Fisher et al. 2015, Sowlay and Lloyd 2010) indicate that
drugs reaching the market are the result of deliberate choices made within the
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organization. While using only approval data leaves out research projects that never reach
the clinical testing phase or are abandoned prior to approval, this constraint presents an
accurate measure of the outcomes that become subject to negotiation between
stakeholders within the field.
The first purpose of the exploratory factor analysis is to examine the dataset to
determine if there are latent constructs to warrant further analysis. This is a conceptual
quantitative first step in structuration (Weber 2013) because it identifies connections
between different actions. The variables in the dataset represent different organizational
decisions; therefore, that factors identified in the model should provide relational
information on general organizational strategies in the field. Following a model fitting
strategy, as opposed to model testing, allows some measure to not load on any factors
without contradicting the overall theoretical expectation that latent constructs exist.
Based on the existing research, several predications can be made about possible
latent constructs. Corporate financial information can reveal the organizational structure
of a pharmaceutical firm and, therefore, can illustrate the focus of organizational strategy
(Chandler 2005, Davis et al 2004, Roy 1997, Richard et al. 2009, Powell and Sandholtz
2012). The financial information, including the structural components of subsidiary,
merger, and acquisition, form the basis of attention for the organization. A factor loading
return on assets (ROA), net earnings per basic share, and marketing and administrative
expenses would indicate strategies of profitability. If research and development, acquired
R&D, and joint R&D cost, load together it could indicate an organizational focus on
innovation.
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The chemical type and therapeutic class variables illustrate organizational
research strategy because each submission is a specific organizational action. The drug
information is more challenging for predicting possible factor outcomes, but drawing on
Fisher et al.’s (2015) work on the drug pipeline, new molecular entity application is
expected to load with antineoplastic agents (cancer drugs) because cancer dominates the
majority of the drugs under development. Antivirals (anti-infectives) and painkillers
(central nervous system agents) are the other top drug classes in development expected to
load with new molecular entity application, along with priority review and orphan drug
status. New combination, new indication, and new formulation are predicted to load
together since they are aspects of drug expansion and possible indications for an
organizational strategy of medicalization.
In summation, the factor analysis will reveal latent constructs at the field level.
These constructs are not all expected to contribute to organizational differences. It is
likely some of the constructs will be the result of structural constraints placed on the
organizations within the field. The contribution of the factor analysis in this research is to
determine if latent constructs not readily explainable by external constraints exist. These
factors are the most likely to provide the measures for the components that comprise an
institutional framework.
Structural equation modeling allows for the determination of a causal relationship
between the factors derived from the factor analysis (Acock 2013, Bollen 2011). This is
an important next step because the central argument, field level constructs effect
organizational strategy, is unsupported by factor analysis alone since the direction of
effects is unclear in first-generation statistical techniques (Bagozzi and Yi 2012). As a
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second-generation statistical technique, structural equation modeling provides a method
for distinguishing latent constructs that are causal indicators of organizational strategy.
Furthermore, since it is theoretically possible not all of the identified factors from
the factor analysis will connect in a single coherent framework, applying a model fitting
strategy allows for the elimination of unrelated factors. The contribution of the structural
equation model to this research is that it will identify the presence of an interconnecting
framework of pharmaceutical practices. Drawing from the strategy-as-practice research,
the structural equation model will indicate distinct organizational level strategies within
the field.
To determine if the measure of the identified strategies create organizational
subgroups, the indicators from the best fit structural equation model will be used to
conduct a latent class analysis. Mo Wang and Paul Hanges (2011) proposed latent class
modeling as a more robust analysis technique for identifying organizational heterogeneity
compared to current methodologies relying on categorization through qualitative
techniques or stratification by demographic characteristics. Clustering analyses based on
categorical variables is common practice but this method is problematic for evaluating
causal claims because while differences may emerge between the groups, the researcher
is unable to evaluate if the differences are a result of the characteristic used to define the
groups (Wang and Hanges 2011). Latent class models can support causal claims because
the techniques statistically derive the groups from a range of indicators; therefore, the
researcher is able to determine which indictors are important for class separation by
evaluating the class prevalence rates. The interpretation of latent classes is based on the
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results of the analysis and it is inappropriate to decide a priori how many classes are in
the data or how to categorize those classes (Collins and Lanza 2010, Masyn 2013).
Latent class analysis uses categorical variables, which require the transformation
of the chemical type and therapeutic class variables from counts into ordinal categories.
With a sample size of only 59 cases, a simple dichotomous transformation (1 = received
an approval, 0 = did not receive an approval) is appropriate given the prevalence of no
approvals in all categories. Using dummy variables does prevent the measurement of
potential differences due to variations in approval rates, but given the small sample size,
it is unlikely much variation would have be picked up in a more detailed categorical
transformation.
5.4 Exploratory Factor Analysis
Since the dataset contains a large number of variables and there is no theoretical
expectation on which items best measure latent constructs in organizational strategy, the
purpose of the factor analysis is to determine first if latent constructs exist and then to
eliminate the items that fail to load on any factors. The factor analysis also provides the
opportunity to assess the identified latent constructs against the findings of previous
research to interpret potential underlying strategies in the field.
Prior to analysis, the dataset was split between the financial variables and the drug
information variables because running all of the variables in a single factor analysis
produced a Heywood7 case. When the factor model for the drug information variables is
unrestricted it still converges as a Heywood case solution, but I think in this instance, the

Heywood cases are “conceptually implausible or impossible estimates in which a communality is
estimated to be 1 or greater than 1” (Fabriger and Wegener 2012: 32). It is important to pay attention of
Heywood cases because they can be the result of misspecification or a violation of the assumptions for
factor analysis.
7
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solution is due to the small sample size and not a specification error. When the number of
factors in the model is constrained, the solution ceases to converge as a Heywood case.
Table 5.6 shows the oblique rotation loadings for the common factor model of the
financial indicators and Table 5.7 shows the factor output for the chemical type and
therapeutic class indicators. Fit was determined by evaluating the eigenvalue and scree
plot output. Since this was an exploratory factor analysis, a liberal approach was used to
retaining factors by also assessing the cumulative variance provided by the factors with
75% as the desired the cutoff point.
Table 5.6 Financial Variable Exploratory Factor Model, Oblique Rotations

Marketing & Administrative
Costs
Operational Costs
Cost of 2 Year Lagged R&D
Cost of Acquired R&D
Cost of Joint R&D
Cost of Litigation
Merger & Acquisitions
Subsidiary
Firm Size
Non SIC
Foreign
Net Earnings per Basic Share
Return on Assets

Scale &
Profit
Focus

Research
Focus

Administrative
Focus

Uniqueness

-0.21

0.27

0.74

0.32

0.21
0.19
-0.24
0.13
-0.08
0.16
0.31
0.84
0.14
0.46
0.21
0.80

-0.78
0.87
0.20
-0.28
0.00
-0.11
-0.24
0.01
0.07
0.03
-0.08
0.05

-0.42
-0.04
-0.48
0.14
0.04
0.14
0.06
0.03
-0.41
0.45
-0.09
-0.02

0.08
0.34
0.61
0.85
0.99
0.92
0.78
0.31
0.81
0.61
0.93
0.40

Note: Factor loadings above 0.5 are in bold to aid interpretation.

The financial indicators suggest that organizational focus differs by the allocation
of resources. Within the sample as a whole, the allocation of the three main expense
categories: marketing and administrative, operational, and research and development, is
stable over the 15-year period (two years are lost due to using a lagged R&D variable).
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The standard deviation of these variables in the sample is greater than the standard
deviation for most individual companies, suggesting that allocation patterns become
established within an organization. This stability of allocation patterns is expected given
the findings from dominant logic research that shows logics create inertia at the
organizational level (Bettis and Parhalad 1995). What is interesting about the model in
Table 5.6, however, is that it indicates inertia also occurring at the field level. Operational
cost loads negatively on both the research focus and administrative focus factors
suggesting that reductions in this category may be a common industry practice for
improving the bottom line.
The model in Table 5.6 shows a tradeoff in expense allocations between a strategy
focused on research costs and one focused on administrative costs that suggest decisions
about these practices may result from different perspectives. The factor model also
suggests a connection between firm size and profitability. Given the industry history, this
factor could indicate either a strategy of scale where larger companies are better able to
target multiple profitable markets or a strategy of consolidation tied to organizational
longevity. In summary, the factor model for the financial variables clearly shows the
existence of distinct underlying concepts related to organizational structure can be drawn
from the financial measures.
The therapeutic class and chemical type factor model in Table 5.7 indicates
eleven distinct strategies. There appears to be two predominant underlying constructs
driving the model based on the item with the highest loading on each of the factors;
factors defined by the therapeutic target and factors defined by FDA application type.
Factors indicating strategies driven by therapeutic targets are diabetes combination
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research, important research, endocrine research, and aging research. Factors indicating
strategies driven by the FDA application type are innovative research, research altering
current treatments, and diverse and genetic research.

Endocrine Research

Aging Research

Uniqueness

0.07

0.11

-0.02

0.02

-0.20

0.17

-0.23

-0.31

0.00

0.37

0.29

-0.08

-0.24

0.64

0.29

-0.14

0.05

-0.06

-0.08

-0.10

0.16

-0.25

0.02

0.32

0.04

0.07

-0.48

0.34

-0.08

-0.06

-0.01

-0.90

-0.12

0.03

-0.13

0.17

0.04

-0.02

-0.03

0.08

-0.01

0.38

0.68

0.35

-0.09

0.01

0.02

-0.13

-0.04

-0.16

0.86

0.10

0.18

-0.04

-0.12

0.11

-0.05

0.12

-0.01

0.09

0.19

0.46

0.01

-0.26

-0.13

0.05

0.83

-0.02

-0.02

-0.13

0.08

0.21

0.76

0.00

0.01

0.19

-0.13

-0.04

0.10

-0.06

0.09

-0.06

0.35

-0.14

-0.23

0.37

-0.01

0.09

0.03

-0.28

0.01

-0.13

-0.41

0.08

0.47

-0.21

-0.09

-0.03

-0.13

-0.03

0.82

-0.10

0.02

-0.13

-0.09

-0.08

0.24

-0.13

-0.12

-0.05

-0.23

-0.07

-0.18

0.01

0.03

0.82

-0.04

-0.09

0.20

NME

0.77

-0.15

-0.11

0.10

-0.05

-0.17

0.00

-0.32

0.00

-0.24

0.13

0.14

BLA
New Active
Ingredient
New Dosage
Form
New
Combination
New Formula

-0.05

0.88

0.16

-0.02

-0.16

-0.05

-0.05

-0.12

0.04

-0.08

0.00

0.18

-0.28

0.01

-0.60

0.28

-0.11

0.12

-0.08

0.23

-0.14

-0.13

-0.03

0.36

-0.51

-0.24

-0.10

-0.12

-0.39

-0.02

-0.14

0.18

-0.07

0.26

-0.03

0.26

-0.19

-0.23

0.20

0.17

0.17

-0.08

0.80

0.06

-0.08

0.04

-0.12

0.18

-0.11

-0.21

0.30

-0.30

0.54

-0.09

-0.30

0.15

0.03

0.12

-0.13

0.22

New Indication

0.29

-0.13

0.20

0.02

-0.01

0.82

0.11

0.05

0.15

0.09

-0.01

0.15

-0.07

-0.03

0.11

0.06

0.03

0.21

-0.16

-0.08

0.33

-0.23

0.04

0.02

-0.17

0.09

-0.13

0.16

-0.03

-0.04

0.13

0.09

-0.03

-0.02

0.16

0.66

0.08

0.03

0.00

0.06

-0.03

Diverse & Genetic
Research

Non-Neurological
Research

Important research

Research Altering
Current Treatments

Innovative Research

Not Gastrointestinal
Research

0.02

Diabetes Combination
Research

0.05

Expansionary
Research

De-professionalization
Research

Table 5.7 Chemical Type and Therapeutic Class Variable Exploratory Factor Model,
Oblique Rotations

-0.17

-0.05

0.02

0.93

-0.08

Antineoplastic

0.34

0.35

-0.12

0.01

0.65

Blood Agents
Cardiovascular
Agents
Nervous
System
Dermatological
Gastrointestina
l Agents
Genito-urinary
Agents
Hormones

-0.07

0.19

0.36

-0.24

-0.24

0.11

-0.18

0.10

0.02

0.01

0.07

-0.21

-0.86

-0.21

0.03

-0.22

0.36

-0.10

0.02

0.02

Immunological
Metabolic
Agents
Miscellaneous
Agents
Ophthalmic
Agents
Psychiatric
Agents
Respiratory
Agents
Chemical Types

Therapeutic Categories
Anti-Infective
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Already
Marketed
OTCs Switch
Priority
Review
Status
Orphan Drug
Status

-0.26

-0.04

-0.01

-0.03

0.82

-0.05

0.01

-0.03

-0.08

-0.02

0.19

0.23

-0.02

0.08

0.14

0.16

0.00

0.12

-0.11

0.09

0.81

-0.10

0.04

0.28

0.35

0.05

0.11

0.62

0.05

-0.13

-0.12

-0.20

-0.13

-0.18

-0.08

0.26

0.67

-0.02

0.03

-0.05

-0.02

0.01

-0.12

0.19

-0.14

0.09

-0.19

0.44

Note: Factor loadings above 0.5 are in bold to aid interpretation.

The factors associated with the therapeutic targets represent a range of therapeutic
classes but they can be connected through general trends in public health. The factors of
diabetes combination research, endocrine research, and aging research represent
therapeutic classes that contain diseases or conditions that are primary health concerns in
the industrial world. Diabetes has been documented as an emerging health issues for
many devolved nations; while ageing is a negative social status. The item inti-infective
agents loads on the factor important research and represents general anti-viral and antibiotic drugs in addition to HIV medications. Taken together, these four factors suggest a
larger underlying construct representing a therapeutic targeted research strategy.
The factors associated with the FDA application types appear to represent
strategies focused on developing drugs representing advancements in treatment or
targeting high status groups. Factors of innovative research and diverse and genetic
research contain the items new molecular entity and biologic license application
approvals, both items that are used in prior research to measure innovation. The items
loading on the factor research altering current treatments represent alterations to existing
treatments but the loading of antineoplastic agents suggest that this factor may connect to
the other two because it represents research on the high status therapeutic category of
cancer. Taken together, these three factors suggest an underlying construct representing a
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research strategy on scientific advancement. However, not all of the factors fit into these
two descriptive categories of therapeutic targeting or scientific advance.
The factors of expansionary research and de-professionalization research are the
factors that most closely align with the thesis of medicalization. The loadings of the items
for both therapeutic class and application type are close in strength, but each factor only
has two items loading, making the interpretation of medicalization a weak argument.
Historical events during the study period also raise doubts as to whether both of these
factors are accurate measures of medicalization. The factor of de-professionalization
research is mostly likely a historical artifact representing Merck, Johnson & Johnson, and
Sanofi-Aventis switching the successful allergy medications Claritin, Zyrtec, and Allegra
to over-the-counter medications following their patent expirations. The items loading on
the factor of expansionary research, psychiatric agents and new indication, make sense
historically and support the medicalization thesis; however, this factor does not contradict
the counterargument that expansionary research could be driven by scientific
advancements. The remaining two factors, non-neurological and not gastrointestinal, lack
a clear interpretation of potential underlying constructs.
In summary, the factor analysis models suggest coherent organizational strategies
exist within the field. The financial model indicates that three latent constructs are
present, but the low number of items loading on each factor means caution needs to be
taken in the interpretation of these findings. While the chemical type and therapeutic
class model suggests some factors may connect through larger underlying constructs
related to either a research strategy focused on therapeutic targets or one focused
scientific progress, there is not enough data in the model to interpret whether these
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strategies are driven by technical aspects in pharmacologic research or the structure of the
approval process. The factor outputs from both models show latent factors exist in the
dataset, which supports the second step of the analysis, building a structural equation
model; however, only the factor analysis of the financial variables justifies the
elimination of potential measures.
5.5 Structural Equation Model
The purpose of the structural equation model is to assess the latent constructs
from the factor analysis models for causal connections and determine if the factors
interconnect though a larger framework. Give the results of the factor analysis models,
the measures of organizational structure from the financial variables are more likely
covariates to drug development strategies than casual indicators. The failure of the model
testing the financial variables to converge supports this interpretation; therefore, these
measures were excluded from further model building.
I began the structural equation modeling process for the drug variables by running
individual models for each of the 11 factors in Table 5.6. To ensure that there were
enough indicators for each construct to reach a solution, all of the variables in a factor
with a loading of 0.30 or greater were included in the models. Models that converged
were retained and all retained models were added in a stepwise process starting from the
innovation research factor, the factor that explained the highest proportion of variance.
Figure 5.2 shows the final best fit model.
The goodness of fit statistics for the model in Figure 5.4 are satisfactory: χ2(40) =
44.84, p=0.276, RMSEA = 0.045, CFI = 0.95, TLF = 0.93, and SRMR = 0.10. Analysis
of the modification indices indicated that the correlation between orphan drug status and
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antineoplastic ratio would improve model fit. This relationship makes conceptual sense
because a potential strategy for altering a drug’s market segment is through expanding
the patient base by utilizing orphan drug requests.

Figure 5.2 Best Fit Structural Equation Model
The model indicates a path dependency in the drug development strategy of
pharmaceutical companies. The inverse relationship between the items loading on the
factors of innovative research and alternating current treatments shows approvals for
alterations to cancer drugs reduces the number of new molecular entity approvals a
company receives. This finding is interesting in comparison to previous research on path
dependencies in the pharmaceutical industry.
Cook et al. (2011) used economic modeling to argue that the path from treatment
A to innovative treatment C could be shorted by the development of the intermediate
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treatment B that was an alteration of treatment A. While my finding does not contradict
this argument, it does question the spillover effect Cook et al. (2011) assumed would
occur internally from the development of treatment B. The model in Figure 5.2 instead
shows that developing alternations to existing drugs, either through new dosage or new
formulation approvals, cost a company through a reduction of innovative approvals. This
finding suggest then that a competitor firm rather than the originator firm as proposed by
Cook et al. (2011) may realize the spillover effect from an intermediate treatment.
Further analysis of the data supports the presence of a bifurcated research path
dependency within the field. Creating variables for innovative research and altering
current treatments revealed that corporations with higher rates of innovate research had
lower rates of altering current treatment approvals. The mean rate of alteration approvals
by corporations above the median for innovative approvals was 0.40, and the mean rate
of alteration approvals by corporations below the median for innovative approvals was
0.62. The same trend occurs comparing the rate for innovative approvals of corporations
above and below the median for alteration approvals, 0.36 to 0.90.
Another interesting finding from the model is the significant correlation between
antineoplastic and orphan drug approvals. While the ratio of orphan drug approvals loads
on the innovative research factor along with the ratios for new molecular entities and
priority review approvals, as covered in Chapter 4, orphan drug approvals can be granted
for existing treatments. Considering that cancer drugs represent the largest therapeutic
category of drugs in the development pipeline and that new treatments are among the
most expensive drugs on the market, this correlation could indicate a distinct strategy of
expanding market coverage for the most profitable drugs in a company’s portfolio. If the
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treatment options are more effective for the target population than existing options, then
this would still represent innovative research, but it also supports criticism of the Orphan
Drug Act as being utilized by companies primarily for financial gain rather than
stimulating novel research for underserved patient groups.
In summary, the model in Figure 5.2 shows that the connections between
organizational research practices are not clearly explainable by the technical or scientific
aspects of pharmacology. The trade-off that appears between developing innovative
products and alterations to existing products is likely the result of organizational culture
emphasizing one research path over the other. A more detailed explanation on this causal
relationship requires additional organizational level data on the internal research practices
at these companies and would be a good direction for future research.
In relation to the process of field structuration, the structural equation model
significantly reduces the number of indicators contributing to measurable latent
constructs in the data. This reduction is beneficial because it allows for a more
parsimonious latent class analysis, as opposed to one including all of the variables, which
increases the likelihood of finding meaningful class divisions (Collins and Lanza 2010).
Additionally, the structural equation model indicates that the financial variables are more
appropriately treated as covariates to the research strategies rather than as measures of
latent constructs.
5.6 Latent Class Analysis
The purpose of the latent class analysis is to determine if the identified latent
constructs of research strategy leads to distinct organizational types within the field. This
will provide more meaningful organizational categories for studying the external effects

173

on pharmaceutical research and development than those based on historical
characteristics. I used the variables from the best fit structural equation model, figure 5.4,
to conduct a latent class analysis in Stata with the LCA Stata plugin developed by Lanza
and her colleagues (2015). Table 5.8 and Figure 5.3 show the results of this analysis.
Table 5.8 Summary of Information on Selected Number of Latent Classes for Drug
Development Strategies
Number
of
Classes

Fit Statistics

Class Proportions
Class Class Class
1
2
3

ρ

G2

df

AIC

BIC

l

1

11

278.85

2036

300.85

323.7

-365.61

2

22

197.15

2024

243.15

290.93

-324.76

77%

23%

3

33

176.01

2012

246.01

318.72

-314.19

52%

26%

22%

4

44

161.16

2000

255.16

352.8

-306.77

26%

28%

22%

Class
3

24%

400

Test Statistic

350
300
250
200
150
100
1

2

3

4

Number of Classes
AIC

BIC

G2

Figure 5.3 Fit Statistic Comparison between Class Solutions

The data in Figure 5.3 and Table 5.8 indicate that the two class solution is the best fit
model. Figure 5.4 shows the prevalence rates for the 11 variables in the model (0 = no
approvals from that class, 1 = all class members received an approval).
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Prevelalence Rate

1.00
0.90
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00

Class 1

Class 2

Figure 5.4 Class Prevalence Rates
Figure 5.6 shows that the model does not have great class separation. The largest
differences occur in priority review, NME, and orphan status approvals, all with above 60
percent difference in prevalence rates between classes. The least amount of separation
occurs with dermatological agents, new dosage, and already marketed submissions. The
data in Figure 5.6 indicates a possible interpretation of the classes but is not very clear.
To assists with interpreting the classes, I looked at the descriptive data for the variables
excluded from the latent class model.
Comparing the data in Table 5.9 with the data in Figure 5.6 suggest that the
organizational subgroups in the latent class model are separated into innovative
corporations (class 1) and modification corporations (class 2). The innovative
corporations receive more new molecular entities, orphan drugs, and priority review
approvals. They were also more likely to develop antineoplastic, anti-infective, and
biologic drugs. Modifiers were more likely to receive approvals for metabolic,
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Table 5.9 Means by Latent Class for Financial, Chemical Type, and
Therapeutic Variables not Included in Latent Class Model
Financial Variables
Marketing & Administrative Cost
Operational Costs
2-Year Lagged R&D Cost
Merger & Acquisition Approvals
Subsidiary Approvals
Number of Employees
Percent not in Pharmaceuticals
Percent Foreign Submission
Return on Assets (ROA) in $s
Net Income per Basic Share in $s
Chemical & Therapeutic Variables
Anti-infective Agents
Cardiologic Agents
Nervous System Agents
Genitourinary Agents
Hormones
Metabolic Agents
Miscellaneous Agents
Ophthalmic Agents
Psychiatric Agents
Respiratory Agents
BLA Submissions
New Active Ingredient Submissions
New Combination Submissions
New Indication Submissions
OTC Switches
Sample Size

Class 1
37%
34%
17%
3%
16%
33,874
43%
44%
6.96
3.13

Class 2
38%
36%
15%
0%
5%
13,500
0%
52%
-1.72
-55.46

Test statistic
-0.23
-0.39
0.97
1.44
1.45
1.97
1.38
-0.52
2.54*
2.01*

13%
5%
14%
2%
9%
6%
4%
6%
2%
5%
9%
1%
7%
5%
1%
46

8%
4%
19%
0%
6%
13%
1%
1%
15%
18%
0%
8%
9%
5%
0%
13

0.81
0.41
-0.77
1.36
0.58
-1.62
0.99
1.04
-2.87**
-2.63*
1.70
-2.29*
-0.62
-0.35
1.30

* = p<0.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001

psychiatric, and respiratory agents. Based on the factor analysis in Table 5.7, these
therapeutic classes are connected to the chemical type submissions of new active
ingredient, new combination, and OTC switch, which are all applications defined as
modifying existing drugs. Using the variables for innovative research and altering current
treatments that were applied to test for path dependency in the structural equation model,
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innovative corporations have a lower rate of approvals for alterations to current research
than modification corporations, 0.47 to 0.66 (p < 0.020 in a two-tailed t-test). Conversely,
modification corporations have a lower rate of innovative approvals than innovative
corporations, 0.18 to 0.78 (p < 0.000 in a two-tailed t-test).
In relation to the financial information, there does not a appear to be a difference
in how expenses are allocated between the classes; as percentages of total expenses,
marketing and administrative cost, operational cost, and the 2-year lagged R&D cost are
similar between classes. In terms of organizational structure, innovators are larger, more
likely to make use of subsidiaries, engage in mergers and acquisitions, and be outside the
SIC industry category of pharmaceutical manufacturing and development. The innovator
strategy appears to be more beneficial for organizations because they were more likely to
have higher returns on assets and positive valuation on net income per basic share, both
outcomes that make organizational survival more likely.
In conclusion, the latent class analysis indicates that there are two organizational
groups in the sample demarcated by organizational strategy. These subgroups pursue
distinct organizational strategies focused on either innovation or modification. The
evidence of path dependency suggests that the latent constructs driving categorization are
the result of organizational culture and not the result of technical or regulatory pressures.
Furthermore, the fact that multiple organizations fall into each category means that the
aspects of organizational cultural influencing the class separation are collective, and
therefore not likely to be the result of unique internal organizational identity. Whether or
not the source of these latent constructs is attributable to logics orders is not assessable
from this model and requires further analysis using qualitative methods.
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5.7 Conclusion
The analyses in this chapter revealed several important findings. The factor
analysis showed that underlying latent constructs effecting organizational strategy can be
identified from measures of general organizational practices. This finding is not restricted
to the pharmaceutical industry and can applied by strategy-as-practice researchers in
other fields. Of interest to researchers in the pharmaceutical industry, the factor analysis
indicates that measures of organizational structure drawn from financial variables are
most likely covariates to research strategies rather than determinants. This finding makes
sense given the long-term research horizons and uncertainty in pharmaceutical
development.
The structural equation model revealed several key latent constructs that
interconnect in a coherent research framework. The most important finding from the
structural equation model is the existence of a path dependency creating a trade-off
between innovative research and alterations to current treatments. While the model does
not assess the scientific contributions alterations to current treatments may have on
shortening the development period for innovative treatments, the findings indicate that a
spillover effect is not likely to be realized internally because of the inverse relationship
between the rates of innovative approvals to alteration approvals.
The latent class analysis showed that distinct organizational categories exists
within the field as a result of the latent constructs within organizational research
strategies. The separation of categories aligns with the path dependency revealed by the
structural equation model, and based on the financial measures, lead to different
economic outcomes. The model shows innovative corporations greater commercial
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success than modifiers. This raises the question that if all of the organizations in the field
are operating within a capitalist market system, why would some corporations persist in
focusing on developing products that are alterations to current treatments? The latent
class analysis cannot address this question but an institutional theory based prediction is
that organizational culture has institutionalized the practices of innovation or
modifications making it unlikely organizational members are aware of the connection
between action and outcome. An analysis at the organizational level is necessary to
determine if institutional factors do in fact contribute to the observed latent classes. The
next chapter presents four case studies, two from each class, to elucidate if the latent class
separation is driven by institutional logics by analyzing managerial attention with the
organizations.
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CHAPTER 6
FOUR CASE STUDIES ON DRUG DEVELOPMENT
6.1 Introduction
Applying the strategic action framework to analyze the incorporation of a new
product within the pharmaceutical regime frames institutionalization as a causal process;
therefore, evaluating how organizations negotiate the release of a new product provides a
set of actions that can potentially reveal the dominant institutional logic of a company.
This chapter is a set of four case studies on the market release of new molecular entities
to elucidate if the latent classes identified in the previous chapter are organizational
categorizes defined by distinct institutional orders. Figure 6.1 is the theoretical model
illustrating the conceptual framework for this analytical step.

Figure 6.1 Model of Theoretical Prediction for Logic Order Effect on Organization
Strategy
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The data for the case studies came from two sources, academic medical journals
and annual corporate reports. These sources directly address the dynamics between
pharmaceutical corporations and two stakeholder groups: medical professionals and
financial investors. The original goal of conducting a comprehensive analysis on all the
major relationships between pharmaceutical corporations and the other stakeholders in
the field ended up being beyond the scope of this project but the case studies conducted
here show expanding the analysis to other stakeholders is a fruitful direction for future
research. The case studies in this chapter show latent class analysis can identify
organizational subgroups connected by organizational strategies; however, the data
suggest that the differences between the innovator and modifier classes is the result of
more than just the alignment of organizational strategy to institutional logics.
6.2 Case Study Data and Methodology
Organizational scholars have a long history utilizing case study research and such
work has led to many groundbreaking insights (Gibbert and Ruigrok 2010). Case studies
provide an in depth analysis of organizational practices that is difficult to achieve in large
sample studies and is an appropriate technique for directly comparing organizational
strategies between groups. The main criticisms of case study research focus on the issue
of the validity. There are two methods researchers have followed to assess the validity of
case study data: triangulation through multiple data sources or using multiple coders to
generate interrater reliability coefficients. This study uses triangulation by drawing data
from two different sources: academic journals and annual corporate reports.
The relationship between case studies and theory can be either inductive or
deductive based on the goals of the researcher. Chandler’s historical analyses (1977 &
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2005), used case studies inductively to develop broad theoretical explanations on
organizational structure and change. Scott and his associates (2000) applied case studies
deductively to elucidate the propositions derived from their quantitative analyses. This
study follows the lead of Scott et al. (2000) and uses case studies to elucidate if the
innovator and modifier classes identified in the previous chapter are the result of different
logic orders on organizational strategy.
6.2.1 Case Study Selection
Rather than directly selecting organizations from each latent class, two drugs from
each class were selected as case study subjects. This allows the analysis to focus on
strategies of drug development by analyzing the actions taken during the release of a
specific product. Considering the propriety nature of pharmaceutical development and
corporate practices in a competitive market system, the case histories are not exhaustive;
however, previous research has shown the data does exist to evaluate the organizational
strategy of pharmaceutical corporations during the drug development process (Abraham
1995, Applbaum 2009, Matheson 2008).
A strategic selection method criterion (Small 2009) was employed by drawing the
sample from the pool of new molecular entity approvals within each class. New
molecular entity is an appropriate criterion because it requires interorganizational
negotiations and therefore increases the availability of data: journal articles that inform
physicians about a new treatment option are more prevalent during the early stages of a
prescription drugs life cycle, and new products are more likely to be featured in annual
corporate reports. In addition to providing potential cases in both classes, this criterion
also allowed for the selection of cases that were within a few years of each other, which
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acts as a control for historical events within the field. The drugs selected for case study
analysis are Novartis’s Tasigna, Johnson & Johnson’s Invega, Sepracor’s Lunesta, and
Novo Nordisk’s Levemir.
6.2.2 Data & Methods
Data were gathered from two sources: academic medical journals and annual
corporate reports. One medical journal article for each drug was found on PubMed by
searching the chemical name of each drug within three years of the FDA approval date.
In order for an article to be selected for analysis, one or more authors had to be clearly
identified as affiliated with the application company. Seven years of annual corporate
reports on each corporation were collected from the Mergent online database. A period of
seven years of reports was chosen for saturation; for example, Fiol (1989 and 1990) only
analyzed three years of reports. The drug approval year was the midpoint with the three
years of reports preceding and following the approval year completing each sample.
The data were analyzed using basic content analysis procedures (Weber 1990).
While there is academic criticism on using content analysis for analyzing latent
constructs, the methodology has become an accepted process for evaluating a wide range
of organizational issues (Duriau et al 2007). In relation to this project, content analysis
has been used for over thirty years to evaluate organizational strategy (see Bettman and
Weitz 1984, Bowman 1984, Ditlevesen 2012, and Stanton and Stanton 2002).
The institutional logics perspective informed the construction of the codebook for
the evaluation of the case study data. The rhetorical analysis of organizational material
has been used successfully in prior research to evaluate the effects of institutional
structure on organizational strategy (Stanton and Stanton 2002, Suddaby and Greenwood
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2005). Discourse related to organizational strategy within the academic journals and
annual corporate reports was coded through an iterative coding process. Table 6.1 shows
the final codebook. The entirety of the academic journals were read and coded; however,
only the letter to shareholders and sections discussing the case study drug were coded in
the annual corporate reports.
Since the purpose of this analysis was to elucidate the latent classes found in the
quantitative analysis, the content coded in each source was statements about
organizational strategy. Rather than counts of words or phrases, cohesive statements
(sentences and paragraphs) were coded as single units of discussions on organizational
strategy. The example of strategies discussing the need for care in Table 6.1 is two
sentences from the 2005 Novo Nordisk letter to shareholders. The goal of this coded
methodology was to ensure the identification of each strategy was correct by including
the context of each statement.
Table 6.1 Codebook for Case Study Analysis
Research articles
author(s)
author affiliations
funding sources
journal
reporting method of treatment
effects

Example
Turkoz et al
all are Ortho-McNeil Janssen Scientific Affairs (J&J
subsidiary)
Ortho-McNeil Janssen Scientific Affairs, LLC
Neuropsychiatric Disease and Treatment
"22% reduction from baseline" - relative effect

treatment groups

pooled analysis of 3 prior studies: five groups on various
strengths against one placebo group

alternative treatments

no alternative medication tested but listed studies of other
drugs that have found similar results

framing of need

"the damaging effect that negative symptoms have on the
ability of patients with schizophrenia to participate fully in
society."

reporting method

ANCOVA, path analysis, structural equation modeling
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iatrogenic effects
trail duration
sample size

ADRs 10% or greater are listed
three 6-week studies
937 treatment & 337 placebo

study limitations

goodness of fit statistics for path analysis were below
acceptable range

drug genesis
other

Annual Corporate Reports
Research & Development

not discussed
results consistent with hypothesis that indirect symptoms are
improved by the drug, but the data is not significant
Example

Logic Order

research pipeline

"For several years Novartis has received more
approvals for new medicines than competitors."
(Novartis 2010:9)

commerce

publications and conferences

"We expect to provide data on arfomoterol Phase
III studies at appropriate medical meetings as we
advance through the drug development process."
(Sepracor 2003:3)

science

research failures

"A hope for stroke patients faded away." (Novo
Nordisk 2007:2)

care

research processes

"Our two separate, six-month, placebo-controlled
studies of the product have provided extensive data
supporting the drug's suitability for nightly
administration over long periods of time without the
complications of significant next-day effects,
tolerance and rebound, which are observed with
other drugs used to treat insomnia." (Sepracor 2005:
2)

science

new projects

“LUNESTA represents a new approach to the
treatment of insomnia, and has the potential to bring
these patients real relief.” (Sepracor 2004:2)

care

need for care

"We have a responsibility as part of our vision to
try to influence the negative trends of this global
health issue and avoid unnecessary human suffering
and a staggering cost to society. That is why we
wish to be a catalyst for changing diabetes." (Novo
Nordisk 2005:4)

care

awareness of need

"As part of our marketing strategy for 2007, we
have begun the rollout of a new physician education
campaign containing some of these data, which we
believe will further distinguish LUNESTA as a
unique treatment available for the millions of
people in the U.S. who have insomnia." (Sepracor
2006:2)

commerce

Patient Health
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"But thanks to our strong financial results in 2004,
we were able to expand our "access to medicines"
programs for uninsured and indigent patients
suffering from leprosy, malaria, tuberculosis,
chronic myeloid, leukemia and other diseases, all
part of our important worldwide corporate
citizenship program." (Novartis 2004: 8)

care

perception of industry
structure

“Our perspectives on health policy are
straightforward: We are champions of a health care
system that provides incentives for innovation, that
permits public and private health care systems to
co-exist, that is characterized by strong and wellrespected regulatory authorities, that is centered
around the best interests of patients and consumers,
that provides for physician and patient choice, and
that allows these choices to be made on the basis of
broadly available, well-founded, clinical and
economic evidence.” (Johnson & Johnson 2005:4)

commerce

intellectual property rights

"The cost increases associated with the growing
demand for healthcare services, diagnostics and
medicines lead political activities aimed at reducing
expenditures on medicines, via price reductions and
generic substitution. Unfortunately, these efforts go
even further and also encompass attempts to
weaken patents and intellectual property rights."
(Novartis 2008: 7)

commerce

interorganizational relations

"We work actively to promote collaboration
between all parties in the healthcare system to
achieve common goals." (Novo Nordisk 2006:2)

care

public perceptions on
industry

"Clearly the global regulatory environment is
growing tougher; pressure is being put on
companies over the cost of health care, and private
enterprise is under close public scrutiny." (Johnson
& Johnson 2004:3)

commerce

company principles

"Thanks to the power of our operating model and
the character of the people we attract, we have been
able to deliver exceptionally consistent performance
decade after decade." (Johnson & Johnson 2007:4)

commerce

mergers and acquisitions

"Thanks to our strategy, in 2008, Novartis stayed on
course and completed several targeted acquisitions
and strategic investments that both strengthened the
portfolio and enhanced our internal growth drivers"
(Novartis 2008:6)

commerce

access to care

Health Care Industry

Organizational Structure
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alliances

"During the first quarter of 2005, we signed a
research and development agreement with San
Diego-based ACADIA for development of new
drug candidates targeted toward treatment of CNS
disorders, primarily neuropsychiatric/neurologic
conditions and neuropathic pain, as well as a
possible 5-HT2A antagonist for use in a
combination product with LUNESTA for sleeprelated indications." (Sepracor 2004:3)

science

organizational culture

"Measurement of working climate indicates that
this has been accomplished without affecting
employee morale. In fact morale is at an all-time
high!" (Novo Nordisk 2003:4)

care

business structure

“Our decentralized management approach
encourages our businesses to develop products and
marketing strategies tuned to local cultures,
enabling them to explore new product categories
and even new business models.” (Johnson &
Johnson 2007:6)

commerce

While the case studies are focused on the development of specific drugs, most of
the annual corporate reports in the sample contained little information on the drugs. This
required expansion of the analysis to include the entire content of the letter to the
shareholders. The content in the annual corporate reports was coded in a two-stage
process similar to Powell and Sandholtz’s (2012) methods. The first pass coded the
material into four main categories of organizational strategy: research and development,
patient health, health care industry, and organizational structure. The second pass coded
the material within each category into the logic order of science, care, or commerce.
The four main categories were identified as descriptive characteristics during the
initial reading of a selection of annual reports. These categories are not interpretations of
latent constructs, i.e. this is not grounded theory, rather the categories were employed to
efficiently separate the data to evaluate the content based on the logic orders. This
process allowed for coherent strategies related to the logic orders to emerge between
different areas of organizational strategy, thereby clearly identifying the overall
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alignment of each corporation’s organizational strategy. The dominant logic of the
organization was determined as the logic order that contained the most statements of
organizational strategies.
Annual corporate reports are an appropriate source for data to evaluate
organizational logics because these publications have shifted from being primarily
accounting reports to tools organizations use strategically to communicate organizational
identity to outsiders (Duriau et al 2007). Researchers do not typically examine the entire
report but focus their analysis on specific sections (Stanton and Stanton 2002). The letter
to shareholders was selected here as the component to evaluate the general organizational
strategy of each corporation because letters to shareholders have been utilized similarly in
previous research to indicate causal relations between management ideology and
organizational actions (Bettman and Weitz 1984, Duriau et al. 2007, Fiol 1989 and 1990).
Neither of these data sources is neutral in relation to institutional frameworks. The
academic journal articles are components of science and the annual corporate reports are
components of commerce. However, this does not mean the content only reflects these
two logics. The factual content, clinical data and corporate performance metrics, is not
the content analyzed. The analysis focuses on interpreting the discussions of strategy that
resulted from the factual content. For example, in the academic articles treatment effects
are coded as reported as either relative or absolute measures because Woloshin et al.
(2008) stated that reporting treatment effects in relative terms was a strategic method
employed to make treatment outcomes seem more impressive to physicians. This tactic
then is aligned with the logic of commerce if the study authors are affiliated with the drug
company because making the trial outcome seem more impressive would benefit the
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company as physicians would be more likely to the prescribe the drug. In a similar
fashion, analyzing components within the letter to shareholders can also reveal
organizational strategies aligned with logics other than the logic of commerce.
6.3 Tasigna (nilotinib) and Novartis: Innovator Class
The FDA approved Tasigna (nilotinib) on October 29, 2007 as part of the
chemotherapy treatment for leukemia. Deininger’s (2008) article is a review of two new
second line treatment options available for chronic myeloid leukemia and is focused on
the results of the clinical trials for Tasigna. The author, Michael W. Deininger, is
affiliated with the Division of Hematology and Medical Oncology at the Oregon Health
and Science University Cancer Institute. He is further identified as a consult for Novartis
in the disclosure section.
This article is the only journal article in the sample that compared the effects of
competing treatment options from different companies. What is interesting about this
tactic is that the actual clinical studies were not comparative trials but Deininger (2008)
attempted to distinguish the drugs from each other based on results from separate studies.
He concluded that the results do not clearly indicate one products is superior, both appear
to have benefits and drawbacks, but Tasigna appeared to have more potential for patients.
The general tone of the article indicates an alignment with the logic of care. Deininger
(2008) framed the competition between second line drugs as beneficial primarily for
patients because it is “an important step on the path to individualized cancer therapy”
(4030). Furthermore, whether or not Tasigna meets the potential predicted treatment
targets, it is still “another piece of good news of CML patients” Deininger (2008:4030).
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These statements connect with the trends aligned with the logic of care in the annual
corporate reports.
One of the organizational strategies that emerged from the Novartis letters to
shareholders was the company’s efforts to provide medicines for patients that could not
afford them. The 2004 letter to the shareholders discussed the company’s recently opened
research center for tropical disease, which is managed as a not-for profit organization and
targets the treatments of neglected diseases in developing countries. The center is part of
the company’s broader goal of providing access to patients in need in line with the belief
that the right to health is a basic human right. This concern for patients is repeated in all
of the letters through statements mentioning the company’s multiple access-to-medicine
programs. This aligns with the logic of care and can be viewed as a tactic to secure moral
legitimacy for the company by appealing to general humanitarian concerns.
Additional examples of Novartis addressing broader health issues occur in later
reports. The 2006 letter to shareholders explained that corporate citizenship was an
important issue at Novartis and that was why the company engaged in multiple access-tomedicine programs, connecting this topic between strategies of patient care and
organizational structure. In the 2007 letter, the section covering the access-to-medicines
programs was expanded to included a discussion on corporate citizenship and a new
corporate commitment to environmental sustainability. The 2008 letter announced the
launch of a vaccines institute in Italy that would focus on developing vaccines for
patients in developing countries, and in the 2009 letter, Novartis is stated to have played a
crucial part in the successful campaign against leprosy, the near eradication of which is
framed as a public health milestone. Finally, the 2010 report noted that in addition to
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continuing to provide medicine to those without access, Novartis was now taking a
holistic approach to health care access by expanding its philanthropic programs to include
management and technical training to assist countries in building health care
infrastructures.
The organizational principle of providing access continues to be visible in the
unusual diversification of the company by selling both prescription and generic drugs.
The letters framed the generic segment of the company as providing access to medicine
for patients in the industrial world who can afford to pay for medication, but not the high
prices of brand name drugs. The generic drug business “provides affordable treatment
options following the expiry of patents” (Novartis 2006:6). In the 2008 letter this
strategy is attributed to helping maintain the overall fiscal performance of the company in
the deteriorating economic climate and it is indicated the strategy is becoming legitimized
within the industry because it “now enjoys broad support and that a growing number of
major pharmaceutical companies are also investing in generic pharmaceuticals” (Novartis
2008:6). This strategy of product diversification is a good illustration of the overall
organizational strategy of Novartis. The letters discussed how the generics business
allowed the company to provide access to more people while at the same time touting the
strategy as successful in contributing to growing profitability. Entry into the generic
market as a strategy aligns with both the logics of care and commerce because Novartis
stated it allowed the company to provide care to an underserved population but at the
same time was profitable. Other components within the letters indicate that Novartis is
equally aligned to the logics of care and commerce.
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Examples of actions that align with the logic of commerce are seen in all of the
reports. The 2004 letter stated the need for strong intellectual property rights and keeping
the industry profitable was necessary to develop innovations for future generations. The
letter also discussed the company’s acquisition strategy as designed to improve its
generic portfolio. Tasigna was first mentioned in the 2006 letter, which stated its
expected launch date and projected Tasigna to reach peak annual sales of 1 billion
dollars. The fact that the earliest discussion of Tasigna is framed around projected
profitability is an example pragmatic legitimacy as an explanation of drug development
and aligns with the logic of commerce. The use of pragmatic legitimacy as an
explanatory tactic for strategies reflecting the logic of commerce becomes clearer in the
discussions on strategy related to the health care industry.
Over a page in the 2007 letter is devoted to an ideological discussion of antimarket assaults on the pharmaceutical industry and why commercialization is the
appropriate strategy for pharmaceutical development. The 2007 letter stated explicitly the
three biggest challenges for Novartis were increased pressure on costs, erosion of patent
rights, and growing public mistrust. Later in the letter, the CEO stated, “I personally feel
the level of hostility toward innovation goes too far when industrialized countries take for
granted that they have the healthiest population in the history of mankind but at the same
time demand breakthrough medicines with no side effects and offered at minimal prices”
(Novartis 2007:8). This letter more than the others reveals the company as conflicted
between seeking to expand access to care while also existing as a profitable commercial
corporation. The connection between innovation and commercialization is an example of
cognitive legitimacy tied to the market ideology; specifically that capitalism incentivizes
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innovation. The 2008 letter to shareholders continued to criticize the larger structural
issues of the health care industry but the critique was toned down from the previous year.
Finally, the CEO stated in the 2009 report “I would like to emphasize that our primary
purpose as a pharmaceutical company is to discover and develop effective medicines and
successfully bring them to market” (10), again reinforcing the connection between
development and capitalism found in the logic of commerce as the dominant component
of the organizational strategy.
In conclusion, it is clear Novartis is a company that cares. None of the other case
studies discussed extensive programs providing access to medicine consistently nor did
they mention founding multiple organizations dedicated to addressing a wide range of
health issues targeted to low profit markets. Yet at the same time Novartis is still a
commercial company stating in response to policies of price controls that people need to
realize innovation has a price and that patients benefit from the financial success of
industry. As a large corporation, the letters mentioned multiple products each year
making it difficult to focus on the development of Tasigna, and Tasigna was only briefly
discussed elsewhere in the annual reports. Based on the content in the letter to
shareholders, my conclusion is the organizational strategy of Novartis is not dominated
by on logic but equally aligned with the logics of care and commerce.
6.4 Invega (paliperidone) and Johnson & Johnson: Innovator Class
Invega is a psychotherapeutic agent approved by the FDA on December 19, 2006
for the treatment of schizophrenia. The article by Turkoz et al. (2008) is a pooled analysis
of data from three prior studies to test for the indirect effects of Invega. The data
analyzed came from random controlled trials that tested five strengths of Invega against
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placebo groups. All four study authors are employees of Ortho-McNeil Janssen Scientific
Affairs, a wholly owned subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson.
The need for an analysis of indirect effects is framed around the complexity of
schizophrenia, which causes both positive and negative symptoms in patients. The goal of
this analysis was to separate the total effects between direct and indirect effects through
path analysis to test the hypothesis that the drug has a direct effect on the negative
symptoms of schizophrenia that contribute indirectly to patient outcomes. The authors’
conclude the findings support this hypothesis: “these data suggest that paliperidone ER
improves the negative symptoms of schizophrenia through a direct effect as well as an
indirect effect on positive and mood symptoms” (Turkoz et al 2008:957). However, the
data only shows the direct effect is significant; neither of the mediated effects tested,
indirect effects on positive and negative symptoms, were significant in the model. While
the authors’ noted that these indirect effects were not significant in their discussion of the
results, the fact that they concluded that the study supported the hypothesis of indirect
effects indicates the intent of this article aligns with the logics of commerce because the
measurable outcomes of the drug are overstated. The analysis of the data from the annual
corporate reports supports further the interpretation that Johnson & Johnson pursues an
organizational strategy aligned with the logic of commerce.
The annual corporate report sections on Invega give the impression Johnson &
Johnson is primarily focused on scientific advancements and patient care. The 2007
annual report is the only one that discussed Invega in detail. The section on Invega
opened with a personal story of a patient struggling with schizophrenia and how
receiving treatment finally led to him becoming a better-functioning person. The section
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then discussed the history of schizophrenia research at the company and the multiple
breakthroughs made since 1953. The conclusion of the section stated Invega was one
more product that will enable patients to return to fulfilling their dreams. This section on
Invega contained no discussions that aligned with the logic of commerce, most of the
discussion is focused on improving patient health and advances in treatment, but the
content in the letters to shareholders indicates the strategic focus of the company was
actually aligned with the logic of commerce.
The 2003 and 2004 letters appeared balanced between the three logics. The 2003
letter contains statements of care: “Patients’ stories of the impact of this technology are
inspiring, and remind us that our business – the business of health care – is a meaningful
endeavor and an extraordinary responsibility”; statements of science: “While financial
achievements are important in themselves, more significant are the health care advances
they enable that are the foundation for our future”; and statements of commerce
“Productivity initiatives such as Process Excellence help us exploit every opportunity to
maximize the resources of this vast organization”. The 2004 letter contained similar
statements but there was more discussion about the how the organizational structure meet
targets related to science, care, and commerce. In addition, the 2004 letter is the first to
mention regulatory pressures on the cost of care as a factor influencing organizational
strategy.
It becomes clear in the 2005 letter that while Johnson & Johnson is making
research advances and improving people’s lives, the dominant organizational strategy of
the company aligns with the logic of commerce. The letter opens with a statement that
growth was primarily the result of managerial decisions rather than discoveries or

195

improved treatments: “An improvement in mix toward higher margin products,
productivity increases driven by cost containment efforts, and positive interest and other
incomes all helped drive impressive earnings growth” (Johnson & Johnson 2005:1). The
letter also discussed the general structure of health care systems in more detail and made
clear the company position is health care systems should be based on market principles
where products have both clinical and economic value.
The 2006 letter is the first letter in the sample to integrate performance metric
graphs into the text. The bottom of the first page presents three bar charts showing net
sales, diluted earnings per share, and dividends per share between 2002 and 2006. The
incorporation of these graphs that were previously in a separate section of the report
emphasized the focus of the strategic statements in the letter is commercial productivity.
The 2006 letter also discussed in detail the four strategic principles of the company: (1)
founded on the values embodied in the Credo, (2) broadly based in human health care, (3)
a decentralized business operation, and (4) a long-term management strategy. Each of
these principles is explained in relation to specific organizational strategies. The credo
“challenges employees to put the needs and well-being of the people they serve first”;
being broadly based offers “advantages that enable us to elevate our performance”
(emphasis in the original); decentralization combines the best properties of small firms
with the resources of a large corporation; and long term management is another “source
of enduring financial strength” (Johnson & Johnson 2006). While these principles cover
the range of all three logics, the letter connected these principles through a broader
organizational commitment to “delivering capital-efficient, profitable growth”, therefore,
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using pragmatic legitimacy to indicate that components of science and care are
strategically adopted to meet the company’s commercial needs.
The 2007 letter was the first to discuss philanthropic sponsorships, but it is clear
the strategy of sponsorship is part of the organization’s commercial strategy: “Our
sponsorship of the 2008 Olympics in Beijing is boosting awareness of our companies and
our brands throughout the Asia-Pacific region” (Johnson & Johnson 2007:6). The letter
discussed the four key businesses principles again but they were modified from the
principles listed in previous years to: (1) winning in health care, (2) capitalizing on
convergence, (3) accelerating growth in emerging markets, and (4) developing leadership
and talent. These new principles are more commercially focused and indicated the
organizational strategy was increasingly focused on market based tactics. Winning in
health care is a particularly interesting principle because the explanation focused on
managerial changes to the organizational structure and indicated Johnson & Johnson
considers the health care industry a competition between organizations rather than an
institution for social improvement. The letter to shareholders in the 2008 and 2009 annual
reports contained similar content to the years of 2006 and 2007 with one notable
exception. The 2008 letter addressed the broader economic issues of the global recession
and discussed how the company remained strong by highlighting the fact it was the third
best performing stock in the Dow Industrial Average for the year.
In conclusion, the data indicates the dominant organizational strategy for Johnson
& Johnson aligns with the logic of commerce. While the content of the material discussed
scientific advances and concern for patient health, these topics were ultimately woven
together as part of an organizational identity based on a profitable commercial enterprise.
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Components of science and care were presented predominantly as elements of cognitive
legitimacy; the company engaged in scientific research and patient care because that is
what pharmaceutical corporations do, not because these actions defined corporate goals.
Components of science and care were also presented pragmatically to explain strategies
designed to provide the company with a competitive edge.
Turkoz et al. (2008) stated there was a clear need to improve schizophrenia
treatment and learn about how current treatments effect the entire range of negative
symptoms. This position represents the logics of both care and science, but the authors
conclusion, that Invega could treat indirect symptoms, is unsupported by the data
indicating the primary interest of the author’s was market expansion. This article also
represents the use of pragmatic legitimacy; the data did not support the hypothesis on
Invega, but neither did it disprove the hypothesis, so practitioners are encouraged to
adopt the treatment because it could improve their patients’ outcomes. The actions in this
situation are legitimized through positions of self-interest. Johnson & Johnson gets
increased sales and physicians can switch their patients to a medication that may or may
not improve their condition but shows no indication it will worsen the symptoms.
6.5 Lunesta/Estorra (eszopiclone) and Sepracor: Modifier Class
The FDA approved Lunesta (eszopiclone) on December 15, 2004 for the
treatment of primary insomnia. Walsh (2007) and colleagues article presented the
findings from a Phase IIIB/IV clinical trial Sepracor submitted to the FDA. Ten of the six
authors’ work for Sepracor and the article stated the company provided the funding for
the trial. The research design was a standard, double-blind randomized trial of the
treatment against a placebo with the treatment effects reported through relative measures
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against the control group and as absolute measures calculated against the baseline of the
treatment group.
The authors stated the clinical trial had several unique components compared to
previous insomnia studies. First, the trial was long, lasting for over six months, and the
researchers used a non-standard methodology for sleep studies by gathering data beyond
sleep quality. Walsh et al. (2007) stated the most significant aspect of the trial was it “is
the first to demonstrate that long-term treatment of primary insomnia with eszopiclone
3mg, or any hypnotic, enhanced quality of life, reduced work limitations, and reduced
global insomnia severity, in addition to improving quantitative, patient-reported sleep
variables” (967). While the article focused on these improvements to patients, the overall
tone of the article framed eszopiclone as a scientific breakthrough in sleep therapy and
indicated a strategy aligned with the logic of science. The early years of the annual
corporate reports also focused on the scientific discoveries and advances in patient
treatments made by Sepracor.
The shareholder letters in 2001 and 2002 framed Sepracor as a company founded
on innovative research. The letters also highlight the organizational structure by stating
Sepracor is a unique, integrated small pharmaceutical organization that can take a product
from development to commercialization. Even though the letters highlight the company’s
scientific abilities, a significant portion of income was derived through royalties from
out-licensed products, indicating that Sepracor’s early infrastructure was more supportive
of research and development than commercialization. Both the 2001 and 2002 letters
discussed in detail only one commercialized product that was developed in-house,
Xopenex an asthma treatment. Both letters discussed Lunesta, under the current brand
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name Estorra, as a promising product in the late-stage pipeline. Outside of the letter to
shareholders, there were lengthy sections in the reports containing a discussion on the
current clinical research results for Lunesta and an explanation of insomnia and its effect
on people’s lives. These sections framed insomnia as an under-treated health need but
indicated the organizational strategy for developing Lunesta focused on scientific
discovery rather than capitalizing on an unmet market demand.
About a quarter of the 2003 letter to shareholders was devoted to Lunesta. The
primary focus of this section was on the general scientific progress being made in treating
sleep disorders and the specific research being conducted by Sepracor. “As the science
surrounding GABA continues to evolve, we feel privileged to be at the forefront of
research for the treatment of sleep disorders” (Sepracor 2003:2). The letter highlights that
2,700 patients were enrolled in the phase III trials submitted to the FDA for approval and
how the company was conducting an additional long-term follow-up study specifically
because “the surprising absence of scientifically robust, long-term efficacy data”
(Sepracor 2003:2). The content of the letter indicates Sepracor presents a public identity
based on scientific accomplishment. This is a strategy of moral legitimacy because it is
justifying the alignment of non-commercial strategies with the general social promise of
scientific medicine. This tactics is seen explicitly in the claim that the need for insomnia
treatments is that sleep is a fundamental component of good health. This strategy
suggests Sepracor’s dominant organizational strategy aligns with the logic of science.
In the 2004 letter, Estorra has been rebranded as Lunesta and discussion on the
drug again takes up about a quarter of the letter. The letter discussed the continued
Lunesta trials and framed the company’s interest in the ongoing research around gaining
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a better understanding on the relationship between insomnia and other commonly
occurring conditions. Stating that Sepracor is interested in furthering scientific
knowledge on insomnia by investigating comorbidity causality is another instance of a
non-commercial organizational strategy justified through moral legitimacy. The content
of the first four annual corporate reports indicated Sepracor is aligned predominantly with
the logic of science; however, starting with the 2004 letter to shareholders, an increasing
amount of the discussion on organizational strategy is devoted to market based tactics.
For example, the 2004 letter discussed the need for expanding the Lunesta sales force to
achieve product growth and highlighted how the company’s unique infrastructure makes
it an ideal partner for a U.S. biotech corporation seeking to commercialize a new product.
In the 2005 letter, the Lunesta content is focused more on patient care and
commercialization than scientific discovery. While future developments are still
mentioned as important to the company’s long-term plans, the letter stated the expansion
of the sales force had driven short-term growth rather than the introduction of a new
product. The discussion of organizational strategies for market development as well as
issues related to the health care industry is even more prevalent in the 2006 letter.
However, the final section of the letter stated, “Increasingly, our focus will be on future
opportunities in the form of candidates that we generate from our internal discovery
capabilities” (Sepracor 2006:3), indicating Sepracor was still strongly tied to the logic of
science.
The final Sepracor letter to shareholders analyzed was a notable departure from
the previous six. The entire structure of the letter was different and focused almost
entirely on market related organizational strategies. Part of this shift could be attributed to
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a new CEO who initiated structural changes as part of an “objective to create a stronger
and more productive commercial organization” (Sepracor 2007:3). While the letter still
mentioned specific products, it no longer contained sections discussing the development
of the products. What is particularly interesting about this letter is that while the content
was predominantly market orientated, the opening section described Sepracor as a
pioneering research company that was built on the scientific advancement of dividing
chiral drugs into parts. This origin story is absent from all of the early letters and seems to
be included here as a tactic of pragmatic legitimacy for altering the organizational
strategy.
In conclusion, Lunesta was the most challenging case to analyze. The early
Sepracor annual reports aligned with the logic of science but the tone and substance of
the reports took a notable departure in 2005 towards the logic of commerce. What is
interesting about this apparent shift in organizational strategy is that while there was a
change in management as the founder and CEO retried in early 2007, Sepracor was
subsequently acquired in 2009 by the Japanese firm Sumitomo Dainippon Pharma. This
information suggests that the shift in tone aligning the company with the logic of
commerce and presenting this change through tactics of pragmatic legitimacy could have
been part of a broader organizational strategy to become an acquisition target.
Furthermore, while the importance of scientific research was dominant in the majority of
the letters, the organizational strategy of out-licensing also was mentioned frequently as a
method of profitability, indicating the company was always pursuing a strategy of
external commercialization.
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Finally, toward the end of the annual reports in a legalese section on licensing
agreements, is the information that the compound leading to Lunesta was in-licensed
through a 1999 data package acquisition from Rhone-Poulenc Rorer SA. The exact intent
of this acquisition is not stated but that Rhone-Poulenc Rorer SA received an out-license
for a Sepracor developed product in return suggest the early company was focused more
on research and development than commercialization, meaning they traded a developed
compound for an undeveloped one with the intent of developing it in-house. In
conclusion, Sepracor was originally a company aligned with the logic of science but
between 2001 and 2007 its primary alignment shifted to the logic of commerce. The
reason for this shift is unclear from the current data but the retirement of the founder
indicates the change in organizational strategy could originate with the new management.
6.6 Levemir (insulin detemir) and Novo Nordisk: Modifier Class
Levemir is a modern insulin for treating diabetes approved by the FDA on June
16, 2005. The article by Hermansen and colleagues (2006) presented the data from a 26week clinical trial comparing Levemir to an existing insulin treatment also produced by
Novo Nordisk. Two of the six authors of the study were Novo Nordisk employees. The
treatment effects were reported as relative differences between the two products and the
authors concluded the newer product, Levemir, offered a clinically important
improvement over the existing the treatment option.
In addition to the scientific presentation of the data, the authors also discussed
several aspects of patient care. Levemir patients in the trial experienced reduced
hypoglycemic incidents and gained less weight; both of these outcomes were framed as
further benefits of the drug rather than clinical treatment targets. The discussion of the
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trial protocols also made clear the authors’ concern for general patient safety and
information on the individual investigators at the 58 research sites is provided in an
online supplement, making this the most transparent journal article in the sample.
Furthermore, seven patients who experienced adverse events during the trial, allergic
reactions or injection site infections, were withdrawn from the study by the researchers.
These actions indicate a strategy interested in demonstrating the moral legitimacy of the
research by focusing on patient safety in addition to clinical efficacy and suggest Novo
Nordisk’s organizational strategy aligns with the logic of care. A strategic focus on
patient care is also evident within the annual corporate reports.
Strategic discussion in the earliest letter analyzed, 2002, focused primarily on the
organizational structure of the company. The report framed the recent acquisition of a
Brazilian company as being “able to make our product portfolio available to a greater part
of the Brazilian diabetes community than in the past” (Novo Nordisk 2002:2). The term
“diabetes community” rather than diabetes market and the statement on making the
product portfolio available rather than expanding both indicate an organizational strategy
aligned with the logic of care. An organizational focus on care is further supported by the
discussion on care related strategies extending beyond the patient. The 2002 letter
discussed a pilot study on corporate climate to evaluate company morale and the 2003
letter reported the results of the first company wide survey showed overall high employee
morale. While the other companies discussed employees, they focused on metrics such as
leadership skill and industry accomplishments; the fact that the Novo Nordisk letters
reported on corporate morale and took pride in the high results further indicates the
company’s organizational strategy aligns with the logic of care.
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The corporate focus on care becomes stronger in the later annual reports. The
2003 letter stated the executive management was requesting the board of directors alter
the Articles of Association to “specify that the company, besides its financial purpose
will strive to achieve its objectives in an environmentally and socially responsible way”
(Novo Nordisk 2003:3). The inclusion of interest on the environment and social
wellbeing beyond the commercial requirements of the company represents a tactic of
moral legitimacy to support the broader organizational alignment with the logic of care
that could be perceived as deviant by financial stakeholders. In 2004, defeating diabetes
is stated as both the passion and business of the company while the leadership position of
the company in the diabetes market is framed as being able to meet previously unmet
medical needs. The organizational strategy to meet the demands of a competitive
business environment is stated as a “long-term, holistic perspective” taking a “multipronged approach to providing better access to health through capacity building, a
preferential pricing policy for the poorest nations, and funding through the World
Diabetes Foundation” (Novo Nordisk 2004:1). These tactics all reinforce an underlying
strategy aligned with the logic of care.
The letter in 2005, the year Levemir was approved, demonstrated the strongest
commitment yet to organizational strategies focused on patient care. The subtitle to the
letter: “Poised for continued growth – but not at any cost” reinforced the company’s
primary focus was on patient health and that strategies sacrificing patient health for
commercial gain were not in the interest of the company. The title statement is explained
as an ethical strategy for growth that includes corporate transparency and care for the
environment. The letter also reiterated the goal of the company is to defeat diabetes and
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stated that the increased profits from cost reduction measures were put back into research
and development. The U.S. approval of Levemir is framed as good news for patients and
physicians and only elsewhere in the annual report is it stated that the U.S. market is the
world’s largest and most profitable market for diabetes treatments.
The 2006 letter restated some of the major strategies aligned with the logics of
care: the goal of defeating diabetes, tackling environmental problems, and maintaining
good employee morale. This letter departed from the earlier ones in how it highlighted
the company’s philanthropy efforts. The 2006 letter opened with the story of a little girl
diagnosed with diabetes and how her quest to raise awareness on the condition led to the
initiation of the United Nations World Diabetes Day. The letter mentioned later that
Novo Nordisk was a sponsor of the first World Diabetes Day. The 2006 letter also
discussed the promotion of collaborative efforts to fight diabetes reiterating that the goal
of defeating diabetes requires collaboration between health care stakeholders. The
statement that collaboration is necessary is a distinctly different from an organizational
strategy dominated by the logic of commerce that would view health care as a
competition.
The 2007 letter again mentioned the company’s participation in World Diabetes
Day and stated Novo Nordisk hosted the “first Global Changing Diabetes Leadership
Forum in New York” (2007:3). The goal of defeating diabetes and the discussions on
corporate philanthropy reveal Novo Nordisk primary interest was in improving the lives
of patients. The final letter analyzed, 2008, continued to indicate the company’s
alignment with the logic of care even though there was an increased focus on market
issues related to the declining global economic conditions. In addition to a new program
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to provide treatment to poor children, the 2008 letter also stated the need to make sure the
global economic downturn does not impede access to care.
In conclusion, the data indicates the organizational strategy of Novo Nordisk
aligns primarily with the logic of care. The company pursued organizational programs
designed not only to address the medical needs of care for patients but also global
environmental issues and internal employee morale. The introduction of Levemir
highlighted the product as an improvement in patient health and discussed how the
product was a step towards tailored care. The most important aspect of the logic of care
revealed in the data is Novo Nordisk’s stated goal of defeating diabetes. Diabetes is a
chronic condition with the potential for maximizing profits through a lifetime of
treatment, but defeating diabetes would undermine the continued growth in profits for a
company focused on diabetes treatments. The use of the term defeat orients the strategy
around the treatment of disease rather than a market competition to expand product share.
Further indicating Novo Nordisk dominant organizational strategy aligns with the logic
of care is the recognition that defeating diabetes requires collaboration between health
care stakeholders.
6.7 Discussion: Evaluation of the Classes
The data show the pharmaceutical field of the United States is a field of
institutional pluralism and that organizations within the field pursue organizational
strategies aligned with different logic orders. The latent class analysis resulted in the
emergence of two organizational subgroups within the sample, but the case studies reveal
that while the organizations within these subgroups demonstrate alignments to different
logic orders, the class separation is not solely the result organizational strategies adhering
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to the different logic orders. Conversely, within class similarities show that the
quantitative assessments successfully identified latent constructs of organizational
strategy that separate organizations within the field, which shows that the mixed-methods
approach used in this project is a valuable addition to the research literature.
The theoretical propositions in Chapter 2 expected the different processes of
institutional legitimacy to align with different logic orders but the data indicates that this
is not the case. I observed tactics of cognitive legitimacy used most often to support
strategies aligned with the dominant logic of the field, commerce. Theoretically, this
makes sense because cognitive legitimacy comes from following expectations because
deviation is unthinkable. Tactics of pragmatic legitimacy also aligned with the logic of
commerce. While my original expectation that the alignment between pragmatic
legitimacy and the logic of commerce was based on the logic of commerce defining selfinterested organizational strategies as appropriate, an alternate interpretation is that
pursuing organizational practices aligned with the dominant logic of the field is a strategy
of self-interest separate from the component of self-interest within the logic of
commerce. Drawing from the general organizational theory literature, it is understood
that organizations act in various ways to ensure survival; therefore, strategies aligned
with the dominant logic of a field are a pragmatic method to meet this goal regardless of
the dominant logic order within the field.
Drawing from the case study data, the clearest example of institutional effects on
organizational strategy is seen by comparing Novo Nordisk to Johnson & Johnson. Both
corporations used combative phrasing to describe the company’s central principles but
the direction of the action is different. Johnson & Johnson’s strategy of “winning in
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health care” was directed at expanding the number of health care markets where the
company occupied leadership positions. This strategy is a clear reflection of the logic of
commerce because the competition is between Johnson & Johnson and other health care
corporations for dominance within the market. Conversely, Novo Nordisk’s strategy of
“beating diabetes” framed the competition as occurring between the corporation and the
disease, reflecting the logic of care. Furthermore, while Novo Nordisk occupied a
dominant position within the diabetes treatment market, the company explicitly noted that
meeting the goal of defeating diabetes would require collaboration between stakeholders.
Collaboration between stakeholders to reduce morbidity rates is an opposing strategy
from that of the logic of commerce.
Another key example from these two case studies is the differences in
organizational strategies on corporate philanthropy. While both organizations engaged in
strategic philanthropy, Johnson & Johnson explicitly pursued philanthropic opportunities
to commercialize and expand the company’s brand. For example, Johnson & Johnson
legitimized sponsorship of the 2008 Beijing Olympics pragmatically as a way for the
company to increase awareness in the Asia-Pacific region. On the other hand, Novo
Nordisk legitimized sponsorship of the United Nations World Diabetes Day as spreading
awareness about a specific health concern with brand awareness as a side note. The data
on Johnson & Johnson and Novo Nordisk clearly show distinct dominant organizational
strategies aligned with different logic orders. If these were the only case studies, then it
would be appropriate to change the label of innovator class to commercial focused
companies and modifier class to patient focused companies, but the other two case
studies indicate that the class separation is more complicated.
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Novartis and Sepracor were companies with conflicting internal alignments
between logic orders. It is clear that Novartis is committed to maintaining health care
within a commercial market system, aligning with the logic of commerce. Novartis’
organizational tactics of labeling criticism against the pharmaceutical industry as
scapegoating and arguing against price controls by stating that innovation has a price are
both strategies of cognitive legitimacy supporting the market model of health care. These
statements also imply that Novartis is not acting primarily in a self-interested manner, for
example engaging in price differentiation between markets is framed as following the
rules of the game. This line of reasoning aligns with cognitive legitimacy, meaning that it
is not just profits driving Novartis strategy but a cognitive constraint on seeing health
care organizations as able to operate outside of a market system. On the other hand,
Novartis also engaged in organizational practices for non-commercial reasons that align
with the logic of care.
Novartis had extensive corporate philanthropy programs targeting underserved
populations. While Johnson & Johnson’s strategy demonstrated corporate philanthropy
within the pharmaceutical industry is just as susceptible to self-interested practices as in
other industries (King 2006), it is clear that the Novartis programs were focused on
providing access to medicine rather than expanding brand awareness. This is the root of
the conflict in analyzing the Novartis data for institutional effects. On one hand, Novartis
is upfront about pursuing strategies of profitability because this is the dominant
expectation of the organizational field, but on the other hand, constantly highlighting
non-profit charity work appears to be a tactic designed to counter industry critics by
demonstrating that the company also engages in non-market practices.
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Comparing Novartis with Novo Nordisk provides an alternative explanation for
this conflicting interest. Both companies originate and are incorporated in Europe and
both companies specifically discussed organizational strategies of corporate social
responsibility and environmental sustainability, two topics that were absent in the
Johnson & Johnson and Sepracor reports. What appears as tactics morally legitimizing
practices related to the logic of care could actually be a reflection of different
organizational expectations placed on European companies.
Cheah et al (2007) noted that within a sample of multinational corporations
investor responses to corporate social responsibility varied because corporate social
responsibility was normative in the United Kingdom but not in the United States. This
research indicates that the data on corporate social responsibility and environmental
sustainability practices for the two European companies in my sample may more
accurately be a reflection of cognitive legitimacy based on the organizational
expectations for European businesses. Reviewing the data again suggests that while
Novartis is exceptional within the sample for its extensive access to medicine programs,
some content classified as representative of the logic of care may more correctly align
with the logic of commerce for European companies. Taking in to account all of the other
examples of strategy aligned with the logic of commerce, it is correct to reinterpret
commerce as Novartis’ dominant logic. Novo Nordisk, however, remains aligned with
the logic of care due to the continued dominance of care related strategies after corporate
social responsibility and environmental sustainability practices were recoded.
Sepracor was a complicated company to analyze for another reason. Sepracor
underwent organizational changes not experienced by the other corporations in the study.
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Figure 6.2 shows the financial expense data for the four organizations in the sample.
Sepracor is a clear outlier compared to the other three organizations. Research and
development is the largest expense category during the first three years but then
marketing and administrative expenses becomes the largest cost category. This change
corresponds to the release of Lunesta, which the annual corporate reports note included a
significant increase in sales personnel. In addition to the data in Figure 6.2, Sepracor was
the only company that did not distribute dividends to shareholders. According to the
annual corporate reports, the company policy was to reinvest income in the business and
management did not anticipate ever paying dividends. This financial data reiterates that
Sepracor originated as an organization aligned with the logic of science but this
alignment shifted to the logic of commerce during the research period.
The data show Johnson & Johnson and Novartis both align with the logics of
commerce, which the historical analysis in Chapter 4 shows is the current dominant logic
of the organizational field. Rather than innovators, it seems more appropriate to relabel
this organizational subgroup as the commercialization class. Novo Nordisk and Sepracor,
however, are not aligned with the same institutional logic. There are two possible
explanations for this. First, the small sample size could have prevented a three class
solution in which Novo Nordisk and Sepracor would have been in different classes from
being the best fit. A larger sample size may be able to detect differences within the
modifier class that the current study was unable to identify. The second explanation is
that the modifier organizations do actually have a homogenous organizational strategy in
the sense that while these organizations do not share the same logic, they do align as
organizations pursuing alternative strategies from the dominant logic of the field.
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Figure 6.2 Allocation of Financial Resources between Case Study Organizations

213

Furthermore, Novo Nordisk and Sepracor both apply moral legitimacy tactics as support
for their alternative organizational strategies.
Quirke’s (2013) research showed that rouge organizations can encompass
multiple different organizational strategies deviating from the dominant logic of the field
but all of the schools were oriented towards a common goal of educating students to meet
the demands of living in an industrial economy. Specifically, Quirke noted all of schools
pursued strategies that would lead to college. My data shows a similar effect since neither
Sepracor nor Novo Nordisk deviated from the dominant field goal to develop commercial
pharmaceutical products. Constructing alternate strategies that still meet the dominant
expectations creates the possibility for internal conflict and results in a tenuous
connection with the alternate logic as other stakeholders in the field evaluate the
organization negatively for failing to meet the expectations of the dominant logic (Kraatz
and Block 2008). However, the data indicates that both Sepracor and Novo Nordisk
reduced the potential for conflict over alternative strategies by utilizing tactics of moral
legitimacy to appeal to broader health related social concerns.
For example, in the Sepracor letters, statements about the company’s research
strategy, especially on Lunesta, were legitimized as supporting the broad goal of
increasing scientific knowledge. While research is expected to occur within a
pharmaceutical company, the dominant expectation is that the company is down-stream
working on commercializing the knowledge of scientific researchers rather than upstream generating knowledge (Cockburn 2004, Hess and Rothaermel 2011). Engaging in
basic scientific research would be a deviation to other stakeholders because it is a
misallocation of resources away from commercialization. Sepracor utilized tactics of
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moral legitimacy to support its research strategy by connecting the work to general social
health through claims such as sleep being essential for good health and a productive
society.
Novo Nordisk used statements of moral legitimacy to support organizational
strategies that aligned with the logic of care also by appealing to broad social issues of
health. The goal to defeat diabetes is legitimized explicitly through the size of the
problem as affecting the functioning of society. In 2006, Novo Nordisk stated 10% of the
world’s population had diabetes or the pre-stages of the disease, making it the largest
health challenge of the century with the potential to increase public health spending and
reduce productivity. This legitimizes the organizational strategy of defeating diabetes by
appealing to the broad goal of maintaining a functioning society.
The modifier class then can be viewed as connected through the use of
organizational strategies employing tactics of moral legitimacy to justify alternative
organizational strategies and goals. This indicates that when organizations exist within a
field of institutional pluralism, pursuing strategies that deviate from the dominant
expectations require organizations to justify those practices through moral legitimacy by
appealing to general social expectations outside of the field. Moralizers then is a more
appropriate label than modifiers for this class of organizations.
Returning to the path dependency identified in the structural equation model, the
case studies reveal a division within classes rather than between classes, Figure 6.3.
Novartis and Novo Nordisk had more innovative approvals than alterations to current
treatments while Johnson & Johnson and Sepracor had more alternation approvals than
innovative approvals. These results do not support the expected effect of the path
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dependency observed in the Chapter 5, but the finding supports the re-labeling of the
classes to commercialization and moralizers. At the same time, this data could be an
artifact of the case study selection criteria that constrained the sample to organizations
that received a new molecular entity approval. In summation, this data suggest that the
path dependency is primarily an organizational level effect rather than a field level effect.
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Figure 6.3 Number of Approvals by Type During the Case Study Period
A question that emerged from the case studies is what affect does scope, in terms
of diversity in an organization’s research portfolio, have on the class separation. The
variable for firm size, number of employees, was not significantly different between the
classes but the moralizer organizations in the case study are clearly smaller than the
commercialization class. Furthermore, the letters to shareholders of the moralizers
focused on few products while the commercialization class mentioned multiple products.
Using a Herfindahl index8 to calculate the scope of organizational research in the total

2
The Herfindahl index ( 𝐻 = ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑠𝑖 ) is used to measure market concentration but Arora et al. (2009)
applied it as a measure of portfolio diversification where s is the percentage of a product portfolio
8
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sample revealed that the mean portfolio of the commercialization class was more diverse
than the moralizer class (0.38 to 0.63, p<0.000 in a two tailed t-test).
This finding adds another explanatory layer to the interpretation of the class
separation, and suggests that successfully legitimizing an alternative organizational
model may be dependent on the scope of the organizational portfolio. A focused portfolio
may lend itself to tactics of moral legitimacy precisely because the few products can be
clearly connected to an alternate external social values; Novo Nordisk presented diabetes
as a global problem while Sepracor linked sleep deprivation to general well-being. Using
moral legitimacy to support a diverse range of products requires a large organizational
investment in identifying diverse social values because applying the same value to a
range of products would increase the chance the alternate logic would be perceived as
illegitimate. Conversely, alignment to a dominant logic within a field may lead an
organization to expand its scope because the uncontested legitimacy may provide the
necessary slack for experimentation in new product directions.
In summary, the case studies show qualitative differences in organizational
structure and practices between the classes identified from the latent class analysis. The
quantitative analyses suggested that the class separation was driven by a path dependency
in the research process between pursuing innovative developments compared to seeking
alterations to existing treatments, but the case studies show this differentiation is not an
accurate interpretation. Rather than being the result of differences in research decisions,
the case studies reveal that the differentiation of classes occurs between organizations
that align with the dominant logic of the field and those that pursue alternative logics. Of

composed by i therapeutic categories. Values for H range from 1 to 0 where 1 equals a portfolio with no
diversity.
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particular importance in the distinction between classes is the use of legitimacy tactics,
whereby, organizations not aligned with the dominant logic seek to justify their deviation
by aligning their strategies to a set of broader social values.
6.8 Conclusion
While previous research has shown that institutional logics influence strategy
within an organization (DiMaggio 1990, Powell and Sandholtz 2012), the results of this
study indicate that this effect is attenuated at the field level. Specifically, when
organizations in a field of institutional pluralism have a range of strategy options between
different logic orders, the strongest effect is between strategies that align or deviate from
the dominant logic of the field.
This study applied a finer grain definition of institutional logics in line with the
previous work by Dunn and Jones (2010), Powell and Sandholtz (2012), and Scott et al.
(2000) but the results suggest an alternative conceptualization of institutional logics in
line with Thornton et al. (2012) as an alternative to assess institutional effects on
organizations. Thornton et al.’s (2012) theory predicted a two class solution because the
logics of science and health are not distinct logics but components within the logic of
professions. My findings align with this broader conceptualization of institutional logics;
however, I am hesitant to relabel the moralizers to professionals because the data shows a
clear difference in organizational strategies between the two cases. Furthermore, the
evidence also indicates science and care are distinct logics because they have both been
identified as the dominant logic within in the pharmaceutical field and medicine in
general during different periods (Dunn and Jones 2010).
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The case studies add a richer understanding to the organizational dynamics within
a field subject to institutional pluralism. These four case studies demonstrate that
organizations are both aware of the dominant logic within the field and the other logics
that shape the expectations of other stakeholders. Managerial attention is strategic in
presenting the decisions and actions of corporations as institutionally legitimate. The
findings show that institutional logics are not just internalized through organizational
culture but form the frameworks corporations use for interorganizational actions.
In summation, the case studies demonstrated that managerial attention is
structured by institutional logics. The dominant strategies of Sepracor and Novo Nordisk
were not aligned with the dominant logic of the field, however, both corporations were
aware that the logic of commerce structures the field and strategically supported actions
aligned with alternative logics by appealing to other social goals rather than challenging
the logic of commerce. At the same time, the data from Novartis and Johnson & Johnson
shows these organization were aware that the logics of care and science are evaluation
frameworks for other stakeholders in the field and utilized components of this logics to
discuss certain strategies. In the end, while a corporation may have a dominant logic,
organizational legitimacy under institutional pluralism requires that the company address
components from each logic that dominates key stakeholders.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
7.1 Limitations and Future Directions
Data availability was the most significant limitation in this project. The variables
in the dataset are operationalized as measures of organizational strategy but they do not
represent the complete decision making process that occurs during drug development.
This dataset also lacks information on drugs not approved or submitted to the FDA, so
organizational strategies related to abandoning or discontinuing research are not
analyzed. Finally, the data collected was aggregated at the organizational level that
obscures internal dynamics of organizational practice. These limitations, however, are not
unique to this project but a reality of conducting organizational research because detailed
internal data is rarely publically available, especially the data needed to conduct an
analysis at the field level.
Another limitation is the quality of the data sources themselves. In his recent
work, Rob Kitchin (2014) discussed at length common problems for researchers using
secondary datasets. Related specifically to this project, Kitchin (2014) noted using
secondary data leaves the data management practices unknown to the researcher and
means that the data collection process may not have focused on the information of
interest. I found several errors in the FDA data that led me to suspect that while the
source is presented as archival information, the data management practices are
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inconsistent with this goal. The errors I found were incorrectly coded application
companies. For example, the FDA listed Pfizer as the application company granted
approval for Torisel on May 30, 2007 but the application for Torisel was actually
submitted by Wyeth Pharmaceuticals. Pfizer acquired Wyeth Pharmaceuticals in 2009 at
which point the sales and the intellectual property rights for Torisel transferred to Pfizer.
This example suggests the FDA database is managed to identify the current manufacturer
rather than the original manufacturer even though the description of the variable indicates
otherwise. If this is the case, it would explain the declining rate of matching in the
sample. However, while this a problem, it is not a problem unique to this study, and any
research using the FDA database will be similarly biased.
The sampling criteria for constructing the quantitative dataset excluded
companies that received less than five FDA approvals, which biases the data towards
larger and established companies and creates the potential for selection bias. This is an
important limitation to consider for interpreting the results because companies that
challenge the dominant logic within an organizational field may have different outcomes
than companies accepting the dominant logic but pursing strategies aligned with an
alternate logic. Based on the data analyzed here, the pharmaceutical field in the United
States is an organizational field where institutional pluralism exists and the dominant
logic is unchallenged; both of the companies in the moralizer class demonstrated support
for the pharmaceutical industry as a commercial industry.
However, this could be a misinterpretation of institutional effects if the reason
excluded companies failed to reach the minimum of five approvals was that they
challenged the commercialization of the field. A direction for future research would be to
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assess this possibility by shortening the period for collecting data to gather exhaustive
data on all of the companies that received FDA approvals. This way companies that only
received a few approvals would be included in the analysis and could be assed for
organizational strategies that challenge the dominant logic of the field. If further research
concludes that no challengers exist in the field, this would suggest a field of sustained
institutional pluralism might only be possible when the organizational practice is
institutionalized. Specifically, the pharmaceutical regime might allow organizations to
pursue alternative strategies because the practice of pharmaceutical development is not
contested whereas in organizational fields with contested practices, institutional pluralism
might only exist during periods of field negotiation.
The sparseness of the data limited the possibilities for the use of longitudinal
analysis techniques. Longitudinal data allows for latent transition analysis and provides a
richer interpretation of classes based on the prevalence of class switching (Collins and
Lanza 2012). While there is no universally accepted sample size for a latent transition
analysis, Collins and Lanza do not recommend researchers attempt the analysis with
sample sizes smaller than 300. My sample size of 59 organizations is well below the
recommended limit, making it methodologically questionable to conduct a latent
transition analysis.
My original intent for selecting the cases studies was to use the experience of a
product-harm crisis as the selection criteria. A product-harm crisis9 creates a situation
where stakeholder interaction related to diverging interests become more visible because

9

A product-harm crisis occurs following the revelation that a consumer good has a detrimental effect on
consumers after its release on the general market. Product-harm crises are not isolated to the
pharmaceutical industry but occur in many industries (Chen et al 2007, Cleeren et al. 2013).
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the situation is a direct challenge to product legitimacy and organizational reactions to
this challenge should identify the dominant organizational strategy (Cheah et al. 2007).
Based on previous research the expectations during a product-harm crisis are that
pharmaceutical corporations act to counter the negative claims and perceptions of other
stakeholders using a variety of organizational tactics to protect the established validity of
a product in the face of contradictions from new data (Abraham 1995, Applbaum 2010).
The most visible product-harm crises lead to the withdrawal of a drug from the market
making it an ideal selection criterion because the entire product lifecycle would be
observed. However, none of the drugs withdrawn from the market during the study
period came from organizations in the modification class so new molecular entity
approval was selected as the alternate criterion.
A strength of this project is that the quantitative analyses provide a clear,
empirical boundary for different organizational categories. The latent class analysis
placed each organization in one, and only one, class. However, the quantitative methods
are limited in capturing institutional logics by the data available and how organizational
processes are reduced to measurable variables. A direction for future research to address
this limitation is to increase the robustness of the dataset by including more information.
Based on the literature review variables measuring in and out-licensing, research and
financial alliances, percentage of income devoted to philanthropy, and occupational
composition of employees would me valuable measure to include in the quantitative
dataset. The case study analysis could also be expanded by including articles by
unaffiliated medical professionals in response to the approval of new drugs and through
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analyzing organizational material directed at potential patients, such as advertisements
and awareness campaigns.
7.2 Conclusion
The United States pharmaceutical industry is a dynamic organizational system
populated by organizations pursuing different strategies to reach different goals. This
project explored the broader organizational field of the pharmaceutical industry to
determine if distinctive categories of pharmaceutical organizations existed by analyzing
data for latent constructs identifying differences in organizational strategy. The data
revealed two categories of organizations: commercialization firms and moralizers. The
larger group, commercialization firms, contained organizations pursuing strategies
aligned with the dominant logic of the field while moralizers were organizations pursing
strategies aligned with different logic orders but connected through the use of moral
legitimacy tactics to support deviant strategy.
This project contributes to the organizational studies literature through a novel
approach to mixed-methods analysis for addressing the challenge institutional theorists’
face in measuring institutional effects. Rather than deriving institutional effects through
qualitative techniques, this study applied latent class analysis to identity subgroups and
then used content analysis to assess those subgroups for components of institutional
orders. This project faced many of the challenges previous researchers have encountered
when analyzing institutional effects but triangulation through quantitative and qualitative
methods provided data that demonstrates institutional effects on organizational strategy.
While the generalizability of the findings is limited, this project shows sustained
institutional pluralism is possible within an established organizational field. The need to
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address differing stakeholder expectations complicate identifying an organizations
dominant logic, but analyzing multiple sources revealed coherent organizational
strategies aligned with defined institutional logic orders. The findings show that the effect
of specific institutional logics is attenuated at the field level. Specifically, that direct field
level institutional effects on organizational strategy occur as a pressure to align with the
dominant logic of the field or to justify alternative strategies aligned with other logics
through appeals to broader social concerns interconnected to the field.
However, the central conclusion of this project rest on the assumption that each
organization has a dominant logic (Bettis and Prahalad 1995). This perspective is not the
only argument on the outcome of institutional pluralism. The hybrid organization model
offers an alternative explanation on how organizations handle competing logic orders
(Battilana and Dorado 2010, Pache and Santos 2013). Hybrid organizations selectively
couple with components from multiple logic orders that are present in the field but resist
domination by a single logic. This process allows these organizations to address the
contradictory demands of multiple stakeholders without decoupling practice from identity
(Westphal and Zajac 2001) or compromising (Oliver 1991).
The case studies provide evidence supporting the existence of hybrid
organizations within the pharmaceutical industry. While Johnson & Johnson and Novo
Nordisk both portrayed organizations aligned clearly with a single logic order, Novartis
and Sepracor presented organizational strategies entangled between logics. Following the
propositions of this project, I empirically determined a dominant logic in both
originations but I am not convinced that this model is the best explanation for these
organizations. It is unlikely that all organizations in a sustained field of institutional
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pluralism would have practices aligned with a single logic because sustained pluralism
requires addressing competing legitimate alternative logics, but this does not mean that
hybrid organizations could not coexists in a field where some organizations clearly align
to a singular logic. However, the fact that Novartis and Sepracor belonged to different
classes suggest that the effect of adopting a hybrid strategy has less impact than the
division between the dominant field logic and alternatives.
This study provides several useful pieces of information for managers. First, the
findings of the structural equation model challenge the existing advice on the value of
developing alterations to current treatments. While the development of mediating drugs
may shorten the timeframe for the development of innovative products, the path
dependency found in the structural equation model indicates that managers need to be
cautious in expecting that the spillover effect from mediating drugs will be realized
internally. The findings from the case studies show that organizations can pursue
strategies that deviate from the dominant logic within a field; however, managers need to
legitimize this deviation by aligning with an alternative logic rather than challenge the
dominant logic.
In summation, institutional logics affect organizational strategy by providing the
templates for organizational practice and shaping the process of interorganizational
negotiation. My findings show that pharmaceutical corporations in the United States
adhere to two research path structures of defined as either innovation or alteration. At the
same time, these corporations negotiate the competing demands of multiple stakeholders
by either aligning with the dominant field logic or morally legitimizing their deviation
through an alternate logic order.
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APPENDIX A
POISSON MODEL TEST OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT VARIABLES

Variable
Foreign
Return on Assets
Firm Size
Non-Pharmaceutical SIC Code
Number of Priority Review
Approvals
Number of Orphan Drug
Approvals
Marketing and Administrative
Expense Rate
Operational Costs Rate
Merger and Acquisition Approval
Rate
Subsidiary Approval Rate
PDUFA Period (1997-2001

New Molecular Entity Approvals
II
III
1.16
1.10
1.01
1.01
0.96
0.99
1.09
1.01

I
1.16
1.01
0.96
1.10

1.26 ***

1.26 ***

1.25 **

1.29 *

1.29 *

1.24

0.96

1.03

0.98

0.38

0.48

0.34

0.79

0.83

0.53

0.92

0.93

0.84

0.93
1.01
1.45

0.92
0.99
1.40

1.01 *
1.11
1.63

comparison period)

2002-2006
2007-2011
2012-2014
R&D Expenses Rate
2 Year lagged R&D Expenses
Rate
3 Year lagged R&D Expenses
Rate

1.31
2.77
1.38

-389.11 ***
-388.15 ***
-345.85 **
Log likelihood
0.0463
0.0486
0.0442
Pseudo R2
Observations
437.00
437.00
398.00
notes: incidence rate ratios reported, total number of submissions used as exposure factor,
*=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001
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APPENDIX B
POISSON MODEL TEST OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT VARIABLES

Variable
Foreign
Return on Assets
Firm Size
Non-Pharmaceutical SIC Code
Number of Priority Review
Approvals
Number of Orphan Drug
Approvals
Marketing and Administrative
Expense Rate
Operational Costs Rate
Merger and Acquisition
Approval Rate
Subsidiary Approval Rate
PDUFA Period (1997-2001

Biologic License Application Approvals
I
II
III
1.01
0.97
0.95
0.98
0.99
0.99
1.77 **
1.65 **
1.58 **
2.88 *
2.66 *
2.66 *
0.55 *

0.58 *

0.56 *

1.16

1.06

1.10

0.39

0.07

0.08

0.02 *

0.00 **

0.00 **

0.40

0.30

0.39

1.19

1.19

1.24

1.67
1.80
4.02 **

1.67
1.86
3.97 **

1.26
1.35
2.66

comparison period)

2002-2006
2007-2011
2012-2014
R&D Expenses Rate
2 Year lagged R&D Expenses
Rate
3 Year lagged R&D Expenses
Rate

259.17 **
42.48 **
65.29 **

-144.88 ***
-145.44 ***
-142.98 ***
Log likelihood
0.1600
0.1568
0.1455
Pseudo R2
Observations
437.00
437.00
398.00
notes: incidence rate ratios reported, total number of submissions used as exposure factor,
*=p<.05, **=p<.01, ***=p<.001
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